# Security K

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#### Attempts to resolve insecurity inevitably fail and creates violent cycles pursuing security – the elimination of one threat necessitates the production of other threats to manage generalized anxiety

Eberle and Daniel, 2022

(Jakub, Research Director at the Institute of International Relations Prague, and Jan, researcher and the Head of the Centre for the Study of Global Regions at the Institute of International Relations Prague, “Anxiety geopolitics: Hybrid warfare, civilisational geopolitics, and the Janus-faced politics of anxiety,” Political Geography, Vol. 92, January 2022, Article 102502, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102502, accessed 6/30/2022, ZW)

On the other hand, however, the Lacanian take allows us to account also for the politics that is imminent in the failure of these anxiety-managing attempts. As we have argued, all narratives built around particular objects of fear, including geopolitical ones, are eventually failing, as these objects are ultimately ‘false targets’. They are merely temporary discursive vessels functioning as placeholders for expressing deeper ontological anxiety, which is bound to strike back. Consequently, attempts to make societies (feel) more secure, habitually end up making them (feel) equally, or even more, insecure and anxious, regardless of how much effort is invested into fighting this or that particular threat. As Heath-Kelly (2015, 2018) and Jacobsen (2020) have shown, successful security discourses like counter-terrorism or cybersecurity have actually managed to internalise this ‘failure to secure’ (Heath-Kelly, 2015) by incorporating it into their very structure. According to them, counter-terrorism and cybersecurity are constructed as dangers so slippery and multifaceted that once we resolve one problem (by killing Osama bin Laden, resolving a particular cyberthreat), a whole new range of terrorist groups or cyber issues emerges to occupy their place.

Consequently, and in contrast to conventional ontological security literature, politics of anxiety is not only about managing and repressing it through narratives, routines and relationships. It is also about other ways of manipulating anxiety for political purposes, including reproducing, nurturing and spreading it via the construction of threats so opaque and widespread that they cannot be possibly resolved, like terrorism, cybersecurity – or hybrid warfare. By its repeated failure to secure, such discourses hold societies in the anxious ‘state of constant and heightened alertness’ (Davies, 2019, p. xii), making them ready to accept a range of pre-emptive security measures across all possible areas of social life.

Bringing the argument together, by the notion of anxiety geopolitics we conceptualise the politics of dealing with anxiety by linking it to objects and issues spatialised through the means of geopolitical imaginations. By references to geographical categories, such as states, regions, continents or civilisations, this type of affective geopolitics promises to transform the amorphous and ambiguous anxiety stemming from range of different issues into tangible and manageable objects of fear taking the form of geopolitical threats. Yet, as all such narratives and images are ultimately bound to fail to resolve the underlying anxiety, the analytical focus must be extended also to how these failures are accounted for and how anxiety is being further reproduced with the help of geopolitical imaginations. Therefore, anxiety geopolitics is ultimately about the oscillation between repressing anxiety through the geopoliticisation of both the ‘threat’ and the self, as much as it is about dealing with the recurring failures to secure the subjects produced by such geopoliticisation, which result in reproduction of social anxiety.

#### The alternative is to reject the 1AC’s securitized representations – threat construction is only possible in a world of discursive repetition – voting negative endorses a discursive model that does not endorse securitization as a model of understanding the world

Van Rythoven 14 (Eric Van Rythoven, PhD candidate at Carleton University studying emotion, securitization, and world politics, E-international Relations, December 21, <https://www.e-ir.info/2014/12/21/emotion-and-dystopian-idealism-in-security-studies/>) SW

The recent forum on emotions and world politics in the journal International Theory is a welcome development for the field of International Relations. The contributors helpfully remind us that emotions research in IR remains hampered by a number of deeply embedded assumptions, such as the belief that emotions are only private and personal phenomena, or the belief there is a sharp dichotomy between emotion and rationality. Critically assessing these assumptions is important not only because it highlights what the discipline gets ‘wrong’ in its picture of world politics, but because it illuminates how current theories help to propagate such distortions.

In this brief intervention I focus on an additional assumption concerning emotion, one which permeates the subfield of security studies.  Here I am referring to the widely shared belief in the ubiquity of fear in the politics of security.  While this association is historically rooted in Hobbesian accounts of anarchy it has a distinct contemporary form.  Fear, we are told by a variety of figures, permeates the politics of security and is consistently and successfully marshalled by political elites, security professionals, and bureaucrats to sustain new images of threat which lead to an ever broadening security agenda.  Fear, whether over predatory great powers, immigrant minorities, or infectious diseases, facilitates securitization.  As a latent social resource collective fears always appear to be waiting patiently in the margins of discourse until they are easily and unproblematically deployed in a security argument.

These kinds of arguments radically underplay the fragility and contingency of political fears.  As forms of collective embodied judgment political fears are produced and sustained only through social interactions.  As I have argued elsewhere the memories, traumas, practices, rituals, symbols, and other cultural resources which sustain political fears are always open to contestation and destabilization (Van Rythoven, forthcoming).  Yet in security studies the logic of fear as a relatively settled and stable substance which can be drawn upon to serve narrow, instrumental purposes enjoys wide appeal.  The consequence is a particular form of dystopian theory, a distorting idealism which ignores both the empirical fragility of fears, as well as the often dispersed power struggles which shape this emotion in a multitude of differing ways.

To appreciate the breadth of this assumption in the field it is useful to begin by looking at two highly disparate figures: Stephen Walt and Didier Bigo.  Walt has become the essential flag bearer for a conventional neorealism that continues to define the mainstream of security studies in America.  Bigo’s contribution to the so-called ‘Paris School’ has made him a central figure in critical security studies which has grown exponentially outside of the heartland of American IR ([CASE, 2006](http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/37/4/443.short)).  While both hold sharply divergent understandings of security, method, and the purposes of its study they are surprisingly similar in their view of the relationship between fear and threat construction.  Nowhere is this more evident than in the close resemblance between their respective figures of the ‘threat monger’ and ‘the manager of unease’.

The figure of the threat monger is most evident in Walt’s contemporary work, especially his popular writings for [Foreign Policy](http://foreignpolicy.com/author/stephen-walt/).  Here the concern is not with the international system, anarchy, the balance of power, nor any other of the concepts normally associated with neorealist theory.  Instead the most pressing issue is the persistent and pernicious practice of threat inflation.  The dangers facing the national security apparatus in western states are vastly overblown.  Everything from the safety of the Olympics, to the danger of international terrorism, to the neologism of cyber security, to the threat of global warming are vastly blown out of proportion, especially relative to the traditional danger of interstate conflict (Walt, [2012](http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/13/what-terrorist-threat/#.UClvYIJhDFA.twitter), [2010](http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/03/30/is-the-cyber-threat-overblown/), [2009b](http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/08/10/national-security-heats-up/)).  Instead of objectively discerning national security demands from the material distribution of power, the United States’ security agenda has become bloated with a host of inflated threats.  In Walt’s view “[o]ne reason Americans exaggerate security fears is the existence of an extensive cottage industry of professional threatmongers, who deploy a well-honed array of arguments to convince us that we are in fact in grave danger” ([2009a](http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/05/04/the-threatmongers-handbook/)).  Through a variety of argumentative techniques threat mongers are able to engender fear in the American public over the threat of some dangerous ‘other’.  Such “tried-and-true methods do not work all of the time, of course, but they are undeniably effective” (Ibid).  Here fear receives little scrutiny.  It is simply a latent social resource activated by the discursive performance of the monger which helps wins audience approval.

Bigo’s ([2002](http://alt.sagepub.com/content/27/1_suppl/63.extract):66) examination of the security profession, “with its ethos of secrecy and concern for the management of fear or unease”, bears more than a passing resemblance to Walt’s threat monger.  His concern with those who work in the professional field of security, spanning from government bureaucracies, police, intelligence agencies, militaries, and their private partners, comes as a reaction to [earlier approaches](https://books.google.ca/books?id=j4BGr-Elsp8C&printsec=frontcover&dq=security+a+new+framework+for+analysis&hl=en&sa=X&ei=XtuRVMHnOYv9yQSi3oCABQ&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=security%20a%20new%20framework%20for%20analysis&f=false) narrowly focused on highly publicized security speech acts.  The social production of danger, Bigo argues, is in part sustained by the “sense of the routines, the day-to-day practices, of the bureaucracies” who produces both insecurity over policy fields like migration and the techniques of governance to respond (Ibid, 73).  Like Walt’s monger however, this task is only made possible through the deft generation and management of fear.  Security professionals partake in a broader discursive formation where “the word immigration becomes a term for catalyzing fears or misgivings about the economic, social, and political development of Western countries. It becomes a fixer of frights and confusions about national cultural identities as well as of weaknesses of solidarity mechanisms” (Ibid, 79 emphasis original).  It is through this capacity to affix specific frights to distinct programs of governance, especially through institutionalized routines, that the securitization of issues like migration is possible.

The differences between Walt and Bigo cannot be underplayed.  For Walt the polemical description of the monger is necessary because these actors recklessly inflate threats above and beyond what is objectively reasonable based upon the current international environment.  Bigo rejects the very framing of threat inflation as it presupposes some mythical baseline from which ‘true’ assessments of threat can be discerned.  Security issues in this view are always historically situated reflections of particular interests and modes of governance.

Yet this deep philosophical divide over threat construction is what makes the convergence between the figure of the threat monger and the manager of unease all the more striking.  Both Walt and Bigo envisage a collection of actors whom, with predictable and institutionalized regularity, engage in a series of discursive moves which couple latent fears with a distinct security agenda.  These fears, which never seem to be in short supply, are amplified, managed, and molded to the instrumental purposes of these actors.  Both present an array of techniques, such as the creation of categories of identity, which can be used to circulate fear, or as Walt pithily puts it “[h]ow to scare your fellow citizens for fun and profit” (2009a).  Though the nuances surrounding these figures differ when it comes to their central role in leveraging fear to produce a collectively shared image of threat they are the same.  The manager of unease is the threat monger and vice versa.

This is a permissive view of threat construction.  Practices of securitization are not simply relatively frequent occurrences, they also achieve a high rate of success.  In the strongest form of this view the deliberative, rule-driven, liberal order of world politics is constantly abridged by the emergency politics of security.  This distinctly dystopian view is sustained by both the assumed ubiquity of fear and its unproblematic instrumentalization.

The concept of dystopia employed here is best understood through its resemblance to earlier critiques of utopianism in IR.  These began with E.H. Carr’s Twenty Years Crisis in which he chastises interwar liberals for a utopian view which grossly exaggerated the ease and possibility of international peace.  More recently Samuel Barkin has revived the concept in his critique of contemporary American constructivism whose progressive view of the spread of humanitarian and democratic norms is eerily reminiscent of Carr’s utopian liberals ([2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1046/j.1079-1760.2003.00503002.x/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false):332-336).  The utopian label functions as a shorthand for highlighting two fundamental defects in thinking about world politics.  The first is empirical.  For Barkin the norms that are the locus of liberal constructivism “are accepted largely uncritically as good ones, as are the elements of international civil society involved in spreading these norms” (Ibid, 335).  There is little empirical interest in ‘bad’ norms or what might be considered malignant forms of international civil society.  Carr explicitly positions empirical ‘reality’ as the opposite to utopianism with the latter being “the product of not analysis, but of aspiration” ([2001[1981]](https://books.google.ca/books?id=Gbz_EsWbioUC&dq=twenty+years+crisis&hl=en&sa=X&ei=BOWRVPu4E6yxsATrkIKIDA&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAA):7).  The second feature of this critique concerns the absence of power.  On this point Barkin repeats familiar criticisms of liberal norms-centered research: that it fails to consider why certain norms spread and others don’t, or why some norms are actively resisted (2003:335).  Carr argues the “[f]ailure to recognize that power is an essential element of politics has hitherto vitiated all attempts to establish international forms of government” (2001[1981]:100).

While utopia and reality are often presented as opposing mirror images–especially by Carr–this ignores how political idealism comes in different forms.  Dystopianism is a form of political idealism but instead of exaggerating the prospect of liberal progressiveness it exaggerates illiberal regression.  Security studies has become dystopian insofar as it has come to fetishize the illiberal character of emergency politics.  While utopianism envisions few substantive limits to the expansion of liberal order, the dystopianism of security studies sees few limits on the expansion of the concept of security.  Walt’s threat monger and Bigo’s manager of unease face no limits on invoking emergency politics because of their unparalleled ability to instrumentalize fear.

Yet because this position is fundamentally idealist it is also subject to the same lines of critique as liberal idealism.  Empirically there is a wealth of evidence (and common sense) to suggest collective fears are fragile, fugitive, and fickle phenomenon rather than the stable, steady, and settled social resources which can be reliably deployed in a security argument.  Wendy Pearlman’s rich ethnographic account of the Arab Spring for example, is centered precisely on the breakdown of collective fears over violent reprisal from authoritarian governments.  Analogous to the figures discussed above, authoritarian “[p]owerholders [in the Middle East] wielded fear as a tool for survival, enforcing it with security apparatuses and state discourses that warned that the alternative to the regime was chaos or Islamic radicalism” ([Pearlman, 2013](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8923772&fileId=S1537592713001072):393).  Pearlman’s account of revolution in Tunisia and Egypt is peppered with references to the overcoming or breaking down of fear, something captured in the popular expression “inkasar hajez al-khawf” meaning “The barrier of fear has broken” (Ibid, 388).

Even in instances where a broadly-based collective fear does emerge it may lack the historical durability to sustain any lasting vision of emergency politics.  Anxiety within in western countries over the spread of Ebola from West Africa reached a fevered pitch in the Fall of 2014.  When asked in October 65% of Americans said they were concerned about the possibility of a nationwide epidemic ([Washington Post-ABC News Poll, 2014](http://www.washingtonpost.com/page/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2014/10/14/National-Politics/Polling/release_366.xml)).  Citing Ebola as “a potential threat to global security” the Obama administration deployed 3,000 military personnel to West Africa ([Mason and Harding Giahyue, 2014](http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/16/us-health-ebola-obama-idUSKBN0HB08S20140916)).  Yet by November declining media coverage, eroding public interest, and empty congressional meetings suggested popular anxieties over the disease had largely evaporated ([Koren, 2014](http://www.nationaljournal.com/health-care/have-americans-stopped-caring-about-ebola-20141113); [Ferris, 2014](http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/224758-as-ebola-attention-fades-lawmakers-beg-for-spotlight)).  By December the Obama administration was left struggling to revitalize anxieties over Ebola to sustain a security response.  In a plea for a further a further $6 billion of emergency funding to maintain the response Obama urged that the crisis “can’t get caught up in normal politics” ([Hughes, 2014](http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/obama-presses-congress-on-ebola-funding/article/2556874)).

The fact that political actors so often struggle and strain to preserve the underlying sense of anxiety and crisis surrounding a security issue points to a precarious set of power relations surrounding emotions.  To be clear, scholars like Walt and Bigo offer very rich conceptions of power within their research.  Walt’s neorealism carries an explicit view of material state power even if this view is difficult to square with his popular writings focused on security discourses.  Bigo offers a much richer conceptualization of power which draws on both the constitutive force of speech acts as well as the positional authority of the security profession (2002:73-74).  While these forms of power are important they do not necessarily shape collective emotions which can be situated in a much more dispersed sets of cultural practices. Consider, for example, Stephen Hawking’s recent claim that the emergence of artificial intelligence could threaten humanity.  This claim likely resonated well in societies such as the United States where films and texts in popular culture have long envisioned autonomous robots as dangerous ([Brasor, 2014](http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/12/06/national/media-national/cultural-differences-shade-reactions-robots/#.VImzsTHF-Sq)).  Contrast this with how “Japan’s tendency to imbue machines with sentient qualities reflects certain native religious precepts” (Ibid).  Machines which may be culturally identified as objects of fear in one society may be objects of comfort, sentimentality, and even happiness in another.  In certain cases pre-existing cultural practices may sharply circumscribe the power of authoritative speech to generate collective fears.

Characterizing security studies as dystopian for its disregard of the power relations and empirics surrounding emotions may seem questionable.  Such accusations of idealism often come to be understood as a form of insult (Barkin, 2003:332).  Yet given how these views of fear have such broad and longstanding status within security studies a provocation, in a sense, is necessary.  There is however, an additional value to this framing of dystopia.  If any prolonged scrutiny of emotions finds the dystopian view of security studies to be unsustainable, then it raises questions over what kinds of worlds do collective emotions in world politics actually contribute to?  The answers to this question are bound to be more complex than simplistic utopias or dystopias, but they also promise to be far more interesting.

## Link

### AI – Tech Race – China

#### The 1AC’s threat perceptions of China’s AI advantage are informed by vague intelligence and exaggerated threat assessments – that produces a US-China security spiral, turning case by making conflict more likely

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China’s expansion of national interests which followed by its military modernization alarms the other side of the Pacific. An observation on U.S. official documents reveals how U.S. is alarmed with rapid military modernization of China. 10 As early as 2006, U.S. has been aware that China, among other countries, has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the U.S. In terms of military technology, U.S. is also aware that the gap with China is closing and unless U.S. could formulate counter strategies, its military advantages would soon be offset (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006, p. 29). The tone of anxiety about China’s military modernization has not much changed years afterwards. In latest edition of Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2014, p. 6), it is stated that “In the coming years, countries such as China will continue seeking to counter U.S. strengths using anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) approaches and by employing other new cyber and space control technologies. Similar notion is found in 2012 Department of Defense’s document of strategic guidance in which stated that “States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities” (Panneta & Obama, 2012). From these publications we can also get a sense on how it is very difficult, if not entirely impossible, for states to acquire complete information regarding their adversaries’ current and future intentions. This problem is worse in the case of China whose authoritarian government is not really familiar with the idea of transparency. Thus, U.S. seems to have no other choice than just equate China’s increasing military capabilities with unfriendly intentions. In Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006, it is stated that “… the United States, its allies and partners must also hedge against the possibility that a major or emerging power could choose a hostile path in the future (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006, p. 28).” It does not require a rocket science to identify the region where there is an emerging power as well as a number of U.S. allies. In Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, it is stated that “… the rapid pace and comprehensive scope of China’s military modernization continues, combined with a relative lack of transparency and openness from China’s leaders regarding both military capabilities and intentions (U.S. Department of Defense, 2014).” The general observations on some publications of U.S. government reveals how U.S. feels, at the very least, alarmed by the rapid military modernization of China. Once this hostile image attached, China’s further military modernization is regarded as a proof to that hostile image. This can be shown, for example, on how U.S. dubs China as developing what it calls as Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities which can be used, and believed is going to be used, to deter and counter U.S. involvement in the events of conflict in China’s Global Jurnal Politik Internasional 18(2) 125 periphery. Applying our theoretical framework of “spiral model,” this stage can be regarded as one when U.S. applying the first logic of overestimating the hostility of its rival, in this case, China. Feeling threatened by the perceived-as-hostile strategic behaviour of China, U.S. starts to respond. In the midst of economic struggle and defence budget cut, U.S. tries to check the rise of China mainly through what it calls as “rebalancing” strategy which involves an intensification of alliances and basing strategies. The strategy covers U.S. basing in Darwin and Guam, the provision of advanced naval weapon systems such Patriot missiles and Aegis system to its alliances, and also diplomatic and economic initiatives such as Trans-Pacific Partnership which exclude China. Hillary Clinton’s “America’s Pacific Century,” (2011) one of the earliest record that lie down U.S. strategic pivot to Asia-Pacific, provides the stated rationale behind the strategy which is to uphold U.S. leadership commitment in the key driver area of current global politics. Interesting to note here how Clinton frames that U.S. rebalancing is not desired by U.S. only, but also by the region itself, hence justifying U.S. continuing presence. Another important note is how U.S. seems to truly believe that it has been a Pacific state. This statement can be regarded as a way U.S. tries to frame that its presence expansion in Asia-Pacific is for benign purposes. U.S. “rebalancing” strategy, which was initially intended to preserve stability in the region, turns out generate the very opposite outcome. China considers U.S., with its “rebalancing” strategy as a revisionist power that seeks to curtail China’s political influence and harms China’s interests; as China rises, the U.S. will resist (Nathan & Scobell, 2012). This view appears to be much influenced by China’s understanding of U.S., as well as China’s view of the international system and how to behave in such system.11 The sense of China being threatened by U.S. strategic behaviour can also be found in China’s official documents. In 2008 edition of China’s National Defense (2009), U.S. military deployment realignment and its strengthened military alliances with countries like Japan are regarded as influencing the complexity of the regional security environment. That U.S. continues to sell advanced weapons systems to Taiwan is also regarded as an infringement to the “one China” policy and U.S.-China joint communiqes. These two issues have been persistently raised afterwards (China's National Defense in 2010, 2011). 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue perhaps is the perfect evidence that shows how China is feeling threatened by U.S. strategic behaviour in Asia-Pacific, and vice versa. Muhamad Arif 126 Responding to U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel that criticized China for its “destabilizing, unilateral actions” particularly in the South China Sea, Lieutenant General Wang Guanzhong, the Chinese military’s deputy chief of general staff said that Hagel’s speech was designed to “create trouble and make provocations” (Han, Barnes, & Page, 2014). Lt. Gen. Wang continued by saying that Hagel’s speech was “full of hegemony, full of words of threat and intimidation,” and part of “a provocative challenge against China.” This speech was then backed by another Chinese official, Major General Zhu Chenghu, who said in an interview, “If you take China as an enemy, China will absolutely become the enemy of the U.S. (Han, Barnes, & Page, 2014).” From this exchanges of strong words by high ranking officials from both China and U.S, we can get a sense of antagonistic, even hostility, in the relations between the two. The sense of being threatened by U.S.’ “rebalancing” strategy leads China to intensify its military modernization. China continues to increase its defence expenditures, until today. Moreover, China intensifies the development of advanced weapons systems that provide it with capability to neutralize U.S. force in the Pacific. These capabilities, which U.S. calls as A2/AD capabilities –which in itself is U.S.’ overestimation of China’s hostility- ranges from fifth-generation fighter aircrafts, advanced intermediate and medium-range conventional ballistic missiles, long-range land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, counter-space weapons to offensive cyber capabilities. And as the “spiral model” postulates, U.S. has been investing considerable amount of resources to develop strategy to counter China’s counter-strategy against U.S. presence in Asia-Pacific. In other words, the conflict between U.S. and China is spiralling.

#### Global competition between the US and China regarding AI accelerates the process of securitization

Lindh 22 (Marcus Lindh, Two-year Political Science MA programme in Global Politics and Societal Change Dept. of Global Political Studies. “The Geopolitics of Artificial Intelligence: A Comparative Policy Analysis of French and Chinese Artificial Intelligence Policy Discourse”. Malmo University Political Science Master’s Thesis. Spring 2022. https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1663057/FULLTEXT01.pdf)

Through looking at previous research conducted on the geopolitics of AI it was found that it is quite limited. As AI is still quite a nascent area of study specifically relating to fields such as global politics, not much research has been conducted so far. As a result, there exists significant gaps within the research wherein this study can fit in, particularly in studying and comparing specific countries and their geopolitical polices in relation to AI. Moreover, the use of the theoretical frameworks of realism and liberalism, as well as the WPR methodology, have not been used to study AI and its geopolitical aspects, all of which this study will apply. 3.2. Chinese Artificial Intelligence Policy As discussed in the preceding section, within the study of Artificial Intelligence there is a significant focus on China and its AI policies. China is one of the countries that has come the furthest in regard to not only implementing artificial intelligence technologies in various areas but also in developing AI strategies and governance surrounding its implementation and impact both domestically and internationally. As a result of this, much research has been done on China and its approach towards AI and AI policy. Within the research that has been done on the Chinese AI approach, little attention has been placed on specifically studying the geopolitical aspect of Chinese AI policy. One of the few studies conducted on AI in China from a more geopolitical viewpoint is the article mentioned in the previous section on the securitization of Artificial Intelligence in China by Zeng (2021). In this article, Zeng applies securitization as the analytical framework in order to study how AI is becoming a security matter within Chinese AI discourse and being tied to its national security. Zeng (ibid) further argues that the Chinese AI discourse being linked to securitization is a result of it being embedded within the historical, geopolitical and domestic Chinese contexts. Specifically, the context of the “century of humiliation” and its historical failures in competing technologically with other countries. Moreover, Zeng (ibid, pp. 418-420) states that China’s securitization of AI is fueled by its geopolitical competition with the US wherein the perception of each other’s AI capabilities and advancements accelerate the process of securitization. This understanding of Chinese AI policy is shared by Alexander (2021). In his article on the 9 geopolitical implication of China’s AI development Alexander (ibid) agrees that global competition is a major driver in China’s approach to its national AI policy. He argues that Chinas national policies concerning AI are a response to external factors particularly those of security as well as competition in economics and AI development. Moreover, that through their AI policy, China is attempting to create a distinct path in the geopolitical system and become a new model for development globally. This is a point that is also shared by Zeng (2021, pp. 418-420) who states that the key objective of Chinese AI policy and development is to become a global leader in AI. Even though there exist significant research on Chinas AI policy and some in connection to geopolitics, most of it is solely focused on the national context of China. If a comparison is made within the research it is exclusively made with the United States. Moreover, as with the research on the geopolitics of AI, none of the research conducted on China utilizes the theoretical frameworks of Realism or Liberalism to analyze the Chinese approach to AI policy.

#### Their securitization of China’s AI development produces insecurity – AI tech race framing creates a security dilemma

Abb 20 (Dr. Pascal Abb, senior researcher at PRIF, 09/3/2021, “Fraying Ties: The Securitization of the US-China Relationship”, PRIF Spotlight, https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk\_publikationen/Spotlight1120.pdf) //KL

This trend has played out most prominently in techno- logy and innovation, where since 2015, China has followed an ambitious plan to become a world leader in key technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, telecommunications and next-generation computing. This policy quickly became a bone of contention with the US and other developed countries. The main concerns were that unfair advantages enjoyed by Chinese tech companies – state subsidies, forced intellectual property transfer, denial of market access to foreign competitors in China, and even industrial espionage – would, if left unchecked, eventually allow them to dominate these fields. Due to the dual-use potential of such technologies in military as well as civilian applications, US policy- makers have increasingly viewed this competition through a national security lens.2 This has been an especially big concern under the Trump administration, which made it a strategic priority to shore up a domestic manufacturing base and increasingly identified “economic security” as a fundamental building block of national security. This view can be found in the most recent US National Security Strategy (NSS) the physical separation of network infrastructure, the banning of platforms outside of Chinese control, and widespread censorship and manipulation of the remaining content.10 However, the previous principled opposition of the US to such moves and its advancement of a different, much more open vision for internet governance makes it striking that its current policy seems to follow very similar premises. A similar point can be made over the economic security concept at the heart of the 2017 NSS. In the late 1990s, Chinese scholars had begun to advance a very similar framework that was named identically, explored many of the same concerns and shared the overall view that strategic competition between states would ultimately be settled through an economic-technological race.11 Specifically suggested policies, like building and protecting a national innovation base, or developing independent world-class capabilities in the IT sector, both inspired China’s subsequent innovation strategy and are now being mirrored in US security policy. This bilateral dynamic is a particularly troubling aspect of securitization, since it creates an imperative to match the other side’s policies or risk a competitive disadvantage. By simultaneously embracing this line of thinking, the US and China have entered a new kind of security dilemma, marked by a technological rather than a military arms race. Clashes over fundamentally incompatible political agendas and visions of world orders may have contributed to the unfolding US-China confrontation, but this is an aspect in which their increasing similarity is the problem.

### Automated Weapons (Drones)

#### The 1AC’s call to integrate AI into military operations accelerates the efficiency of warfare while relying on racist stereotypes to construct and identify threats – that increases instability and generates the justification for endless war – voting neg challenges calls to militarize AI and invests instead in diplomacy to de-escalate tensions

Suchman, 2020

(Lucy, professor of the anthropology of science and technology at Lancaster University, “Algorithmic warfare and the reinvention of accuracy,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 8, Iss. 2, 2020, pp. 175-187, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2020.1760587, accessed 7/2/2022, ZW)

The discourse surrounding Project Maven overwhelmingly begs the question of the criteria by which ‘objects’ are identified as imminent threats. Just what constitutes the profile of an ‘ISIS pickup truck’ (Peniston 2017), and what were the 38 categories used by those who hand-labelled 150,000 images to form the initial training data set? Most pressingly, what does it mean to be living under drones, where the presence of what is seen by the US apparatus as ‘abnormal activity’ (Weisgerberger 2017) might at any point trigger the identification of a threat and attack from weapons operating outside the range of one’s own perception (Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012)? The project demands that we turn our attention to the highly problematic systems of classification by which categories like ‘Islamic State militants’ operating in Iraq, Syria, Somalia and other areas of US strategic interest are constituted. Even more urgently, it calls on us to question the premise that those categories are pre-existing and stable and that their members exist independently of the classificatory schemes that identify them, or of classification’s violent consequences (see Bowker and Star 1999).

At some point down the road, according to Shanahan, the goal is to put the Project Maven technology ‘at the edge,’ on the drones themselves (Weisgerberger 2017). Analyses of the use of remotely-controlled weapon systems should begin to make clear, however, the further problems inherent in the project of untethering these systems from their human controllers, which military technophiles take as the next logical step in the automation of warfare. Inescapably, the actual situations in which weapons are used are fraught with uncertainties. That these give rise to misrecognition on the part of human combatants could be – and has been – cited as the rationale for further automation of target identification. But if we look carefully at the circumstances surrounding documented incidents, it becomes clear that however tragically prone to misreading actual situations of contemporary ‘irregular warfare’ might be, the premise that they could be specified algorithmically is indefensible. There is no technological solution to this problem.

Conclusion

Interrogating the Cold War logics of nuclear deterrence, Mackenzie (1990) has effectively opened up for us the black box of weapons targeting, and elucidated the contingent accomplishment of accuracy as a fact. In the case of strategic nuclear missiles, accuracy involved stabilising mathematical calculations of the trajectory that would be followed by a missile once released from its silo. The reinvention of accuracy in the case of so-called counterterrorism operations has worked to elide the difference between the precision with which a weapon, once fired, will strike its target, and the acts of identification of legitimate threats that targeting presupposes.

Insofar as the ‘becoming weapon’ of perception is tied to the identification of an Other as threat, this process long predates modern weaponry. A question for us to pursue, then, is just what are the particular apparatuses of recognition that comprise contemporary military discourses and technologies? How does the current ‘threat’ become recognisable, as specifically situated persons, embodied and emplaced? As military perceptions become more deeply imbricated with weaponry, it is also clear that the elaboration of weaponry is characterised not by a corresponding sophistication in military visualities, but rather by ever more reliance on still crude classificatory systems of racial/ethnic stereotyping and profiling. The cross hair of the weapon is deeply implicated in the objectification of its target. Yet as long as the ‘accuracy’ of the weapon is measured by the relation of lethal force to its designated object, the most vital question is left outside of the frame. Whether for a guided missile system, or the final actions of a suicide bomber, the fundamental question is how a target comes to be designated as such in the first instance, and within what regimes of historic injury and future accountability.

The operational trope of ‘situational awareness’ is a core doctrine for military command and control. Taking a commitment to situational awareness seriously opens generative lines of critique – critique that needs to be taken seriously as well by those committed to military doctrine and operations (see de Goede 2020; Austin, Bellanova, and Kaufmann 2019). My aim in this paper has been to contribute to the wider body of scholarship devoted to understanding more deeply how technologies of militarism enrol their subjects and create their objects. The circuits that connect the apparatuses that I have discussed are the fantasies of recognition and the practices of dehumanisation that have shaped the politics of militarism since the advent of modern war fighting. These become ever more dangerous in the contemporary moment, as the figure of the ‘imminent threat’ is expanded into a horizon of anywhere and of endless war, and in that way actions taken in the name of defence by the US and its allies become a truly imminent threat to others. The promise of algorithmic warfare is a technological solution to the infamous ‘fog of war,’ taking the speed that automation enables as a proxy for the validity of the analyses that result. Rather than further accelerate the speed of warfighting, we need to challenge proclamations of an inevitable AI arms race and redirect investment to innovations in diplomacy and social justice that might truly de-escalate the current threats – both geopolitical and planetary – to our collective security.

### Disease – COVID

#### The 1AC’s approach to disease security is underpinned by a racialized politics of insecurity that fails to respond to future pandemics and naturalizes racist assumptions that inform Western pandemic responses

Pan, 2021

(Chengxin, Associate Professor of International Relations at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Deakin University, “Racialised politics of (in)security and the COVID-19 Westfailure,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 9, Iss. 1, 2021, pp. 40-45, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2021.1904195, accessed 7/2/2022, ZW)

Mainstream security theory and practice (methodologies) consist in a highly racialised IR epistemology-cum-ontology. These three imbricated layers together provide a crucial context within which the West’s interpretations of and responses to COVID-19 need to be understood. First, the racialised politics of (in)security has allowed many in the West to intuitively associate the threat of coronavirus ontologically with the ‘zone of insecurity’, particularly the ‘yellow people’. Initially identified in China, COVID-19 was quickly ontologised, perhaps subconsciously by many, as a disease of non-whites, Asians, and particularly Chinese, possibly due to their seemingly unhygienic and even inhumane practices such as the ‘wet market’. In a UC Berkeley’s Health Services Center ‘managing fears and anxiety’ informational post on Instagram in early 2020, xenophobia towards Asian people was listed as a ‘normal reaction’ (Hussain 2020).

Meanwhile, locating the virus threat in the ‘zone of insecurity’ also evokes a (false) sense of security and immunity among those who think they safely reside in the ‘zone of security’. At the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting in Riyadh in late February 2020, the topic of COVID-19 came up but European countries were not interested. An indifferent Italian representative allegedly said that ‘We have nothing to do with it [COVID-19]. It is a yellow people’s disease, not ours’ (Jiang 2020). Repeatedly calling the coronavirus the ‘China virus’, US President Donald Trump wasn’t concerned either: ‘you have 15 people [in the US], and the 15 within a couple of days is going to be down to close to zero’. In other words, such diseases would be unlikely to take hold in the ‘zone of security’. To be sure, not all Western political and opinion leaders buy the racist narrative on COVID-19 and, while some did, it happened mostly during the early stage of the pandemic. However, in the fight against a rapidly spreading pandemic, such initial ontological misperceptions could and have proven very costly.

Second, when the coronavirus inevitably spread to the ‘zone of security’, many (certainly not all) Western measures in controlling the pandemic closely followed the predictable script of some racialised methodologies of security and biopolitics. The Trump administration was quick to seal its southwestern border and deport thousands of migrants in an attempt to prevent the ‘import’ of coronavirus from ‘elsewhere’, while in fact its deportation policy contributed to exporting cases to countries like Mexico, Haiti and Guatemala. Earlier, it also implemented a travel ban on the entry of Chinese nationals. Australia and other Western countries quickly followed suit. Even as case numbers surged in Western countries such as Italy, Spain, and the US, there was a strong reluctance to apply the travel ban within the Western ‘zone of security’. Dr Norman Swan, presenter of the Australian broadcaster ABC’s Health Report, attributed the reluctance to the factor of ‘politics’ (Zhou and Xiao 2020). Yet no ordinary politics, this is racialised biopolitics informed by the aforementioned racialised ontology of (in)security.

A third important dimension of the COVID-19 Westfailure has to do with epistemic racism, which defines the ‘zone of insecurity’ in terms of its perceived inability to know (or even count). Those in such a zone are believed to have little to offer in the way of credible expertise or knowledge. ‘Can we trust Chinese Covid-19 science?’, reads the title of a Guardian article that, while paying lip service to the merit of Chinese research (on COVID-19), made sure to mention every possible reason to be suspicious of ‘Chinese’ science: from its authoritarian regime, censorship, human rights abuse, and ambition for global science dominance to academic fraud, intellectual property theft, and lax approaches to research ethics (Spinney 2020). The same concerns prompted the Australian media to ask a similar question: ‘Can we trust a Chinese vaccine?’

The mistrust of non-Western knowledge and experience, among other things, saw strong Western resistance to wearing face-masks, at least in the initial phase of the pandemic. A common practice in Asia, mask-wearing was seen as mostly associated with diseases and reflective of Asians’ ‘herd mentality’ that is ‘ingrained into their cultural psyche in a way it isn’t here’ (Elliott 2020). Western leaders and medical experts only began to encourage mask-wearing after they eventually felt satisfied that there was now enough accumulative scientific evidence (McCabe 2020). Never mind much earlier evidence in Chinese research, which helped shape China’s national policy response to the COVID-19 (including mandatory use of face-masks in public areas) from the start of February 2020. A later Cambridge-led study published in the journal Nature Medicine arrived at similar findings, but it did not mention the earlier Chinese discovery. The explanation of the lead researcher of the Cambridge team is telling: the quality of the Chinese study ‘was not at the standards that we were comfortable to cite or rely on scientifically’ (Chen 2020).

Indeed, while Western responses seemed to be based on scientific evidence, Chinese responses were almost invariably labelled ‘draconian’, ‘excessive’, ‘flat-out backward’, and ‘dystopian’ (Johnson 2020), or simply referred to as ‘Xi Jinping’s tactics’ (Birtles 2020). By definition, such tactics would be anathema to Western scientific and democratic sensibilities. In their policy recommendations to the government, British scientists initially did not even consider a Wuhan-style lockdown an option, citing that it ‘would never be acceptable in a democracy like the UK’ (Grey and MacAskill 2020).

Conclusion

Most studies of racism in international security have focused, and rightly so, on its violence and injustice imposed on the racialised Others (see other contributions in this Forum). But as this piece has illustrated, the racialised politics of (in)security is a double-edged sword, not only often traumatising the weak and the disadvantaged in the ‘zone of insecurity’, but also (albeit less often, certainly less often acknowledged) inflicting damage in the ‘zone of security’ itself, particularly in terms of the necropolitical economic consequences for those racial and intersectional Others within (Mbembe 2003; Scauso et al. 2020). Thanks to the highly racialised frameworks and strategies, many Western countries have mistaken the racialised Others for the source of the transnational threat of COVID-19, adopted racist half-measures that are ineffective, and failed to learn valuable lessons and experiences from the Others who have traditionally been dismissed as civilisationally and scientifically inferior and backward. Yet, the self-serving racial boundaries between the imagined zones of security and insecurity offer no defence against a virus that neither recognises nor operates along colour lines. Various lessons could and should be learned from the pandemic, but Western security experts and policymakers would do well to critically reflect on the ontological, epistemological, and methodological myths, blind spots, and dangers of their racialised regime of truth. If anything positive was to come out of the disastrous failures, it would entail radically re-imagining security/insecurity in a post-COVID and posthuman world.

### China – Economic Competition

#### Threat construction unfairly justifies a victim story that US policymakers use to justify radical and extreme policy action

Yuan and Fu, 20 (Zhengqing Yuan, Senior Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Qiang Fu, Associate Professor at the School of Foreign Studies of Central University of Finance and Economics, 10 July, 2020, Chinese Journal of International Politics, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article-abstract/13/3/419/5869540?redirectedFrom=fulltext)

However, it should be noted that, in the original Greek text, Thucydides himself does not explain the war as a structural mindset. It is Allison who inserts a structural frame when emplotting the war, one that perfectly captures in people’s minds the schema of a rising power and the ruling power, thus contributing to its popularity.108 This structural interpretation of Sino–US relations and the world arena is, at best, just one of the possible ways of narrating the reality. Other alternatives, like ‘a new model of major-power relationship’ or ‘a community of shared future for mankind’, can also tell a coherent story with the same facts. For example, through the lens of ‘a community of shared future for mankind’, the AIIB and the Belt and Road Initiative can be seen as evidence of the public goods China offers towards achieving with the world common prosperity, whereas through the lens of the Thucydides Trap, they would be rendered as evidence of China’s move to replace American hegemony. As is explained in the theoretical section, threat stories can be self-fulfilling. Once the story of power competition between a rising power and a ruling power is accepted, people will depend on it to make sense of the world and take actions. In other words, the focus of US policy towards China turns from engaging with China to preparing for the worst. China is first and foremost perceived as an economic threat that presents a global challenge. Most of this discourse falls under two kinds of narrative template: one where China challenges US economic hegemony; the other story of victimhood in which the United States has suffered huge job losses, a serious decline in its manufacturing industries, and an enormous trade deficit due to China’s unfair trade practices and competition. These two modes of narration are two sides of the same coin which differ only in their emphases. One the one hand, China is an economic challenger. China’s challenge in hightech sectors is a salient node of the threat discourse network. Traditionally, the United States has taken technological leadership to be an indispensable feature of its hegemonic identity, as it signifies both cultural superiority and a guarantee of US economic prosperity and military superiority.109 But now the United States increasingly believes that its economic competitiveness is under serious threat from China’s advance in high-tech industries. What most alarms Americans is China’s high-tech initiatives, especially the ‘Made in China 2025’. A 2019 senate committee report chaired by Senator Marco Rubio articulates that China’s ‘Made in China 2025’ seeks to be ‘the global leader in innovation and manufacturing’, and that such a goal ‘would be an unacceptable outcome for American workers’.110 Another significant node of China’s economic challenge discourse network is that of China’s challenge to the world economic order dominated by the United States. According to these stories, as China’s economy continues to grow, China will rewrite the existing rules of the world economy and reshape the international political economy in a way that favours its interests. For example, China’s proposal to reform the current international monetary system is perceived as challenging dollar hegemony, and the newly established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is interpreted as a move to replace the US-led World Bank and International Monetary Fund. On the other hand, the discourse tells the story of US victimhood. Similar to what the revisionists did in 1980s, proponents of China threats also invoke a victim story to make sense of China’s economic rise and the United States’ underperformance in competition with China. President Trump is a major advocate of this story. In his State of the Union address in 2019, he said: ‘We are now making it clear to China that, after years of targeting our industries and stealing our intellectual property, the theft of American jobs and wealth has come to an end’.111 In crafting this story, many negative images and memories of China, in American novels and movies, have been cashed in on, and ‘China the thief’ and ‘China the manipulator’ are now two widely used narrative templates. Within the metaphorical frame of ‘thief’, Chinese government agencies and companies have proactively engaged in economic and industrial espionage that has caused huge economic losses for American corporations and great harm to their economic competitiveness. For example, an investigation report by the Office of the United States Trade Representative in 2018 states that China is the most active actor in economic espionage, having gained ‘unauthorised access to a wide range of commercially-valuable business information’.112 Notably, cyber theft and intellectual property theft are the most common memes in the discourse. In the manipulator narrative, meanwhile, China exercises unfair trade practices through manipulating exchange rates, monetary policy, subsidies, etc. to promote exports and restrict imports, resulting in the failure of American companies, an enormous trade deficit, and immense job losses; and at the same time, China manipulates its economy through such measures as industry policy, market access restriction, forced technology transfers, and government procurement, among others. A 2018 White House report states that, in order to dominate high-tech industries, the Chinese government has carried out industrial policy though state-sponsored theft, forced technology transfers, economic coercion, information harvesting, and statebacked investment in high technologies.113 As to the ‘thief’ and ‘manipulator’ tales about China, such stories can also blind people. For example, the allegations of China’s currency manipulation and forced technology transfers may to a large extent be apocryphal or at least exaggerated, and rather than being made victims, US companies benefit from China, as even certain hawks have noticed that ‘Americans are investing more in China’ amid the trade war.

#### Speech acts against China such as the debt-trap narrative legitimize securitization

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This literature review illustrates how China has been securitized because of ideological and perceptional differences. The literature demonstrates how the BRI has been securitized but not explicitly because of ideological and perceptional differences, rather there is more of a focus on the economic impact of China’s policy. While Singh (2020) and Almén et al’s (2021) highlight the BRI’s debt-trap issue, there is substantial controversy concerning the legitimacy of the debt-trap threat. However, by using securitization theory focused on post structural aspects as Song (2015) demonstrates, we can gain a deeper recognition of the performative aspect of speech acts and if securitizing actors legitimize the debt trap narrative. Post structural 10 securitization theory, as noted by Hansen (2011: 358), ‘may enable a more critical engagement with the politics of security’, for example, the power-knowledge nexus and the ways in which discourses on security construct the objects of which they speak. This thesis contends with the reviewed literature that China has been securitized. However, the aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the distinctiveness of poststructural securitization theory in analyzing the perceptions and ideological differences concerning the BRI. Scholarly analyses have mainly focused on the economic and military sectors of security in relation to the threat China presents, therefore examining the differences in ideology and perceptions in relation to the BRI and American strategy aspects outlined by Chengqiu (2020) will aid in determining what other security sectors are affected. 3. Theoretical Framework In order to answer the research question “How do speech acts contribute to the securitization of China?”, it is necessary to discuss securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School. This theory has been widely used in previous research concerning China, and therefore it is advantageous for this thesis to widen the understanding of how discourse concerning the BRI has been connected to security through the process of securitization. Additionally, Hansen expands securitization theory by (re)adding elements of poststructuralism. This part of the thesis has two purposes: first, laying the foundation for this thesis’ operational framework of poststructural securitization, and secondly for the utilization of it in the analysis chapter. 3.1 Securitization Theory In Buzan, Wæver, and Jaap’s (1998) revolutionary book Security: A New Framework for Analysis, they address two conceptual developments: sectoral analysis and Wæver’s concept of securitization. Securitization involves framing an issue as ‘a special kind of politics or as above politics’ (Buzan et al, 1998: 23), therefore can be viewed as a ‘more extreme form of politicization’ (ibid). One of the distinguishing features of this theory is the framing of a subject as an existential threat and a ‘specific rhetorical structure’ (ibid), as in if the problem is not addressed quickly, it will be too late and we will not be able to rectify it. Securitization places emphasis on speech acts which assume that speeches are not only to express an idea or present information but also to perform an action. Speech acts also illustrate the power knowledge nexus. ‘We are subject to the production of truth through power and we cannot 11 exercise power except through the production of truth. Thus the production of a truth, or the creation of knowledge through a discourse, is an exercise of power.’ (Ibrahim, 2005: 164). Therefore, the securitizing actor performing a speech act is exercising power over the intended audience. However, securitization theory has been subject to many criticisms. It has been critiqued for being too static and not being able to take on the developments in the security field, Derrida criticized securitization for being too strict in evaluating the success of the speech act, and Howell and Richter-Montpetit (2019) have even criticized it for being Eurocentric and racist. Hansen (2011) recognized the shortcomings of Buzan et al’s (1998) work and expanded on it by (re)adding elements of poststructuralism. In a sense, it is re-adding poststructural elements because securitization and speech act are rooted in poststructuralism.

### China – Great Power Competition

#### The hegemonic position of the US in the squo and expansion of Chinese ideology has lead to securitization of the “Chinese Threat”

Gilkey, **Qiana**, 20**22**, (Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).) "How do speech acts contribute to the securitization of China?: A critical discourse analysis of perceptional and ideological differences in American discourse vis-à-vis the Belt and Road Initiative.," DIVA, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?dswid=-6447&pid=diva2%3A1667683

The hegemonic position held by America and its position in the international system as a dominant state is central to its identity. As Fukuyama’s (1989) article noted, the collapse of the Soviet Union shaped American identity as a global hegemon, an example of them as a leading Western liberal and democratic state, and a state which aims to spread liberal and democratic values. The US perceives its hegemonic position, therefore its core identity, as being threatened by China. The previous subsections have demonstrated how there has been a rise in securitizing discourse regarding the BRI which affects multiple sectors, not solely the economic and military sectors. The analysis also demonstrates the role that conflicting ideologies play in securitizing speech acts. While explicitly stating that China is using the BRI to actively spread its authoritarian and communist values in the economic sector, the analysis shows how the perceived ideological expansion and perceived threats further contribute to the securitization of China and the construction of the ‘China threat’. The securitization of China is in no way a new and untouched subject of study, however, the use of poststructuralism has been underutilized. The aim of this thesis was to explore how securitization regarding the BRI also includes differences in ideologies and perceptions, as ample research has mainly focused on the economic, military, and strategic elements. The use of Fairclough’s three-dimensional model along with the theoretical framework developed by Hansen has been used to highlight the perceptional and ideological differences which play key roles in the securitization of China. It also reveals the latent power relations and how the discourse by US elites reproduces these unequal power relationships. The method and theoretical framework were chosen to explore how historical context and social contexts at a specific period in time affect speech acts. The articles reviewed mainly focus on the economic and military sectors, and while this is acknowledged to play a substantial role, the ideological differences have shown to also securitize the political and societal sectors as well. The inclusion of more sectors provides a more robust and deeper understanding of the securitization process and how it contributes to the further securitization of China. The addition of poststructuralism contributes to the security field by emphasizing different ontologies and epistemologies, which only serves to deepen the understanding of the securitization process and if it will be successful or not. It also allows us to understand why US-Sino relations have been strained and how this can affect the current international system dominated by Western liberal and democratic concepts. The guiding argument was that differences in ideologies and perceptions contribute to the securitization of China. In the analysis, we can clearly note the increase in securitizing language being utilized by political elites over the years. This may be due to the change in the presidency or the fact that the BRI was implemented over a longer period, nonetheless, there is a clear correlation in how the discourse has framed China as a threat in a more obvious way. The language has also reflected the rising inclusion of the general public. The historical construction of the American identity in the international system has been shown to contextualize how their identity being threatened plays a more considerable role in why there is an escalation of securitizing discourse. Securitizing the BRI, therefore further securitizing China as a whole, is advantageous to the US as these efforts will assist in preserving the current status quo, therefore retaining their unipolar and hegemonic identity.

#### US narrative and threat construction justifies extreme policies, creates an “Self” vs “Others” scenario which is dangerous

Yuan and Fu, 20 (Zhengqing Yuan, Senior Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Qiang Fu, Associate Professor at the School of Foreign Studies of Central University of Finance and Economics, 10 July, 2020, Chinese Journal of International Politics, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article-abstract/13/3/419/5869540?redirectedFrom=fulltext)

Rather than the rationalist approach to national security, we adopt a narrative approach to unravelling the narrative process whereby national threats are constructed. Having encountered three successive national rivals since WWII, the United States has constructed three distinctive threat stories to safeguard its hegemonic identity. The Soviet threat consists in the story of two ideologically opposed rivals competing for world domination; the Japan-bashing narrative tells a victimhood story stemming from Japan’s unfair competition. China threat stories, however, are now more complex, conflating a story of US victimhood at the hands of China’s unfair competition, advocated by President Trump, with a widely embedded but malleable epic tale of power competition between a rising power and the ruling power, and a new, ‘deep state’ defence community-propagated Cold War script. All these threat stories have framed what is perceived and what should be done, but they are merely those from among other alternative narratives that eventually gained a dominant position at critical junctures. These so called national threats are hence no more than narrative constructs in a self-other manner of articulation rather than one of objective existence. Upon examining the narrative templates of US threat stories, we find striking differences among them. The Soviet threat spectrum ranges from the ideological to the political and military domains, and economic challenge is the focus of the Japan threat. But China represents the full spectrum of threats that previously featured in both the Soviet threat story and the Japan-bashing narrative. Upon zooming in, we further find that an ideological conflict constitutes the main thread of the Soviet threat storyline, but that the economic challenge of the China threat outweighs the ideological and political ones. On the political front, the Soviet Union’s totalitarian dictatorship is the polar opposite of liberal democracy, while China is often styled as an authoritarian state—a far less antagonistic wording. As to military threats, the Soviet threat is urgent and global, but the China threat is only a rising and regional one. To counter the economic challenge emanating first from Japan and then from China, the United States adopted different strategies to construct its victimhood story, namely, coining new concepts for Japan, and cashing in on stereotypes for China. In spite of the above-marked differences, however, we can also clearly discern continuity in the United States’ national threat stories. This is reflected not only in the United States’ consistently resorting to the victimhood narrative to counter economic challenges from both Japan and China, and unremittingly cashing in on its widely-shared mythologies and images regarding the Self and Others to achieve resonance, but also, more revealingly, in the underlying logic of US national threat-making. The United States will invariably adopt a zero-sum mindset in making a diametrical self-other story for any country—be it a formidable power with an antagonistic ideology like the Soviet Union, an ally like Japan, or a rising peer competitor like China—that might threaten its hegemonic identity. According to this logic, the American Self is always superior to Others, and articulating the threat confirms its superiority. Not surprisingly, when Others, like Japan or China, challenge its economic primacy, the United States, rather than examining its own problems, will always blame such others for playing an ‘unfair game’. This paper also provides us with a vantage point to appreciate the current debate on Sino–US relations. Clearly, we are in the second half of the critical juncture wherein the question is not whether the United States and China will compete with each other but in which way the competition will unfold, for the bankruptcy of the liberal international order discourse makes it unlikely to revert to yesteryear’s policy of engagement. As the three narrative threads of the China threat stories all point to competition and conflict, and can be self-fulfilling, we may witness increasing tensions between them. Specifically, the Japan-bashing victimhood story can shed considerable light on our understanding of Trump’s China policy. We find that the story President Trump advocates to a large extent matches the victimhood story that the revisionists concocted to deal with Japan in the 1980s. Trump’s rhetoric regarding unfair trade and industry targeting, slapping of trade tariffs amounting to blackmail on both China and US allies, resultsoriented approach to trade negotiation, and the US high-tech stranglehold that curbs or bars investment in the industry by US competitors can all be found in the Japan threat story toolbox. Having pivoted China policy towards conflict, however, there are few indications that Trump wants to act out a Cold War script. In accordance with the storytelling logic, should Trump retain his presidency in the coming election, the trade war will probably not end in a ‘fair’ trade agreement until such time as the US economy far outperforms China’s, because US superiority entails outperformance, failing which the blame must go on unfair play. That is what happened to Japan, that is to say, successive rounds of sanctions and negotiations until Japan drifted into the Lost Decade. China may, moreover, face even greater US hostility to its high-tech industry and investment, as happened in 1980s. These are issues that China’s political nature and growing military may further complicate. But it should be noted that China is not Japan and will neither give in easily as Japan did nor pose a solely economic challenge to the United States. The Soviet threat story also offers insight. Indeed, a new Cold War rhetoric is rising in Sino–US relations narratives in the United States. Hawks in the US defence community, among them congressman like Senators Rick Scott and Marco Rubio, former officials like John Bolton, and to some extent even Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, have all contributed to the rise of a Cold War mentality. The effect of this Cold War rhetoric is apparent in government policy, such as the barring of visits from certain Chinese scholars and treating Chinese news media as ‘foreign missions’. Although this new Cold War script may sensationalise and aggravate the already deteriorated Sino–US relations, unless major events or crises occur, it seems unlikely to become a grand dominant narrative in the near future. This is partly due to the fact that China, unlike the Soviet Union, does not export Communism, so what Americans are agonising most about now is China’s catching up and the United States’ relatively underperforming economy. Moreover, quite apart from China’s refusal to accept and act on such a script, China has become deeply embedded in the world economy, and its trading partners have little incentive to contain China. The future dominant threat story is hence likely to be a hybrid one that allows cooperation while being open to confrontation.

#### Threat construction portrays China as a political threat—justifying extreme policy action

Yuan and Fu, 20 (Zhengqing Yuan, Senior Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Qiang Fu, Associate Professor at the School of Foreign Studies of Central University of Finance and Economics, 10 July, 2020, Chinese Journal of International Politics, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article-abstract/13/3/419/5869540?redirectedFrom=fulltext)

American hawks, especially those of the ‘deep state’ intelligence and defence community, advocate a new Cold War script where China constitutes a progressively serious political threat. This rhetoric has been on the rise over the last couple of years. In the first place, an existential threat is the ideologically and politically antithetical Other. To American hawks, China is an authoritarian regime under Communist one-party rule, which in itself constitutes an existential threat to the free democracy of the United States. For example, the 2017 US National Security Strategy states that China ‘spreads features of its authoritarian system’.115 This mindset is even more apparent in an open letter from former military officials, scholars, and other conservative China watchers to President Trump in 2019, in which they emphasise that China and its Communist party are an existential threat to US values and the US-led world order.116 Meanwhile, it should be noted that although there is a rising rhetoric on ideological differences, it is more about China’s political system itself than the expansive nature of communism so often promoted in the Soviet threat story. In the second place, there is the China Model. In this frame, China represents an authoritarian capitalism, and its great economic success offers other countries an alternative model. This constitutes a challenge to the United States’ free democratic market economy model in the global order. The Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community released by the Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats in 2019 bluntly points out that China will more actively ‘seek to assert China’s model of authoritarian capitalism as an alternative’ for other countries to the Washington Consensus, which may ‘threaten international support for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law’; also that China’s Belt and Road Initiative is a platform to expand China’s ‘global economic, political, and military reach’ and ‘diminish US influence’.117 In the third place is the whole-of-society threat. In this hawkish portrayal, China is taking advantage of the United States’ open environment and political loopholes to gain economic, political, and military benefits, thus threatening US security from the inside. Although this mode of thought has long existed in the China threat discourse, the ‘whole-of-society threat’ concept was coined by FBI Director Christopher Wray during a Senate hearing in February 2018. He said that, in order to replace the United States’ global leadership, China employs not only state institutions but also non-traditional collectors like students and professors to amass intelligence and steal intellectual property rights, so this is ‘not just a whole-of-government threat, but a whole-of-society threat’.118 This narrative template was reinforced in Vice President Pence’s China policy speech in October 2018, in which he said China was attempting to ‘shift American public opinion and public policy’, influence US elections, and fragment domestic interest groups by ‘rewarding or coercing’ agents of influence, such as students, scholars, journalists, and think tanks in the United States.119 One month after the Pence speech, a report from the Hoover Institution echoed this frame by detailing how China has employed agents of influence to influence American domestic politics and policies towards China.120 This narrative was rapidly transposed into government policy. Over the last two years, the visas of certain Chinese scholars have been withdrawn, a number of Chinese Confucius Institutes closed, and the enrolment of Chinese students in certain key areas has also clearly been affected.

### China – Military

#### Unjustified anti-China military rhetoric is overemphasized—fear of China only justifies extreme US policy

Yuan and Fu, 20 (Zhengqing Yuan, Senior Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Qiang Fu, Associate Professor at the School of Foreign Studies of Central University of Finance and Economics, 10 July, 2020, Chinese Journal of International Politics, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article-abstract/13/3/419/5869540?redirectedFrom=fulltext)

While both China and the Soviet Union are narrated as a military threat, China is largely framed as a regional one rather than a global one. Admiral Philip. S. Davidson, the Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command said in his statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on US Command Posture on 12 February, 2019: ‘The PLA is the principal threat to US interests, US citizens, and our allies inside the First Island Chain’.121 It should be noted that China’s **so-called** military threat does not signify that China’s forces have surpassed or actively challenged US military power but rather that China’s military threat arises as long as China can potentially pose a challenge to US military predominance. In this narrative logic, China’s increased military spending, upgrading and expanding of weapons systems and technologies, and overseas deployments to protect its commercial interests, or even the limited access to information on China’s military planning are taken as evidence of China’s rising military threat. This kind of **hawkish rhetoric** is widespread in annual Department of Defense reports to Congress on China’s military power and in US Defense Intelligence Agency reports on China’s Military Power. One notable feature of the evolving discourse is the growing attention the United States is paying to the PLA’s cyber and nuclear warfare capabilities.

### Climate Change

#### The 1AC is part and parcel of a securitizing climate rhetoric that amplifies ongoing injustice and reinforces the third world as disposable. This contributes to an embedding of Black dispossession of material lands, resources, and demonization of climate refugees in US climate policy. Any attempt to sanitize this process fundamentally downplays a legacy of imperial violence in the name of climate change.

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Maintaining the racial order in the green transition

Based on the above analysis, the paper contends that racialized workers in the US and frontline communities that have historically been exposed to climate hazards appear to rhetorically afforded certain benefit of future jobs in the Green transition. However, through planned and ongoing US state interventionist and extractive corporatism, the US continue to contribute to the reproduction of surplus populations in the Caribbean. Caribbean societies, tethered to US imperialism and hegemony, have become displaced through the latter’s historical actions and are seen as new spaces for accumulation and debt. Despite United States’ patchy record and ambivalence on climate issues (see Lewin, 2020), the Biden Plan indicates that the US’ national security and prosperity are at stake if climate change envelopes communities and worsens large-scale migration from abroad (Biden, 2020). President Biden intends to put an end to countries ‘cheating’ the United States and employ US financial (and potentially military) power. In the Biden Climate Plan, his administration wishes to:

invest in the climate resilience of our military bases and critical security infrastructure across the US and the World, to deal with the risk of climate change effects, including, including extreme weather events that caused over $8 billion in damage to Department of Defense bases in just the last year (Biden, 2020).

Further, like the CCAP, Biden deems the climate threat, which already causes significant socio-economic and ecological disruption in the global South, an investment opportunity to expand accumulation and ‘facilitate commercialization of affordable carbon capture retrofit technologies for export to the developing world’ (House Select Committee on Climate Crisis, 2020: 244; Kerry et al., 2020: 5). These proposals envisage that domestic investments ‘will create jobs for blue-collar workers, including in fence line communities, help decarbonize American industries, and create valuable new exports to help mitigate climate change around the world’ (Kerry et al., 2020: 5). Green New Deal proposals equally join in on this policy chorus. Aronoff et al. (2019: 163) wish to ‘prioritize mechanisms to transfer funds and technologies to countries in the global South to help them cut carbon emissions’. As Girvan (1978) has critically argued, such transfers are not benevolent acts of global North players or themselves costless, particularly as state capital and transnational corporations come to exact costs in terms of lost autonomy, inappropriate technology to production methods or on a society’s culture, as well as considerable costs associated with knowledge acquisition and infrastructure. We can also notice the contradiction especially on the immigration question related to environmental calamities. Under the Obama Administration, actions towards Haitians deemed them disposable, unequal racialized others. In 2010, after Haiti witnessed a 7.0 magnitude earthquake that killed as many as 300,000 Haitians, the Obama administration granted temporary protected status (TPS) to over 100,000 undocumented Haitians in the United States (Wennersten and Robbins, 2017). They were refused entry as refugees or asylum seekers which would have granted them a suite of rights under international law in the United States6 (see Loyd and Mountz, 2018). There was no permanent solution from the Obama Administration and Congress, even after multiple requests from Haitian authorities.7 After category 4 Hurricane Matthew in 2016 devastated the southern part of the country, destroyed 300,000 homes and killed more than 800 people in the process, Haitians were further denied protection and legal recognition (Wennersten and Robbins, 2017). Barack Obama’s policy was to not accept climate refugees. Obama expressed serious concern about a major exodus of immigrants due to climate change that would constitute a ‘serious threat to US national security’ (Ahmed, 2018: 16). The US Congress Climate Agenda and the recent climate proposals by Joe Biden continue to depict climate-induced migration as a security threat: ‘The climate crisis amplifies geopolitical threats as resource scarcity and catastrophic events fuel conflict, mass migration, and social and political strife’ (House Select Committee on Climate Crisis, 2020: 14). New migrant subjectivities of racialized and gendered groups are created and must seek routes to boost their resilience (Agostino, 2015; Baldwin, 2017) to which the homeland defence and national security systems must respond and inform intelligence plans (House Select Committee on Climate Crisis, 2020: 15, 507–509). The US climate initiatives thus refer to ‘security’ and ‘a geopolitical threat’ at least 188 and 37 times respectively (House Select Committee on Climate Crisis, 2020: 14; White House, 2021b). The cases of Barbuda after Hurricane Irma and Maria also loom large. Barbuda (the smaller island of the sovereign state of Antigua and Barbuda) was the site of immense devastation after the passage of these category five hurricanes that marooned over 1800 of Barbudans in shelters for several months on the sister island of Antigua and prompted the Prime Minister to request international aid (Baptiste and Devonish, 2019; Lightfoot, 2020). The aftermath was a quagmire, where the Antiguan Prime Minister Gaston Brown announced plans to offer valuable plots for sale to billionaire US and Australian real estate moguls to erect a $200 million-dollar tourist resort against the legal collective claims of Barbudans to maintain ownership of their communal lands8 (Gould and Lewis, 2018). Black dispossession of material lands, resources, and non-material cultures are thus an evident feature of these ongoing climate injustices. Again, category five Hurricane Dorian in 2019 devastated the Bahamas islands Abaco and Grand Bahama, resulting in over $3.4 billion in damages, over 250 fatalities, damage to over 70,000 homes and displaced 3000 Haitians residing in informal settlements (Zegarra et al., 2020), not to mention the uncounted undocumented Haitians whose lives were lost. The Trump Administration refused protective status under its Temporary Protective Status programme to newfound ‘refugee’ Bahamians and Haitians that would have allowed those displaced by the crisis to seek shelter and support from relatives in the US. Trump depicted dispossessed Bahamians and marginalized Haitian residents in the Bahamas as potentially ‘very bad people’ and a country that has ‘very bad drug dealers’ (Reuters, 2019). Up to that time, Bahamians had been allowed under regular visa rules to enter the US without a visa by sea or air once they held a passport or no criminal record. In the shadows of this humanitarian crisis, undocumented Haitians residing in a makeshift, flood prone community called the Mudd in Marsh Habour on Abaco, were themselves treated poorly by the Bahamian government. As many as 340 undocumented Haitian were deported after accepting the Bahamian government’s vow to support Haitians displaced by the storm there. This episode shows that colonialist and anti-Black racism also pervades postcolonial states in the sphere of US-maintained global white supremacy (see definition of racism in Gilmore, 2002a, b). Haitians are persistent subjects to racialized environmental marginalization characterized by a normative white supremacy that do not recognize their ‘alien’ existence. In the end, the effort to differentiate Caribbean peoples and render them surplus populations can be seen within the US climate agenda characterized by racial capitalism. At one time, Caribbean societies are considered fertile for ‘green’ capitalist accumulation by US authorities, organizers and transnational corporations. The US cannot deny its longstanding institutional structures and policy agenda are rooted in anti-Blackness and privilege so-called white working-class communities. US climate policy and interventions fail to acknowledge its hegemonic role in maintaining political economic structures that fuel climate catastrophe in the Caribbean. No interest exists in meaningfully act on climate debt or reparations from liberal or ‘progressive’ quarters (Sheller, 2018). These contradictions within the policy architecture and actions abroad may ultimately lead to more dispossession, inequality, and undermine the needs, self-determination and liberation of ordinary Caribbean peoples. Under the spectre of racial capitalism, US policy-making institutions have weaponized climate policy for environmental racism abroad. This time, specifically targeting the ‘darker nations’, the US’ political establishment has created policy imperatives to maintain the politico-economic and cultural order by ensuring that immigrants fleeing climate devastation or facing other form of socio-environmental instabilities may be impeded from seeking refuge within its borders. The Global South is in its sights. The US has deflected from its responsibility as the principal historical contributor to global warming and deems it an opportunity for green accumulation. Climate policy outcomes are embedded in a racial capitalist framework and universally represents ‘workers’ as white and deserving of opportunity, wealth and a secure future. In the process, the US has attempted to downplay its continued imperial record and deny its history of racial capitalism that is playing out in the context of climate change. As temperatures and sea levels rise, hurricanes unleash untold disaster that differentially affect Caribbean island territories, these populations may need to find new strategies of resistance and solidarity. Environmental marginalization and dispossession guarantee that Caribbean communities will continue their struggle against uneven political ecologies that seek to undermine Black liberation, impose additional debt, and comprise their self-determination.

#### The 1AC’s humanitarian appeal to climate change is not neutral, but permeated by a ‘bunkerization’ of the aid industry wherein humanitarianism is tied to security actors thus rendering the space of aid intervention a space of security. Their scholarship equivocates disaster with conflict – the first step in the naturalization and depoliticization of warfare characterized by militarized humanitarianism.

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Military response is also mobilized domestically in response to crises, often with respect to marginalized and alienated populations as with Hurricane Katrina in 2005 where the predominantly black population was targeted by state violence (Smith, 2006), or with Indigenous activism, whether the 1991 Oka crisis in Canada or the ongoing Dakota pipeline protests in the US (Estes, 2019). Yet militaries are also undertaking pre-emptive action. For example, this is evident in Operation Continuing Promise, launched in 2008 by US Southern Command, to provide basic medical care to vulnerable communities in Latin America and the Caribbean in anticipation of potential future crisis, which Joe Bryan (2015) has shown renders humanitarianism as a means of waging war without end. In this way, humanitarian practices and spaces form a part of a larger geography of war, anticipating and pre-empting future conflict by deploying militaries in the present. Militaries are also involved in the securitization of channels of global migration. Geographers have underlined the ways that borders, and the work they do, are extended internally and externally through appeals to humanitarian care and control, which paradoxically serves to reinforce and securitize the very national and regional borders that asylum seekers are trying to cross (Islemen, 2018; Jones, 2016; Pallister-Wilkins, 2018). Of course, the securitization and militarization of migration is not new. But the technologies of migration management – and the forms of circumvention or resistance that are mobilized – are taking new shape and form. What begins as a ‘humanitarian’ operation can quickly devolve into a more interventionist and militarized operation of capture, containment and control. For example, both NATO and the EU have launched military operations in response to the ongoing refugee crisis in the Mediterranean. Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli (2018) have argued that although their stated aim is to protect migrants and disrupt smuggler’s networks, these missions act to dissuade migration flows through the central and eastern Mediterranean and disrupt the potential of certain populations to move through space. Migrants are both the subjects to be saved, and those who are prevented from travelling – a phenomenon that is not limited to Europe (Loyd et al., 2016; Mountz, 2020). Recent moves to militarize the response to refugees have been fuelled by the conflicts and war in Middle East and Africa – paradoxically, the means of war are increasingly being used to regulate the consequences of war – but discourses around militarization have also proliferated with the anticipated rise of ‘climate refugees’ in response to climate change (Gilbert, 2012; Hartmann, 2010). In all these examples, the nexus of militarized-humanitarianism is leading to more violence, rather than its mitigation. As Fassin and Pandolfi (2010: 12) have argued, disasters and conflict are rendered equivalent behind the moral discourse of humanitarianism, prompting military intervention or militarized responses, and leading to the ‘naturalization – or depoliticization – of war’. Citizens are turned into ‘passive beneficiaries’ of the responsibility to protect, transformed from rights-bearing agents to ‘recipients of charity’ (Mamdani, 2009: 264). Weizman (2011: 52) has noted that the blurring of roles of militaries and humanitarians has led belligerents ‘to construe aid workers as enemies, an integral part of the occupying force’, rendering them more vulnerable to attack and violence (see also Foley, 2008). In turn, this has resulted in what Mark Duffield (2012) has termed a bunkerization of the aid industry, with the presence of humanitarian organizations becoming increasingly fortified in conflict zones, further tying them to security actors and rendering the space of aid intervention also a space of security. This reflects a hardening of boundaries that characterizes militarized humanitarianism, with specific spaces of security produced that reinforce divides between those who save and those who will be saved. However, as Jennifer Fluri has shown, attempts to secure the lives of international aid workers in conflict zones can also render civilian bodies more vulnerable, for example, through the disruptions arising from highly securitized compounds, to the violations of private spaces (Fluri, 2011). Despite these vulnerabilities, military engagement in humanitarian response is used to legitimate it as a force of good, which obfuscates its lethal force. As new crises unfold, from disasters caused by climate change to health emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic, geographers will need to continue to interrogate the militarized responses that are marshalled in the name of humanitarianism, as they take new shape and form.

#### Their securitization of climate is a self-fulfilling prophecy

Warner et al 21 Warner, Jeroen, and Ingrid Boas. “Securitization of Climate Change: How Invoking Global ... - Sage Journals.” Securitization of Climate Change: How Invoking Global Dangers for Instrumental Ends Can Backfire, Jeroen Warner, Disaster Studies, Social Sciences Group, Wageningen University https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018. //parip  
A securitizing move involves an existential, life-and-death threat and its corollary: an extraordinary course of action as the only way out. Both case studies discussed here ([Table 1](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018)) show a dramatic securitising move, where climate change was presented as the source of great potential crisis that will harm us all, unless we take urgent action – either for mitigation (the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions) or for adaptation (adjusting to climate impacts). In the UK case, the FCO warned about the security implications of untamed global warming – such as climate conflict or mass climate migration – to persuade the international community, and in particular the emerging economies, to mitigate their emissions to prevent these potential security threats. In the Dutch case, the security framing legitimized considerable interventions in the form of dike reinforcement, river rehabilitation and defence infrastructure, raising the level of Lake IJssel in the Central Netherlands, digging a bypass, and moving huge amounts of sand around (‘Building with Nature’). A special Delta Fund and Delta Commissioner added to the special pleading to counter the climatic threat. By reducing the number of scenarios and options, and successfully controlling the ‘staging' ([Hajer et al., 2010](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018)) of its public launch, the Delta Commission almost seems a textbook example of turning the logic of ‘choice' into one of ‘necessity' ([Verduijn et al., 2012](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018)). In the end however the mandate of the Commissioner and the extent of intervention was seriously curtailed. Our analysis helps us to further explain discrepancies in climate securitization processes. Once successfully placed on the policy agenda, its effect has been lacklustre in both cases. Whilst endorsing an exceptional discourse, in both cases the securitizers ultimately sought to endorse ‘a rather piecemeal and technocratic approach’ ([Methmann and Rothe, 2012](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018): 324). The UK FCO’s securitising move was strategic and instrumental. Instead of purposefully endorsing, exceptional measures such as military intervention and martial law, the agency sent apocalyptic warnings to raise the urgency of mitigation measures. Even its actions within the UN Security Council seemed mundane, although clothed in alarmist discourse considered excessive by India and other BRIC countries, risking the further polarization of the climate debate in the international arena. The FCO primarily used the Council as a platform for raising further awareness, rather than to actually institutionalize climate change within the UN Security Council, which would have been a more exceptional move. The Delta Commission did not call for drastic action either. Instead, the Commission aimed to secure long-term year-on year funding and legitimacy for infrastructural investments, and was successful in that striving, if in a watered-down form. In many other countries, a commitment to infrastructural funding up to 2200 would be considered absurd. Attrition and erosion inevitably took their toll, but the plans essentially still stand. Thus, in line with arguments advanced by scholars such as [Trombetta (2008)](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018), [Corry (2012)](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018) and [Methmann and Rothe (2012)](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018), we note the urgent action promoted here is within the everyday realm of climate policy: the mitigation of GHG emissions via carbon markets, technological innovation without major implications for the world economy and raising flood defences against potential sea-level extremes Our cases furthermore demonstrate the instrumental nature of these securitizing moves, as carefully planned and developed within policy settings. As the interview quotes from the UK case in particular show, the FCO employees promoting the narrative were instrumentally using its argumentative value for their climate diplomacy efforts, making it integral to their climate communication strategy. However, both cases illustrate that security language can but does not necessarily help to increase the urgency of climate action, particularly if it comes across as strategic. In the words of one Indian interviewee, interviewed in relation to India’s position as audience to UK’s efforts in the UN Security Council: ‘If you want policy to be changed you [will] have to tell people: this is the challenge and this is the policy response for it and it has to be believable’.[14](javascript:popRef('fn14-2399654419834018')) Instead, the FCO’s securitising move fuelled further distrust amongst key target audiences within the UN Security Council debates. It made emerging countries more sceptical of the UK’s intentions on climate change and felt pressured through scare stories that were unfounded. The lesson from this case, then, is that a framing has to be genuine and valid for it to be convincing and successful amongst an already sceptical audience. Furthermore, as the Dutch Delta case demonstrated, apocalyptic discourses risk fuelling public disengagement with climate change and promote a sense of fatalism or scepticism leading ‘to denial of the problem and disengagement with the whole issue in an attempt to avoid the discomfort of contending with it’ ([O’Neil and Nicholson-Cole, 2009](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018): 371). In this case, the dramatic imaging of climate change fuelled a sense of anti-environmentalism and scepticism regarding the likelihood of extreme weather impacts, such as severe and sudden storms and sea-level rise (see also [Bettini, 2013](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018): 69; [Hulme, 2009](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018): 213; [Lowe et al., 2006](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018)). Exaggerating the gravity of the crisis, the Delta’s commission risked losing its credibility and playing into the hands of hard-line populist scepticism. In both cases, the security frame backfired like a ‘policy boomerang’ ([van Buuren and Warner, 2014a](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018)). To conclude, the analysis illustrates that particularly in the domain of climate change, where the future remains uncertain and many of discussions focus on issues of risks and potentialities ([Corry, 2012](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018)), successful securitization is complex. An audience is not easily persuaded when hearing that something is an urgent threat – such a discourse needs to resonate with a context giving some indication that the doom scenario might come true. The debate on climate change and security is in many respects ‘dominated by its futurology’ ([Baldwin et al., 2014](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018): 121), making it an easy target for politicians to play on but also a difficult one to successfully securitize. When there are multiple audiences, chances are that not all will accept the securitization, which obtains for both cases. Given the lack of an immediate threat, the time element inexorably works against climate securitizers. The ‘affect’ of climate change ([Protevi, 2009](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018)) moreover was short-lived as climate change became out-securitized by economic and immigration concerns in both countries. Climate issues however have bounced back; these days it seems to have returned to the global agenda again, as the plight of Syrian refugees has been framed by some as the shape of things to come in a warmer world ([Le Page, 2015](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018)). Likewise, natural disasters are increasingly ‘climatized’ ([Grant et al., 2015](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018); [Oels, 2012](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399654419834018)). Climate security discourse, then, appears to be resilient, attaching itself with the political ‘mood’ and state of the political game du jour. For it to remain on national and international agendas however, its advocates should be well aware of the danger of ‘overselling’

#### The international community has securitized climate change, your evidence is the result of years of fearmongering.

**Warner and Boas 19** (Warner, Jeroen is a professor of sociology at Wageningen University and Boas, Ingrid is an assistant professor at Wageningen University, “Securitization of climate change: How invoking global dangers for instrumental ends can backfire”. EPC: Politics and Space 2019, Vol. 37(8) 1471–1488. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2399654419834018>) //AP

Davoudi (2014) shows how the social understanding of nature moved from nature-asclockwork (Enlightenment) through nature-as-finite (Club of Rome, 1970s), through nature as risk (1990s) to discourses of global danger and insecurity caused by nature. The author traces the rise of ‘climate securitization’ back to a conference, ‘The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security’ in Toronto in 1988, which portrayed the consequences of climate change as only second to nuclear war. Since the 1990s climate change has often been presented as a global crisis, an existential threat to human civilization, a planetary catastrophe (Paglia, 2018). Yet, unlike an aggressive force out to conquer foreign territory, climate change is a special domain of emergency, that of ‘threats without enemies’ (Prins, 1993). As argued by Methmann and Rothe (2012: 328), climate is depicted as an external threat, with impacts coming suddenly, ‘from the outside’. Issues of risk and security ‘can provoke strong emotions, legitimise extraordinary practices, and lead to practices that are otherwise indefensible’ (Davoudi, 2014: 371–372). Environmental securitization however is an uncertain domain for securitization (Buzan et al., 1998; Trombetta, 2008). In climate change, the burden of proof to legitimize securitization is especially tricky. While a clear majority of the academic community considers anthropogenic climate change sufficiently proven, its invisibility as a source of anticipated catastrophes that have yet to happen, cannot easily compete with visible weather events in the ‘attention economy’ (Hamblyn, 2009). Other publics, then, are not convinced, as has become clear for instance under the Trump administration. Moreover, there is no ready consensus within the academic community on a clear and present nexus between climate change, violent conflict and/or migration (Adams et al., 2018), and if there is, that it can be successfully averted through a particular course of action.

### Climate Migration

#### Securitizing rhetoric about climate migrants results in violence against minority group because of the increase in risky border crossing into the EU.

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For decades, we could observe two parallel but contrary processes – debordering and rebordering – a decreasing and at the same time increasing impact of borders. Whereas the former was linked to the process of political and economic European integration and globalization, the latter was justified by security measures. Borderlands studies have followed these developments and analyzed the changes generated by Europeanization, globalization and the recent revival of nationalism. Increasingly, the migration crises brought to the fore the question of the ethical dimension of the bordering process. By taking into consideration that borders do not only divide physical space but are also used to sort people according to the degree of their belonging, Laine (2021, p. 747) questions the state-centric thinking and emphasizes that “borders carry considerable moral weight in determining ethical responsibilities towards those who are not considered to belong”. However, since people live in networked societies today, and not in isolated national communities, the humanitarian principle is not the sole argument that borders should be made more permeable. Hence, Laine proposes the ethics of unbounded inclusiveness to move away from the nation state-centric form of organization and the rigid borders and to consider alternative forms of belongingness towards more inclusive societies.

Nevertheless, as the optimistic vision of a borderless world has already vanished, and the idea of cosmopolitical citizenship (Balibar, 2010) has not been implemented by nation states yet, we can rather observe border securitization in Europe than debordering policies (cf. Prokkola, 2021; Léonard & Kaunert, 2020). The tightening of borders and the adoption of more restrictive migration policies results in the increase of clandestine journeys and more desperate and risky attempts to enter EU member states. Thus, securitization which leads to violence, injustice and bad treatment of migrants, also provokes humanitarian impulses on the side of public opinion, NGOs, and migrant activists’ groups. In effect, securitization and humanitarianism at the border are two sides of the same coin: the former is supplemented by the latter, and the latter is determined by the former. This double-bind can be described as ‘hostipitable’ (both hostile and hospitable) condition of EU border regimes (Vaughan-Williams, 2015). What migrants face when they approach Europe is the state of indifference between security measures and human rights. The policies which should help to differentiate between unwelcomed invaders and deserving refugees only contribute to arbitrary treatment of people on the move. The role of states in having control over national borders (and their permeability to different categories of people), but also over boundaries, which relate to social exclusion and inclusion (Donnan & Wilson, 2007) – is strongly evident in current events.

### Cybersecurity – General

#### The 1AC’s call for increased cybersecurity is another manifestation of the hysteric social relation that maintains an unrealizable need for improving cybersecurity through shifting the goals of cybersecurity or proposing unattainable standards

Jacobsen, 2020

(Jeppe Teglskov, researcher at the Royal Danish Defence College’s Institute for Military Technology, “From neurotic citizen to hysteric security expert: a Lacanian reading fo the perpetual demand for US cyber defence,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 8, Iss. 1, 2020, pp. 46-58, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2020.1735830, accessed 7/2/2022, ZW)

At the end of 2008, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) brought together policy experts to develop cybersecurity recommendation for the incoming president. Under the headline ‘Military Doctrine and Deterrence’, the commission report emphasised the importance of ‘the need for a credible military presence in cyberspace to provide a deterrent against potential attackers’ (CSIS 2008, 24). The following quote from the report, however, calls in to question the commission’s own recommendation:

Deterrence in cyberspace is particularly complicated because of the problems with attribution and identification. If a country does not know who is attacking, it is difficult to create appropriate and proportionate responses in ways that reduce the chance of escalation. A signal that a country is contemplating a response that goes to all potential attackers will not deter and could actually create more conflict (ibid.: 26).

In short, if the attacker is not attributable and hence does not fear retaliation, then even the most potent cyber military is superfluous. To make a policy recommendation and in the same breath call into question the soundness of this policy is a hysteric communication par excellence. It avoids the anxiety that emerges when the specific object of desire (offensive military capabilities) is achieved by already introducing a new object of desire (better attribution).

Tellingly, the Administration’s decision to establish the US Cyber Command, the cyber branch of the US military, was immediately criticised as insufficient. CSIS director James Lewis underlined, for example, that ‘the U.S. is widely recognized to have pre-eminent offensive cyber capabilities, but it obtains little or no deterrent effect from this’ (cited in Markoff, Sanger, and Shanker 2010). In other words, the government should do a better job defending against and identifying the culprits in cyberspace.

Then Deputy Secretary of Defense, William J. Lynn III was ready with a plan for improving cyber defence capacities. Presenting the Department’s cyber strategy, Lynn underlined that ‘[US cyber] deterrence will necessarily be based more on denying any benefit to attackers than on imposing costs through retaliation’ (Lynn III 2010, 99–100). The newfound priority of cyber defence did not appear to reassure the expert subject. As a case in point, the National Research Council (NRC) hosted a 2010 workshop with policy experts on cyber deterrence. And shortly after, the independent Defense Science Board (DSB) created a task force on Resilient Military System and the Advanced Cyber Threat to provide recommendations on how to maintain deterrence in the cyber era. Neither the NRC workshop nor the DSB report found offensive cyber capabilities or cyber defence to be the solution to the cyber deterrence problem. Instead, the desired object had drifted along: Now, the Administration needs to clearly articulate the willingness and the capacity to respond to cyberattacks not only with cyber weapons but with all available tools – ultimately nuclear weapons (DSB 2013: 15; Rosenzweig 2010, 247).

Articulating the willingness to respond to cyberattacks with any means was first introduced by the Obama Administration in the 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace and subsequently iterated in both the Department of Defense (2015) Cyber Strategy as well as in a White House cyber deterrence white paper of late 2015 (Obama 2011: 14; Department of Defense 2015: 11; Otto 2015). However, as is prototypical in a hysteric social bond, getting close to the object of desire – that is, having more steadfast articulations about the willingness to retaliate – causes anxiety that prompts a slide towards a new object of desire. In this case, manifesting in a redefinition of the meaning of cyber deterrence.

Two subsequent commission reports on cyber deterrence, namely the CSIS cyber recommendations to President Trump and the 2017 DSB follow-up report on cyber deterrence (CSIS 2017a; DSB. 2017), no longer focused only on large-scale cyberattacks against the US critical infrastructures as that which needed to be deterred. In fact, the government’s cyber deterrence’s efforts including the articulation of a willingness to respond with all means necessary seemed to have worked, as no serious, crippling cyberattacks against US critical infrastructures had taken place – despite the experts’ continuous criticisms of US national cyber insecurity. What the US did not prevent, however, was economic cyber espionage and minor, non-destructive disturbances of public and private networks. Thus, in the new commission reports, the anxiety over such malicious cyber activity was now included as that which needed to be deterred. Once again, anxiety pushes desire along, now in the form of a desire for better defining a proportional response to cyberattacks on private entities and economic espionage. This drift to better declaratory policy also offers an explanation as to why the government – when it finally delivered on the previous demand for better attribution – failed to satisfy the expert’s desire for cyber deterrence. In 2014, the US successfully attributed and indicted Chinese government hackers for commercial cyber espionage, but as the expert’s desire for cyber deterrence now involved a desire for a strong national security response to cyber espionage, the US government’s attributions only reinforced the demands for economic sanctions (Nakashima 2015).

In short, as soon as the government delivers, the expert subject’s desire shifts, from offensive military capabilities in cyberspace to better attribution, to an articulation of willingness to respond, and most recently, to the need to define proportional responses to non-military cyber activity. With the drift, the cyber threat continues as a pertinent national security challenge – to which the solution remains always just out of reach.

Yet, the constant drift in the object of desire is only one manifestation of a hysteric social bond. Another is a demand for the unachievable. One of the policy recommendations that seems most persistent is cyber resilience: The 2013 DSB report demanded investments in resilient systems to ensure a ‘survivable strike capability’ (DSB 2013, 41), which was reinvented as the demand for resilient ‘thin line strike capabilities’ in the 2017 DSB report (2017, 17–8). And both the 2008 and 2017 CSIS report (2008: 27; 2017a: 6), and the NRC workshop proceedings (Rosenzweig 2010, 256) call for more cyber resilience initiatives. As an element in a hysteric social bond, the persistent demand for resilience ties to the lack of clarity that accompanies this policy recommendation. The same reports that call upon the Administration to implement resilience-building measures, call into question the feasibility of resilience. The DSB. (2017: 4, 10) underlines that the Internet of Things ‘will only exacerbate an already tenuous posture and make defense even more challenging in the coming years’, and consequently that ‘offensive cyber capabilities continue to grow and are likely to outpace cyber defense and resilience’. The CSIS (2017a, 6) is equally sceptical: ‘While there have been good advances in the network protections of leading defence contractors, this has only encouraged opponents to become more inventive and more persistent’.

The assessment that resilience in cyberspace is unfeasible is understandable. Resilience is defined as ‘the ability to provide acceptable operations despite disruption: natural or man-made, inadvertent or deliberate’ (DSB 2013, 2). But when is something ‘acceptable’? And, how do you determine whether resilience efforts are deterring the adversary? These questions remind unanswered.

The critical risk literature has explained how resilience, along with precaution, premediation and imagination are styles of reasoning that have come to dominate security governance, for example, in the response to terrorism or natural disasters (Aradau and van Munster 2011). As the above has shown, this also applies to cyberspace; however, reading the expert subject’s call for cyber deterrence through the hysteric social bond reveals the shortcomings of reducing the expert to the provider of security techniques such as resilience. Truly embracing risk or uncertainty management would force expert subjects at least to recognise the need to discuss what ‘acceptable’ levels of cyber risks and ‘resilient enough’ look like. The lack of attention given to questions such as these suggests that the expert subject occupies a social position not simply for managing cyber risks and uncertainties but where identification takes place through making demands that keep the space for criticism open. With reference to uncertainty, the expert subject can always insist that current strategies do not sufficiently manage the cyber insecurities, keep the confrontation with its desire at a distance, and ultimately reproduce ‘cyber’ as a national insecurity.

### Democracy/Liberalism

#### Western security thinking premised on the promotion of liberal international norms is predicated on securitizing and imagined self-image against a racialized, illiberal, and irrational Other

Pan, 2021

(Chengxin, Associate Professor of International Relations at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Deakin University, “Racialised politics of (in)security and the COVID-19 Westfailure,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 9, Iss. 1, 2021, pp. 40-45, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2021.1904195, accessed 7/2/2022, ZW)

Mainstream Western security thinking is predicated on a self-gratifying imaginative geography: the world is divided roughly into two contrasting zones, one marked by community, order, and security and the other by disorder, insecurity, and threat. These imagined binaries are both underpinned by and emblematic of a thinly disguised Orientalist, Eurocentric, and ultimately racist idea, which equates the former zone more or less with whites and the West, and the latter with non-whites (Barkawi and Laffey 2006; Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2019). The idea, often passed off as fact (through the Western-dominated subfield of security studies), has been constitutive of the highly racialised realities in international relations (Bell 2013; Carrozza, Danewid, and Pauls 2017; Ling 2017; Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2020).

Although by no means unique to the West, racism is a key source code of mainstream Western theory and practice of security. Security presupposes a subject, namely, what or who needs security or should feel secure, which, in turn, implies what or whom is to be secured from or against. Central to security studies, therefore, is an implicit ontological bifurcation between the subject of security and its threat. And the security/threat boundaries are often drawn along a ‘colour line’ (Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam 2015).

The racially-mediated binaries in security thinking and practice are enabled above all by an epistemic hierarchy, which insists on ‘the inherent superiority of one’s culture over all others’ (Le Melle 2009, 77). Indeed, racism is first and foremost epistemic racism, which is ‘the foundational form … of racism’ (Grosfoguel 2010, 29). The West’s self-representation as the quintessential modern knowing subject, who has the rational capacity to know the objective world (Pan 2012), is epistemic racism par excellence. Since ‘[k]nowing is then linked to the possibility of control of the known’ (Walker 1988, 51), the knowing Western subject can enjoy certainty, dominance, and security, hence the self-image as a zone of security. The West’s epistemic certainty thus helps lay the groundwork for its sense of moral, political, economic, civilisational, and geostrategic superiority vis-à-vis other races and peoples, whose ‘epistemic inadequacy’ makes them irrational, ignorant, uncivilised, and ontologically threatening (even if occasionally blissfully innocent and/or exotically attractive).

Threats from ‘zones of insecurity’ have taken many forms: tribalism, terrorism, crime, disease, overpopulation, unregulated migration, espionage, unfair trade practice, anarchical, illiberal power politics, or some combinations of the above (Kaplan 1994; Huntington 1996). Intellectually sophisticated and racially agnostic as they are, many (Western) security concepts and approaches are in effect about methodologies of eliminating, minimising, or containing the (largely non-Western) ‘zone of insecurity’, whether through democracy promotion, norm diffusion, free trade, transnational activism, emancipatory intervention and developmental assistance, or by ways of alliance building and expansion, forward defence, military deterrence, containment, power balancing, and border control.

### Hybrid Warfare

#### The aff’s securitization of hybrid warfare is *anxiety-reproducing* – oscillating descriptions between its knowability and unknowability as well as its undefined scope entrenches anxiety and primes audiences to accept strategies to manage anxiety produced by the threat of hybrid warfare

Eberle and Daniel, 2022

(Jakub, Research Director at the Institute of International Relations Prague, and Jan, researcher and the Head of the Centre for the Study of Global Regions at the Institute of International Relations Prague, “Anxiety geopolitics: Hybrid warfare, civilisational geopolitics, and the Janus-faced politics of anxiety,” Political Geography, Vol. 92, January 2022, Article 102502, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102502, accessed 6/30/2022, ZW)

\*HW = hybrid warfare

Building on Heath-Kelly and Jacobsen, our final argument is that hybrid warfare works exactly like their examples, as HW, too, is a discourse that is simultaneously anxiety-repressing and anxiety-reproducing. In fact, we argue that the linking of HW and East/West geopolitics produces a particularly strongly anxiety-ridden discourse. While hybrid warfare presents threats as invisible and omnipresent due to their covert and networked nature, the East/West imagination further raises the stakes and salience of such threats by painting them as parts of a titanic civilisational struggle. The subjects produced by such discourse can never rest, as what may be going on right behind their noses is not just one particular cyber-attack, a single conspiracy theory that has gained traction on Facebook, or merely one instance of information stolen by a spy. Instead, it is a battle for the future of ‘the West’ and the Czech belonging to it, one where the alternative option is the most tragic one: a descent deep into the ‘abyss’ of ‘the East’ (Cadier, 2019). We will now illustrate these arguments by focusing on the unfathomability of HW, the shifting nature of the threats it produces, and the anxieties inherent in the East/West geopolitics that underpin it.

First, the ‘failure to secure’ (Heath-Kelly, 2015) is pre-emptively incorporated in the HW discourse by its portrayal of the looming dangers as insidious, invisible and even impossible to detect. As a key security document states, ‘[t]he principal risk to which a subject attacked by a hybrid campaign is exposed lies in the fact that they will not be able to identify the hybrid campaign – in time, in its full scale, or at all’ (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2016, p. 129). According to the deputy Helena Langˇsadlov ´ ´ a, what we are supposedly facing are highly dangerous, yet ‘creeping threats’, which we ‘cannot see on a day by day basis’ (in Chamber of Deputies, 2019). This leads some to claim that ‘at no point in history was it so extremely difficult to decide, if we are at war, or not’ (Taborský, ´ 2019, p. 164). While there may be little drama on the surface, no one can ever rest in this logic. An attack may be already underway, one that can even be approximated to war, literally at any minute. As the Special Forces general, Karel Rehka, ˇ put it at a conference organised in the Czech parliament: ‘In a way, we are already at war, we just do not realise it or are not able to admit it.’ (Lang, 2015) This is a mode of thinking that produces highly anxious subjects, in a constant sense of the ‘expectant dread’ that is anxiety (Hook, 2015, p. 117), one not yet having a clear referent and directed towards all possible yet still unknown dangers that may materialise at any time.

It is in these notions that an unspecified existential threat may be hidden behind mundane events that the otherwise backgrounded ‘postmodern’ geopolitical imagination of HW suddenly kicks back in. If the ‘modern’ East/West geopolitical imagination ‘made sense’ and provided at least some fleeting ontological security by pointing to Russia, this is frustrated by the surplus anxiety produced via this ‘postmodern’ imagination of insidious, hidden networks operating in physical and cyberspace alike. In fact, as the discourse postulates, we may not even know that it really is Russia in the first place that is behind a particular incident, as hybrid attackers seek to create ‘an environment where responsibility for these activities cannot (at least formally) be attributed to them, or at least only speculatively and with great difficulty’ (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2016, p. 127). We may ultimately never know if this or that mundane event is actually not a part of something much bigger, as it is the very aim of the attacker to ‘prevent a clear interpretation of events and the discovery of their interconnectedness’ (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2016, p. 127). Therefore, while the prevalent ‘modern’ geopolitical reading of HW enables channelling anxiety by constructing Russia an object of fear, it still remains far from the manageable fear of ‘fight or flight’ (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020, p. 241). This is because these supposedly known aspects of the danger are constantly being accompanied and disrupted by the surplus anxiety of the ‘unknown unknowns’ stemming from the partial inclusion of the ‘postmodern’ geopolitical reading. This effectively pre-empts the HW discourse from ever solving the problems it is supposedly designed to tackle, as it is wholly unclear how to act upon threats that we are not yet aware of or do not know how to make sense of.

Second, this oscillation between the known and the unknown and between fear and anxiety manifests itself in the constantly shifting construction of what is supposed to be the exact nature of the threat coming from Russia. This is best illustrated in the wording of the annual reports of the Czech counterintelligence agency (SIS), which reinforce the notion that Russia is indeed a severe threat, yet the precise character and shape of this threat appears to be changing year after year. As already mentioned, in first annual public report reflecting on the situation after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the SIS warned that their assessment showed the formation of what was spectacularly labelled as the ‘New Reincarnation of the Comintern’ – a loose network of allied actors, similar to the Cold War Soviet-controlled network of ideologically affiliated political parties, agitators and agents. The danger was portrayed as a new version of this tried and tested strategy, which Russia supposedly employs to connect different groups dissatisfied with the Western liberal democracy (Security Information Service, 2015, pp. 11–12).

However, the spectre of the Comintern was a one-off, never to appear again. Instead, SIS later concluded that the threat resided in a much looser combination of often uncoordinated actions of Russian intelligence, authentic Czech individuals not in any way linked to Moscow but ‘only’ spreading their own ‘pro-Russian’ worldviews, and finally, even in the lack of education about modern history in schools (Security Information Service, 2018, pp. 6–8). This trend of diffusing the danger from a Kremlin-coordinated network to seeing the threats in mere ideological resonances further continued. The most recent report notes that there is a ‘transition from state-controlled or directed activities to spontaneous actions’ of like-minded actors. ‘When Russian state officials express what they desire to happen (for instance by spreading manipulative information), proxy actors without any links to the Russian state proceed to action on their own initiative and based on what they think the officials might want’ (Security Information Service, 2020, p. 9).

Through this move, the spectre of ‘Russian hybrid warfare’ can now encompass virtually anything that can be somehow interpreted as matching with the desires or interests of the Kremlin, without any need for proving direct links, as these are no longer considered necessary. The construction of ‘a threat’ now includes even situations when ‘a foreign power does not engage in any direct action and keeps its distance, while using various ways (PR, instigating statements, propaganda etc.) to inspire individual persons to take action’ (Security Information Service, 2020, p. 9). Put differently, Russian threat can be present even where there is no direct Russian hand whatsoever. Literally any individual with views somehow similar to those of the Russian state can be seen as part of it, which makes the idea that security can ever be achieved virtually impossible. Instead, this logic contributes to the reproduction of an anxious society, defined by ‘the constant presence of the possibility of that threat, and with it, the sense that government cannot fully protect the people and that danger resides in the everyday’ (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020, p. 247).

Third, this notion that the possibility that something ‘Russian’ may be insidiously present deep within the Czech society then revives also the old anxieties inherent in the ‘modern’ East/West geopolitical imagination itself. Central Europeans’ self-positioning in East/West geopolitics is highly ambivalent (Kuus, 2007; Todorova, 2009). On the one hand, being or becoming part of ‘the Western civilisation’ is a source of ontological security. On the other hand, this security is never quite complete or permanent. This is because Central Europeans locate themselves at the very limit of the West, as ‘European edge-men’ (Ma¨lksoo, 2010, p. 5), whose membership in the civilisation must constantly be proved as it can always be taken away – especially by the forces of the ‘East’. The ‘old shadow of Yalta’, the feeling that the region’s ‘freedom could yet again be expendable in times of crisis’ is constantly present (Ma¨lksoo, 2010, p. 75). Put differently, East/West geopolitics equips the Czech ‘pro-Western’ security intellectuals with a ‘mental map, where the country is depicted as being on the “edge” of Europe and constantly risking to “fall” into an abyss […] traditionally characterised as the “East”’ (Cadier, 2019, p. 84). While the East/West geopolitical imagination can succeed in spatialising the threat in the Russian ‘other’, the position it grants to the self is always potentially insecure. Therefore, it is also East/West geopolitics itself that produces subjects that are constantly on alert, facing the constant ‘possibility of loss of one’s soul’ (Balaska, 2019, p. 8) that defines the experience of anxiety.

Such fragile geopolitical self-positioning further fuels the search for new and new sources of hybrid threats, as failing to uncover and face them may have existential consequences, especially given that ‘Easternness’ may have already infiltrated and compromised the Czech social body. This notion of ‘East within’ links to the above discussed unfathomability and invisibility of HW and manifests itself in multiple ways. For one counterintelligence report, it takes the form of smuggled ideas and narratives, presented ‘in a way leading Czech citizens to believe they are recipients of opinions held by fellow citizens not of Russian propaganda’ (Security Information Service, 2015, p. 11). Similarly, a popular book on ‘fake news’ geopoliticises social attitudes en bloc by identifying them along East/West axis, presenting the ‘disappointed’ part of society as ‘seeing a model in Russia, or perhaps China’ (Gregor, Mlejnkova´, & Zvolsi.info, 2018, p. 62). For others, the ‘East within’ takes the form in the physical presence of ‘Putin’s agents’ who supposedly ‘quite likely teach your children at universities, you meet them for a coffee in your favourite caf´e or work in normal jobs.’ (Kundra, 2016a, p. 88).

The anxiety geopolitics of hybrid warfare is thus also about creating the normatively highly disturbing ‘“red under every bed” mentality’ (Fridman, 2018, p. 3) and applying ‘the ethics of total war […] even to the smallest skirmish’ (Galeotti, 2019, p. 8). Therefore, viewing security threats through the prism of hybrid warfare reproduces a highly anxious society and perpetuates the justification for those ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ (O ´ Tuathail & Agnew, 1992) that would not hesitate to provide the sort of geopolitical fixes that were discussed in the previous sections. Thereby, the discourse ends up reproducing itself, as the two faces of anxiety geopolitics not only disrupt, but also dialectically reinforce one another: geopolitical discourse emerges to repress anxiety and provide ontological security, yet the anxiety inherent in the discourse disrupts ontological security and, to come full circle, creates the need for geopolitical discourses. The result is a society oscillating between its desire to avoid anxiety and the repeated frustration thereof; an affective pulsation that has arguably been elevated to a dominant mode of politics of (in)security in our present time (Eklundh et al., 2017), of which hybrid warfare is a prime example. As similar patterns of anxious over-reaction and securitisation of broad areas of social life have been recognised by authors writing about HW in different empirical contexts (Fridman, 2018; Galeotti, 2019; M¨ alksoo, 2018; Ord ¨ ´en, 2019), we believe that the problem with ‘hybrid warfare’ is of a more general nature and the relevance of our analysis reaches beyond the Czech case.

#### The 1AC’s descriptions of a Russian hybrid warfare deploys Orientalist tropes to secure a collective Western identity threatened by Russia as a scapegoat for dispersed sources of anxiety

Eberle and Daniel, 2022

(Jakub, Research Director at the Institute of International Relations Prague, and Jan, researcher and the Head of the Centre for the Study of Global Regions at the Institute of International Relations Prague, “Anxiety geopolitics: Hybrid warfare, civilisational geopolitics, and the Janus-faced politics of anxiety,” Political Geography, Vol. 92, January 2022, Article 102502, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102502, accessed 6/30/2022, ZW)

\*HW = hybrid warfare

First, a certain event needs to be constructed as a supposed point of origin of the perceived unease, a ‘crisis’ that dislocates the symbolic order (Nabers, 2015). This is the first move in the repression of anxiety, one in which an ‘actually existing’ empirical event is discursively presented as the apparent cause of the deeper ontological crisis that is affectively experienced as anxiety. In the HW discourse in Czechia, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine of 2014 is presented as such profoundly shocking and dislocating event. As the otherwise rather down-to-earth and matter-of-fact military intellectual, Karel Rehka, ˇ puts it: ‘the Russian Federation shocked the whole world. The unimaginable was broken into.’ (Rehka, ˇ 2017, p. 199) ‘Shock’ and ‘helplessness’ are words used also by a high-ranking Czech diplomat (personal interview, Prague, August 4, 2020). A leading Czech think-tanker then recalls how ‘surprised’ he was by Russia’s invasion and how ‘disorganised and fragmented’ the security debates were in the months that followed (Janda, 2017). The affective experience is captured well also in a widely cited and circulated popular book, which vividly describes how ‘we are walking on the edge of a cliff’ and ‘[u]ncertainty is the only thing that you can count on these days’ (Alvarov´ a, 2017, p. 20). Therefore, 2014 was constructed as a radical breakthrough into a much more insecure world. Yet, this move of identifying the supposed origin of these dizzying feelings of anxiety in one particular event was at the same time already the first step of seeking ontological security by making sense of it.

A second step is putting the name on the problem. It is only the performative and affect-laden performance of naming that connects disparate phenomena together and creates a discursive ‘object’ that can be then dealt with politically (Laclau, 2005). In our case, this leads to the creative appropriation of the concepts of ‘hybrid warfare’ and ‘hybrid threats’, which were virtually non-existent in the Czech public discourse prior to 2014 (Daniel & Eberle, 2018), and using them as a linchpin that connects all sorts of societal problems. For an authoritative Czech security document, ‘hybrid threat’ is a ‘way to wage a confrontation or a conflict’, one that is characterised by an extraordinarily broad spectrum of measures: ‘a wide, complex, adaptable, and integrated combination of conventional and unconventional means, overt and covert activities, characterised primarily by coercion and subversion’ (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2016, p. 127). The range of actors that can execute such methods is similarly broad, including ‘military, paramilitary, and various civilian actors’ (ibid.). Similarly, an overview of a ‘Russian hybrid strategy’ provided by the counterintelligence service includes ‘interpretation of modern history’, different ways of ‘information warfare’, ‘networking/infiltration’ across the fields of politics, economy, crime, espionage, culture and education, and military/guerrilla operations alike (Security Information Service, 2018, p. 7). In statements like these, hybrid warfare is stretched so as to incorporate almost anything that can be understood as a hostile activity. A such, it becomes an universal object of fear, broad enough to be used as a placeholder for all sorts of anxieties.

In the third move, hybrid warfare is territorialised by pointing to Russia as its ultimate source. The ‘postmodern’ geopolitical imagination of hybrid warfare in terms of flows, clouds and infrastructures, is backgrounded in favour of the ‘modern’ territorial East/West geopolitics of a Russian threat. In certain cases, this means little more than merely pointing out that it is indeed Russia that ‘has executed hybrid operations [ …], including targeted disinformation activities and cyber-attacks’, as the Defence Strategy (Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, 2017, p. 7) puts it explicitly and other documents hint at implicitly (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 2015). More interesting are the instances which present Russia not only as one source of threats, but as an orchestrator coordinating all possible means and actors. In such cases, the ‘postmodern’ geopolitical imagination of networks is used and reproduced, yet with a key twist: such networks are seen as hierarchical, with centre in Moscow. In this logic, different domestic actors – ‘alternative news’ websites spreading anti-Western narratives, right-wing populists, even contrarian intellectuals – can ultimately be tied to an overall Russia’s masterplan (for an example see Janda & Kundra, 2016). The counterintelligence agency reports are an example of this ‘puppet-master’ approach. One of them lists ‘covert infiltration of Czech media and the Internet’ and ‘foundation of puppet organizations, covert and open support of populist or extremist subjects’ among the key activities of Russia’s ‘information operations’ (Security Information Service, 2016, p. 9). Another outlines this logic in colourful detail, claiming that ‘Russia is creating a structure in Europe drawing on the concept of the Comintern (the Communist International; the Third International) founded by the Soviet Union’ (Security Information Service, 2015, p. 11), an organised network of all sorts of actors ‘with pro-Russian stances or fighting against the system’ (ibid., 12).

However, different actors can be labelled as agents or instrument of HW and then geopoliticised and linked to Russia not only by direct association, but also because they are merely voicing opinions that can be somehow qualified as ‘pro-Russian’. As a more recent counterintelligence report puts it, actually an ‘overwhelming majority of disinformation websites in Czech are the work of Czech […] citizens, who are not supported by Russian entities.’ (Security Information Service, 2018, p. 8) Nevertheless, this still makes them a part of a broader geopolitical threat, as ‘these people and their internet projects are misused by Russia to spread propaganda or support other components of the hybrid strategy.’ (ibid., 8) It is this imagination of a Russian-orchestrated networked threat that enables a leading Czech journalist to blankly dismiss the prominent disinformation website, Aeronet. cz, as ‘writing for Putin’ (Kundra, 2016b), without any evidence of links to the Russian state known at that point and with his own subsequent investigations showing that this is most likely not the case. It also makes it possible to deal with anxieties by externalising the problem, such as when a popular book argues that ‘Furious hate […] is not Czech, it is something new, foreign. It came from the outside and ‘somehow’ entered into us.’ (Alvarov´ a, 2017, p. 88).

In the fourth and final move, this ‘hybrid’ struggle with Russia is endowed with meaning by being inserted into the whole symbolic structure of East/West civilisational geopolitics, in which ‘[i]ssues of security and geopolitics are […] reframed in cultural terms. They become simultaneously geographical, cultural and strategic concepts, and they diffuse into ever more spheres of political life.’ (Kuus, 2007, p. x) The societal anxieties that are managed via the narrative of hybrid warfare emanating from Russia, are now also made part of an eternal struggle between the East and the West. This reactivates the ‘mental maps’, in which ‘the West’ functions as a desired point of identification and a promise of security and prosperity, whereas ‘the East’ is seen as ‘an abyss’, a notion ‘which in the Czech political discourse refers less to a geographical space than to ontological categories defining the alienated past of the Czech Republic.’ (Cadier, 2019, p. 84) As one member of parliament, Jan Bartoˇsek, put it, the Czechs are left with an unequivocal choice: ‘either we will be part of NATO as a firm ally of our pro-Western orientation, or we will be just one of Russia’s many colonies. There is no third way.’ (in Chamber of Deputies, 2018a).

In statements like these, Russia is presented as a fundamentally different entity, a quintessentially Oriental actor, belonging to a different ‘universe’ that ‘until nowadays has not met’ with the European one (Alvarova, ´ 2017, p. 70). Echoing classical Orientalist tropes, Russians supposedly rely on ‘[m]ysticism, irrationality, associational instead of logical thinking – thus, a model of thinking that is of different civilisation, the one we know rather from the Orient’ (Alvarova, ´ 2017, p. 193). The potentially catastrophic consequences of allying with Russia are then often presented through references to the past, reinforcing the notion that what is at stake in HW is in fact yet another instance of a historical struggle between civilisations. ‘Many of us probably know our modern history, from 1945 through 1948, Russian advisers, death of [foreign minister] Jan Masaryk, occupation in 1968. The Russian influence, which simply broke us away from the West, ripped us from [our] democratic development, and has incalculable economic consequences stretching to this day.’ (Helena Langˇsadlov ´ a ´ in Chamber of Deputies, 2018b).

This idea that issues like propaganda, misinformation or rise of populism are instances of a dramatic geopolitical confrontation, is finally driven home also by the notion that it is the West as a whole that is under attack, not just any individual country. According to a counterintelligence report, ‘the goal of the Russian hybrid campaign’ is ‘primarily to weaken NATO and the EU internally, e.g. by weakening individual member states’ (Security Information Service, 2018, p. 7). Therefore, should the Czechs fail to defend themselves, they are supposedly endangering something much bigger. According to a member of parliament, Jan Lipavský, what the Russians want is ‘to break European unity’ (Chamber of Deputies, 2018b). Such ideas connect hybrid warfare squarely to the Messianistic undertones of the East/West geopolitical imagination, in which the Central Europeans serve as guardians defending the West at its limit. To paraphrase Milan Kundera’s (1984) foundational essay on Central European civilisational geopolitics, by fighting hybrid warfare, the Czechs are risking ‘dying for Czechia and the West’, which indeed gives a sense of deep purpose and meaning to their cause and produces a strong anxiety-repressing narrative.

To sum up this part, one important aspect of the anxiety geopolitics of hybrid warfare lies in the way how it allows channelling deeper anxieties by using the East/West geopolitical imagination to produce familiar storylines, identities and objects of fear. Despite being constructed as multifaceted, broad and difficult to detect, hybrid warfare is made legible by being projected on a familiar ‘mental map’, where it becomes merely the most recent instance of long-lasting struggle between the West and a fundamentally different, antagonist Russia. However, the relationship between the discourses of hybrid warfare and East/West geopolitics goes both ways: HW is not only territorialised by, but also gives broader meaning to and, in a way, promises to reinforce the East/West civilisational geopolitics. It is in and through HW that Russia is constructed as fundamentally different and the West presented as a coherent entity under attack, as well as something worth defending against the potentially tragic alternatives. Through the discourse of hybrid warfare, doubts about the relevance or resilience of a Westcentric geopolitical order are seemingly brushed away and old geopolitical identities are hardened. This is precisely the logic of ontological security that makes the ideas of a ‘return of geopolitics’ and the ‘new Cold War’ so appealing, as shown by Guzzini (2012, 2016) and Browning (2018).

### NATO

#### NATO’s addiction to security is increasing threats and insecurity, and perpetuating their and others addiction.

Porter 10 (Patrick Porter, Patrick Porter is Chair in International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is a Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, NATO'S FUTURE: Hooked On Security, TheWorldToday.org, November 2010)//KS

Currently, pressing menaces to our way of life are played out through banks not tanks. Yet NATO is not content with this staggering historical success, it cannot get enough security. Hungry to justify its existence and fascinated with itself, it ! scans the horizon for threats and the shadows of threats. NATO's role and limits have not been finally settled. Neither operations in the Sudan, Bosnia, Kosovo and I Afghanistan, nor new missions, nor new members, resolve the issue. There are endless arguments for growing it, redefining it, abandoning it, even for an Atlantic-Russian super-alliance. This identity question is not abstract. The issue of NATO's domain was bloodily raised in Russia's 2008 war over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it divides the Ukrainian people, and in Afghanistan soldiers are dying and losing limbs to keep the alliance afloat. Its visionaries point to an unstable, complex world, a turbulent frontier on the periphery forever threatening our core. They warn of terrorists armed with apocalyptic weapons, of failing states and stealthy cyber attacks, a web of chain reactions and chaos. Their remedy is expanding membership and forward leaning offensives into failed states, or new game-changing defenses such as a missile shield system. And in the age of human security, defense means the export of Atlantic market democracy to stabilize the dark places of the earth and widen our defensive perimeter. Addiction increases in intensity even while the addict loses sight of the side effects. With peace and stability our forbears could not have dreamt of, NATO's addiction and identity crisis has become dangerous in itself. If there is a threat, it lies partly in NATO's messianic restlessness; its innocent vision of threats not flowing partly from its own behavior, but being simply ťout there'; its ideological fundamentalism; its own self-perception as the natural guardian of world order with obviously pure intentions ; and its exhausting, self-defeating pursuit of relevance.

### Nuclear War

#### The 1AC’s securitization of nuclear weapons creates a self-fulfilling prophecy – their rhetoric is psychological conditioning that necessitates militarization of the American public and justifies endless warfare in the name of securing the homeland

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Nuclear End-Times

In the U.S., nuclear fear colonized the very idea of the catastrophic in the twentieth century. It was officially deployed to create a new kind of national security state, and with it, a new citizen-state relationship mediated by images of absolute destruction. During the Cold War, the nuclear state not only built a meticulous global machinery for nuclear war, it also taught Americans to think and feel as nuclear subjects, to contemplate a sudden end of the U.S. and transform that cataclysmic vision into a perverse new form of nation-building. What we remember today as Civil Defense, the duck and cover drills and national nuclear attack exercises of the first decades of the Cold War were the means of installing specific ideas about nuclear crisis within American society, and then mobilizing that imagined crisis as a means of militarizing the public. The cataclysmic became a formal basis for political life in this moment, making claims on the imminent death of the nation a powerful new form of state- and nation-building. The nuclear revolution was thus both technological and psycho-social, simultaneously material, cultural, and emotional. We forget today that the nuclear crisis has not always been with us, that before 1945 the future had many worries but not one overpowering, totalizing one. In the U.S., the atomic bomb has always been a double-edged revolution, simultaneously installing a new domestic vulnerability (in the form of surprise nuclear attack) as well as an absolute offensive power (in the form of the U.S. nuclear arsenal). The bomb becomes the basis for U.S. “superpower” standing but also reorganizes collective death as imminence, a pure potential loaded into every second of everyday life. Thus, it sutures the ability to destroy and be destroyed in a new machine form, one that folds official terrors and hegemonic desires together in a novel configuration. Beginning in the early 1950s, the public project of Civil Defense was to teach Americans to respond to nuclear danger productively as Cold Warriors, to train the public to psychologically engage nuclear crisis as the basis of American power and international order.14 Civil Defense constituted (that is, both invented and installed) a new register of threat in everyday American life, the surprise nuclear attack that would decimate urban America and leave the rest of the country a radioactive ruin in a matter of minutes. Civil Defense was rehearsed for generations in public schools and through national mass media campaigns, and informs official disaster planning to this day. Its extraordinarily achievement was to turn contemplating the end of the nation-state into a form of national building, constituting an affective relation to destruction as the terms of a new collective beginning.15 This image of catastrophe, constituting the public side of nuclear war planning, was extraordinarily influential, enabling a new kind of Cold War consensus of anti-communism and global capitalism through mass psycho-social domestic regulation. In other words, by deploying the imminence of ultimate danger and using official secrecy to carefully calibrate the depiction of nuclear threat, the Cold War nuclear state transformed catastrophe itself into a politicized and instrumental vision, a core tool of domestic governance. Evoking the sudden end of American civilization has since become a basic tool in governance, a reliable means of blocking domestic debate as well as taking extraordinary international actions—most recently, invading other states (such as, Iraq in 2003) and conducting deadly drone strikes around the world. But if the public side of Cold War nuclear crisis was civil defense, with its commitment to emotional management via images of the end of the nation-state, what about official logics and registers; that is, what of the actual governance of nuclear war? With that question in mind let’s consider the U.S. nuclear war plan of the early Cold War, the first formally coded U.S. nuclear war strategy, an official program for planetary destruction.16 Conceived during a period of hyperactive U.S. and Soviet thermonuclear testing in the late 1950s, the official U.S. nuclear war program was breathtakingly simple and unprecedentedly violent.17 The U.S. nuclear war plan consisted of two versions of the same option: a pre-emptory strike against global communism, and a retaliatory strike against global communism.18 Both plans involved using the entire U.S. nuclear arsenal to eliminate communism worldwide (from the Soviet Union to North Korea to China) within a few hours of nuclear warfare. Thus, it inscribed as U.S. policy a commitment to maximal violence as “defense.” This program was depicted in a U.S. Air Force film, The Power of Decision, commissioned in 1958 strictly for internal military use.19 It was declassified, and provided to the openness activists at the National Security Archive by the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in 2010, having not likely been watched in decades.20 This is a rare record of how those in control of the nuclear arsenal first imagined and internally discussed fighting a global nuclear war. It was made for restricted internal Air Force use and thus was not trying to minimize the consequences of nuclear war for a public audience along the lines of Civil Defense, but rather sought to shape ideas about the rationality and reliability of the nuclear system itself for war fighters. As the American public was learning to duck and cover in the event of nuclear war, the command and control officers were learning how to push the buttons to launch a new kind of totalizing violence. Walking viewers through the command and control logics of nuclear weapons and war, the film offers a factual, and remarkably affectless, depiction of how the U.S. and the Soviet Union would consume each other under mushroom clouds. The film constitutes the ability of U.S. command and control to survive a nuclear attack and successfully retaliate as a “victory,” regardless of the subsequent global nuclear cataclysm. Viewers are told early on that the U.S. has the power to “strike anywhere in the world” and, in a few hours of nuclear war, deliver “more explosive power than has been used that in all the previous wars in human history combined.” Thus, this film is also about American self-fashioning as a reluctant but supremely powerful warrior-state, articulating the imaginary terms for righteous revenge against a surprise Soviet attack. Power of Decision depicts a psychosocial field of projection and fantasy, but one mediated by a global technological infrastructure of mass destruction. Film has always been a key means of establishing—giving both form and image—to the nuclear danger in the U.S. Nuclear fear had to be learned before it could be felt. The nuclear security state created films for every audience—military personnel, civilians, scientists, and politicians—each crafted to bring them into a specific relationship to the bomb.21 The vibrant production of public films for civil defense was only exceeded by the production of classified films for use within the weapons laboratories, military branches, and for policy makers. The Power of Decision establishes the serious authority and closed world system of early nuclear war plans within the classified networks of the time but also, in detailing how the U.S. would fight a nuclear war, demonstrates the paradox of that authority.22 Here security and insecurity meet under the sign of the mushroom cloud, and nuclear governance—despite an all-out effort to make it logical and proportional—is rendered absurd as it contemplates generating hundreds of millions of deaths worldwide in a few minutes of nuclear warfare. In the opening frame of The Power of Decision, viewers meet an Air Force officer, who stares directly at the camera and introduces the film. The style of his presentation is that of a military briefing, blunt but with certain flourishes: declaring that he is standing hundreds of feet underground in a blast and radiation proof bunker, our narrator theatrically walks through layer upon layer of internal security to the command center itself, stating that: “From this room, the [Air] Force throughout the world is controlled and monitored twenty-four hours a day—in peace as it would be in war.” Rendering the distinction between war and peace suddenly murky, our narrator quickly introduces viewers to the “Big Board”—an analog map of all the various strike routes aimed at the Soviet Union, as well as the exercises that are currently taking place. A tangled web of multicolored lines, the diagram obliterates the USSR under the weight of Air Force bomber vectors, actual planes in the air, potential exercises, feints, and alerts. We are told that attack vectors are being flown every minute of every day and, to keep “the enemy” from being able to predict American routes and strategies, that there are fake exercises mixed into the planned assault strategy. Viewers are introduced to the “red phone,” which over-rides all other communications in an alert, as well as the multiple systems for gaining information about the global fleet of American planes and the military actions of enemy states. This depiction of a global early warning and command and control system is the formal project of the film, but steely determination to fight a nuclear war is the fetish. Defense and deterrence are collapsed into nuclear war fighting ability in this presentation, which depicts nuclear war as an affectless circuit of human-machine interfaces and expertise. The will to fight is portrayed as equally crucial to the technological infrastructure of nuclear war as the bomb itself. The film is organized in two parts, the first a briefing of Air Force nuclear logistics focused on “Operation Quickstart” (the ongoing training for nuclear attack), while the second, “Operation War Dance” offers a live action illustration of the process of recognizing a Soviet attack, pursuing an American counter-strike, and then conducting a post-nuclear war damage assessment. In the first part, an animation of the globe demonstrates how U.S. and Soviet aircraft can now fly over the polar north to attack one another, underscored by a second animation of a globe covered in mushroom clouds (see Figure 1.1). This animation is the precursor to dramatizing the global sequence of nuclear war, this time structured around actual U.S. nuclear test footage of thermonuclear detonations, as well as blast and destruction sequences from the nuclear test program, all intercut with staged command and control decision-making. The largely analog universe of American command control and information systems is presented as cutting edge technology, allowing near instantaneous global communications, a 24/7 monitoring of Soviet activities, and an always on alert nuclear Air Force that has at least 15 percent of its fleet in the air at all times. This is a system claiming the highest level of rationality: technological precision is combined with exacting timetables, sequential assessments, and escalating actions, but inevitably this techno-scientific system results in the end of the known world. Thus, the hyper-rationality of the nuclear system is mobilized in an attempt to over-ride the inevitable reality of its use, showing how security and defense have paradoxically merged with mass violence on a new kind of planetary scale in Cold War nuclear logics. As reports come into the command center of a Soviet first use of nuclear weapons in Europe and Japan, a general intones: “By giving up the initiative, the West must expect to take the first blow.” This is a coded reference to pre-emption, as nuclear debates in the 1950s focused on the illogic of allowing a nuclear strike on the U.S. if it could be pre-empted by a surprise U.S. nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. The head of the Strategic Air Command, Curtis LeMay, advocated striking the Soviet Union before their nuclear forces reached parity with the U.S..23 But a U.S. military culture founded on the Japanese “sneak attack” at Pearl Harbor resisted the logics of nuclear pre-emption, arguing that such an assault would be against American values. Moreover, in the age of thermonuclear weapons, a preemptory attack would not eliminate the possibility of a nuclear counter-attack (precisely what is documented in The Power of Decision). As the film theatrically presents, no matter who starts a nuclear conflict, massive destruction occurs all around the world: there is no place of safety on planet Earth during a nuclear war. The Power of Decision is ultimately a documentary about a “defense system” that is also a planetary mechanism of collective suicide. The Air Force soon unleashes its nuclear bombers, staging sequential and incremental runs across Soviet territories to close in on “Target M”, presumably Moscow, which is soon reported destroyed. After less than a day of nuclear warfare, the U.S. has eliminated the Soviet Union, as one U.S. General puts it: “They must quit: We have the air and the power and they know it.” But what does such a victory look like? The after assessment, also a briefing on the big board, reveals a stark reality: while the U.S. nuclear system worked perfectly in terms of command and control, over 60 million Americans are dead or injured. The industrial core of the U.S.—Detroit, Chicago, Pittsburgh, as well as New York—is destroyed. Similarly, major cities in Europe, Japan, as well as much of the Soviet Union and China are radioactive ruins. Viewers do not get an assessment of the total global dead. But in addition to the urban destruction, radioactive fallout would travel globally bringing a second wave of death in the form of radiation injury. In 1958, a “nuclear winter”—produced by the combined atmospheric effects of the particulate matter elevated into the stratosphere by destroying cities on this scale—was not yet an operative concept.24 Thus, weather is only discussed as a problem for managing planes in flight and is not yet part of the post-nuclear world assessment, which we now know would likely include a massively destabilized climate. But, even on its own terms, The Power of Decision documents the nuclear cataclysm as a techno-rational system, one in which the ability to exert American “will” on the Soviet Union is constituted as a victory despite the hundreds of millions of deaths worldwide, leaving an image of victory at the end that is apocalyptic at its core. The insight that war is now too deadly to actually fight is a repeated refrain in the film. But this refrain is undermined by the obvious pleasure in detailing exactly how the nuclear war machine would function in a matter of minutes to bring about an unprecedented, and perhaps the very last, global calamity This ever-expanding technical capacity to fight a global nuclear war constitutes the first human generated and controlled planetary crisis. In the first decade of the Cold War, people faced the possibility of an absolute ending of their own making for the first time, a political deployment of a global infrastructure of mass destruction in which there might not be a human left to tell the story of what happened and why. In this regard, The Power of Decision does not contemplate what the world would be like for the nuclear war fighting team as they leave the bunker, return to the surface, and enter the post-nuclear ruins. The new American empire would be highly radioactive, subject to a radically destabilized climate, and structured by unprecedented levels of material damage and psychological trauma. It might be a technical victory for the U.S. within the logics of the Cold War system as the film claims, but a planetary cataclysm nonetheless, all achieved in less than a day of warfare. The Power of Decision offers no insight into the cause or logic of the Soviet attack or considers the existence of the nuclear war machine itself, opting for a factual treatment of machines, vectors, targets, and casualties. There is no room for diplomacy in this vision—only military action. What is also lost in the description of closed world machines and nuclear delivery systems is the extraordinary amount of work that it took to build a global doomsday system. With each frame the nuclear fetish is ever more naturalized in this filmic production, making catastrophe the basis for state power rather than a feat of human engineering that could simply be dismantled or not extended in the name of collective security. Indeed, after 1958, the U.S. nuclear arsenal only grows in both numbers and explosive power, reaching a peak of over 35,000 nuclear weapons by the end of the 1960s, enough to destroy every major city on the planet many times over. U.S. “defense” remains to this day founded on the ability to strike anywhere on planet earth, and to destroy all major population centers outside the U.S., within a few minutes of nuclear warfare. Culturally, this notion of the end—of a nuclear strike that obliterates totally and almost instantaneously—has come to define American notions of the cataclysmic. From nuclear war to the war on terror, U.S. security logics are structured by fear of the surprise attack that is constituted as both imminent and complete. To a remarkable degree, nuclear fear has been coded into the idea of disaster itself in American culture, allowing counter-formations that attempt to be equally total, equally surprising, equally violent. In this way, building a counter-communist state during the Cold War (and, a counter-terror state today) has relied on certain images of the end, promoted and magnified via official state systems as a means of affectively mobilizing diverse publics and experts. With constant technological improvements in missiles and warhead design, speed soon became a particular problem in the nuclear age. By the 1960s, the technological terms of nuclear war had advanced to such an extent that the entire system had to be slowed down to allow human decision-making in the midst of crisis. Everything from the telephone hot line between U.S. and Soviet leaders (established after the Cuban Missile Crisis) to nuclear war plans themselves were structured around the realization that a nuclear war could start before there was time for a political debate or alternative action to launching a full counter-strike.25 The always-on-alert system of missiles-bombers-submarines armed with thermonuclear weapons made not launching a nuclear war a minute-to-minute calculus, and then naturalized that restraint as the basis of “defense”. In psycho-social terms, this means that Americans have lived for more than half a century in the temporal space in which the missiles may have always already been launched—that is, within the 15-minute window offered by early warning systems. The nuclear cataclysm thus may have always already happened, with simply the global fallout to be negotiated. Nuclear crisis has in this way come to structure our very idea of crisis, where the sudden shock of a total ending becomes the basis for thinking large-scale threat. The slow and slower violences of capital, energy, health, and environment become difficult to see as forms of cataclysmic violence precisely because nuclear war offers Americans so perfect and speedy an image of the end.26 Our notions of catastrophe today have been crafted by the nuclear system, which invented a machinery and imaginary of ultimate endings. This concept of danger—totalizing and short—is forever at odds with nontotalizing violences, cataclysms of slower duration, and particularly threats that exceed the power of the nation-state itself.

### Russia – Disinformation

#### The 1AC securitizes Russian disinformation threat – constructing uniquely Russian AI attacks.

Unver 22 - Associate Professor at Ozyegin University, Department of International Relations (Ahmet Kurnaz AND\*\* Research Assistant, Political Science and Public Administration, Çanakkale 18 Mart University “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=4040148)

Our analysis has shown that NATO has developed two disinformation-related communication strategies for two outlets: a more up-to-date and faster-developing threat discourse for its Twitter presence, and a more traditional, slow-moving threat presence visible in its official documents. This is particularly interesting and acutely visible in more 20th century military topics like command and control cohesion, missile defense, air defense architecture, naval defense, satellites and military intelligence-related topics that are more frequently mentioned in official documents, and much less referenced on Twitter. However, the overwhelming majority of disinformation, misinformation, hybrid war, information warfare and fake news-related communication topics are securitized on Twitter. This shows the emergence of two NATO discourses: one for its official documents, and one for its social media presence and messaging. The advent of digital communication technologies and social media has been significant for the evolution of securitization. Since securitization entails production and dissemination of insecurity frames through discursive networks, a more dynamic, interconnected information ecosystem is more conducive for collective meaning-making. On social media, the formation of insecurity processes are more rapid and interactive, and are able to influence and alter traditional, boring securitizing acts of elites. To that end, media outlets like Twitter provide a more interactive and fast-paced securitizing environment where elites and non-elites can set the security agenda and mobilize masses. The most clear expression of this novel medium, as demonstrated in our results, is that NATO’s Twitter securitization efforts change much faster, and spread more widely than traditional outlets like official speeches, texts and reports. This could be interpreted in two ways: first, that NATO may prefer securitizing disinformation exclusively on Twitter, since such threats are generally more visible and debated on social media platforms. The second interpretation is that NATO’s official statements and documents could largely be focusing on macrolevel doctrinal issues that pose a direct military security threat to its members, rather than disinformation, which is a nuisance, but poses no direct military threat. Since disinformation is being discussed in contemporary policy debates within the context of electoral integrity and social polarization, their actual military relevance may be less relevant to be taken into account in formal NATO documents. In either case, our study of the NATO lexicon demonstrated that disinformation and related terms are constructed as uniquely ‘Russian’ nuisances. This isn’t surprising since most of these terms - at least their digital interpretations - have entered the NATO lexicon after the Russian military involvement in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. However, since then, Russia remained the only country against which NATO has constructed its disinformation narratives, indicating that Russia is NATO’s sole disinformation concern. Although very recently China has emerged as a runner-up country within the context of COVID-related disinformation concerns, Russia is largely the main threat in NATO’s lexicon. This could be counterproductive to long-term NATO efforts to combat disinformation, given the global prevalence of fake news and information meddling. While Russian disinformation efforts are observably valid, cornering a universal problem like disinformation into the limited space of NATO’s interactions with a single country may lead to conceptual contraction. This in turn, may prevent NATO from mobilizing full alliance resources against disinformation, defined as a global and universal problem. Overall, our analysis has shown that NATO still defines its security identity against Russia, and there isn’t a significant shift in NATO’s securitization dynamics since the Cold War, evidenced by our comparative analysis of older and newer NATO texts. Although Chinese disinformation attempts have also begun to enter into NATO threat language, NATO’s primary discursive security identity continues to develop against and around Russia. This is most evident in our longitudinal analysis or pre- and post-2014 documents that prioritize Russia as a threat alike, implying that it is not really disinformation or fake news agenda that is rendering Russia a threat for NATO. This suggests the hypothesis that even if technologies change, NATO Russia rivalry will remain securitized the same way. In other words, contemporary disinformation and fake news agenda is a continuation of the same NATO-Russia rivalry – at least in discursive form – through newer mediums.

### Russia – General

#### Mutual securitization between Russia and the United States creates a “zero sum game” and validates extreme measures in the name of “security.”

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Егор Simanov “HOW COULD NATO AND RUSSIA CO-EXIST IN THE TIME OF THE INFORMATION AND "HYBRID" WARS? “No 1 (18) (2021) Pages: 100-105 https://journals.ssau.ru/smus/article/view/8782/en\_US

The current condition of relations between Russia and the West, which consists of the NATO member-states, tends to chaotization and elimination of the institutions providing the architecture of regional and global security.

Both Russia and NATO are concerned about ensuring their security. Russian actions to strengthen their defenses (modernization of the army, military exercises) are viewed by NATO as a threat to the security of its member countries. At the same time, the expansion of NATO to the east (the admission of Eastern European countries into the ranks of the Alliance, with the ensuing conduct of military exercises, the introduction of Western standards, and the creation of new military infrastructure) is viewed by Russia as bringing the Alliance closer to the Russian borders. Here we see a classic manifestation of the "zero-sum game" when the success of one side in defending its security is perceived by the other side as a threat to its security and leads to countermeasures.

Moreover, it’s possible to use the concept of securitization proposed by the Copenhagen school of security studies to describe actors’ moves [1]. Official documents in the field of security, such as the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation and the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, NATO 2030 Report, especially the concepts and strategies of national security of the Alliance member-states, define each other in the categories of “military threats” (in case of Russia) and immediate existential threats (in case of NATO and member countries). The parties concerned or "securitized" certain aspects of international interaction: they translate them into the category of threats to the existence or integrity of the state or security in the region, which makes it possible to use or "legitimize" extraordinary means to counter this threat.

The situation is complicated by the use of images of "friend or foe" associated with the rhetoric of securitization in order to resolve the domestic issues rather than those of foreign policy. Such attitude is typical, for Russia to a lesser degree than for the "West" due to the more heterogeneous nature of the "West" itself.

#### Russia threats Are overstated – caused by energy concerns instead of security dynamics

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How the EU frames Russia before and after the Crimean annexation betters our understanding of the motives and incentives behind a securitized unanimity in EU energy policy and decarbonization given previous internal dissensus. Europe’s energy transition and security policy is contingent upon Russian relations, considering its gas dependency. Given the 2022 Ukrainian invasion, studying past rhetorical change instigated within the EU is relevant, using the 2014 annexation as a potential catalyst. Russian energy flows reaching the EU are decreasingly predictable since they pass through key transit states like Ukraine. An overview of recent EU-Russian normative trajectories becomes appropriate as the EU tackles an energy crisis and is interconnected with an unreliable energy provider. Complex interdependence is used to explain the EU’s framing of Russia in energy relations, where mutual dependence, vulnerability and sensitivity to policy change define the states’ well-being, as postulated by Keohane and Nye. Marco Siddi’s conflict-cooperation dichotomy on the Russian Other supplements the framing analysis. An abductive coding approach forms the methodology, where the chosen material may inform the codes, alongside conceptual themes generated beforehand. The frames are applied to EU-parliamentary policy briefings, commission frameworks and bilateral EU-Russian roadmaps spanning between 2011-2016 with three yielded frames: ‘Commercial ties and sunk costs’, ‘Jeopardized security order’, and ‘Fossil-bound authoritarianism’. These frames are divided into pre-and post-annexation sections. The outcome points to attitude shifts in the EU, from perceiving Russia as a Cooperative Other to an Antagonistic Other. This manifests itself within energy security realms and partly in decarbonization. All three frames imply an EU-Russian bilateral relationship entrenched with sunk costs and commitments—with ideological rifts widening in energy security where the EU frames Russia as a normative and contractual violator. The changed framing of Russia may thus help explain how EU energy policy experienced recent change.

### Tech – Dual Use

#### The aff’s threat construction of dual-use technology causes security dilemmas

Lupovici 21 Lupovici, Amir. “The Dual-Use Security Dilemma and the Social Construction of Insecurity.” Taylor & Francis, 6 Jan. 2021, Amir Lupovici is a senior lecturer in the School of Political Science, Government and International Affairs at Tel Aviv University and a research fellow in the Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center at Tel Aviv University. He was a faculty fellow in the School of International Service at American University (2017-2018) and a visiting scholar in the Centre for Conflict Resolution of International Conflicts at the University of Copenhagen (2014), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2020.1866845. //parip

A dual-use security dilemma occurs when actors face an opponent that wields technologies with both civil and military/harmful applications. In developing this concept of the dual-use security dilemma, I build on traditional and constructivist approaches to security. Following traditional security scholars, I suggest that uncertainty shapes actors’ behavior and argue that we can extend the concept of security dilemma to capture the dynamics around the threat of dual-use technologies. However, these uncertainties, and actors’ responses, are also socially constructed and shaped by knowledge and social understandings. From a traditional security perspective, the dual-use security dilemma extends the dynamics of policy makers’ fears around an opponent’s defensive or offensive intentions to include the fear of the potentially harmful civil technologies. Policy makers are uncertain whether the opponents have harmful intentions in using the technology. But the potential of their using or adapting the technology for harmful purposes, even over the long term, creates insecurity and may spur policy makers to take measures to address the threat. Similar to the traditional security dilemma, these measures can influence an opponent’s behavior, leading it to acquire military means or even to make military use of the dual-use technology. Furthermore, and also like the traditional security dilemma, these dynamics may spiral, aggravating the actors’ security. Even actors whose aim was to develop technology solely for civil purposes may find themselves in an arms race or a costly situation. While militarily arming a civilian project can be very expensive (for both sides), failing to respond to a military project because of its civilian characteristics can also be very costly. From a constructivist approach, the dilemma is shaped by how the insecurity is constructed. Insecurity is not given, but rather is socially produced through actors calling attention to certain issues and mobilizing support to address them. Moreover, how a technology is applied—for peaceful or military purposes—is also socially determined. This means a technology’s dual-usage is influenced not only by its technical characteristics, but also by international norms, by how it is conceived, and by how knowledge is mediated by socio-scientific agents. Seeing a technology as dual-use allows an actor to construct it as a(n) (existential) threat, even if the technology is developed for civil purposes. The dilemma, then, is whether or not to securitize. While securitizing a potential challenge carries the advantage of preparing for a threat and mobilizing support for certain policy measures, it can also contribute to a spiral insecurity dynamic. Once a technology has been acknowledged as dual-use, an enunciator can take advantage of the accompanying uncertainty of how the technology will be used. They can securitize an opponent's dual-use technology to justify taking extraordinary measures to address it—regardless of the opponent’s intentions around developing the technology’s military/harmful applications. Furthermore, the very act of securitizing an opponent’s technology without taking any extraordinary measures—can alarm an opponent, who then initiates a securitizing reaction. All these may result in a securitizing chain reaction that decreases both actors’ security.

### Terrorism

#### The 1AC’s representations of terrorism are racialized threat constructions that boost Islamophobia- Trump’s administration proves

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Melissa Jane Kronfeld, May 2018 “The Construction and Prioritization of Threats in the Post-Cold War Era and the Evolution of American National Security Policy ” https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/57350/PDF/1/play/ //mj

When employing crisis discourse to frame the threat of terrorism, Trump has consistently engaged in the amplified, fear-mongering rhetoric necessary for high level prioritization, as depicted in Chapter Four. Crisis discourse plays on American fears of threats to its values and principles. Morgan Marietta, et. al. argues Trump has been successful at, “melding threat and absolutism into the absolutist threat” by grounding rhetoric in the context of threats to personal safety.1476 And linking foreign policy to national identity, as explored in the Chapter Two, is a powerful rhetorical tool and critical framing mechanism. Oz Hassan writes, Trump securitized Islam through Islamophobia and Orientalism, making Muslims an existential threat.1477 Like his predecessors, Micah Zenko writes, Trump has succeeded in depicting terrorism as a ‘monolithic enemy.’1478 Trump has described terrorism, as “a tremendous threat, far greater than people in our country understand.”1479 In his inaugural address, the President declared, “we will unite the civilized world against radical Islamic terrorism, which we will eradicate completely from the face of the Earth.”1480 Trump has stated he would ‘demolish’ and ‘destroy’ ISIS and vowed to ‘eradicate’ the threat of ‘radical Islamic terrorism.’1481 And following the August attacks in Spain, Trump declared terrorism must be stopped “by any means necessary.”1482 But this further illustrates continuity across administrations. As Zenko notes, Bush, Obama and Trump have all suggested, “tough-sounding but implausible objectives.”1483 But Trump’s discourse tends to differ is in the amplification of certain elements of the threat. For example, the administration frequently employs the term ‘radical Islamist terrorism,’ and he has referred to terrorists as ‘lawless savages’, ‘savage killers’ and ‘horrible enemies.’14

## Impact

### 1NC – Cyclical Insecurity

#### Attempts to resolve insecurity inevitably fail and creates violent cycles pursuing security – the elimination of one threat necessitates the production of other threats to manage generalized anxiety

Eberle and Daniel, 2022

(Jakub, Research Director at the Institute of International Relations Prague, and Jan, researcher and the Head of the Centre for the Study of Global Regions at the Institute of International Relations Prague, “Anxiety geopolitics: Hybrid warfare, civilisational geopolitics, and the Janus-faced politics of anxiety,” Political Geography, Vol. 92, January 2022, Article 102502, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102502, accessed 6/30/2022, ZW)

On the other hand, however, the Lacanian take allows us to account also for the politics that is imminent in the failure of these anxiety-managing attempts. As we have argued, all narratives built around particular objects of fear, including geopolitical ones, are eventually failing, as these objects are ultimately ‘false targets’. They are merely temporary discursive vessels functioning as placeholders for expressing deeper ontological anxiety, which is bound to strike back. Consequently, attempts to make societies (feel) more secure, habitually end up making them (feel) equally, or even more, insecure and anxious, regardless of how much effort is invested into fighting this or that particular threat. As Heath-Kelly (2015, 2018) and Jacobsen (2020) have shown, successful security discourses like counter-terrorism or cybersecurity have actually managed to internalise this ‘failure to secure’ (Heath-Kelly, 2015) by incorporating it into their very structure. According to them, counter-terrorism and cybersecurity are constructed as dangers so slippery and multifaceted that once we resolve one problem (by killing Osama bin Laden, resolving a particular cyberthreat), a whole new range of terrorist groups or cyber issues emerges to occupy their place.

Consequently, and in contrast to conventional ontological security literature, politics of anxiety is not only about managing and repressing it through narratives, routines and relationships. It is also about other ways of manipulating anxiety for political purposes, including reproducing, nurturing and spreading it via the construction of threats so opaque and widespread that they cannot be possibly resolved, like terrorism, cybersecurity – or hybrid warfare. By its repeated failure to secure, such discourses hold societies in the anxious ‘state of constant and heightened alertness’ (Davies, 2019, p. xii), making them ready to accept a range of pre-emptive security measures across all possible areas of social life.

Bringing the argument together, by the notion of anxiety geopolitics we conceptualise the politics of dealing with anxiety by linking it to objects and issues spatialised through the means of geopolitical imaginations. By references to geographical categories, such as states, regions, continents or civilisations, this type of affective geopolitics promises to transform the amorphous and ambiguous anxiety stemming from range of different issues into tangible and manageable objects of fear taking the form of geopolitical threats. Yet, as all such narratives and images are ultimately bound to fail to resolve the underlying anxiety, the analytical focus must be extended also to how these failures are accounted for and how anxiety is being further reproduced with the help of geopolitical imaginations. Therefore, anxiety geopolitics is ultimately about the oscillation between repressing anxiety through the geopoliticisation of both the ‘threat’ and the self, as much as it is about dealing with the recurring failures to secure the subjects produced by such geopoliticisation, which result in reproduction of social anxiety.

### China War

#### Securitization of China locks in a mutually reinforcing power struggle – causes military buildup and makes conflict inevitable

Kimiayjan and Romero, 22 Pouyan Kimiayjan: Research Associate at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy and Johnsen Romero: Policy Research Assistant at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy and a Yenching Scholar at Peking University; The National Interest; January 15, 2022; https://nationalinterest.org/feature/securitized-competition-china-working-against-america-199279 // KM

In November 2021, U.S. president Joe Biden and Chinese president Xi Jinping held their first [face-to-face meeting](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/16/readout-of-president-bidens-virtual-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/) on managing great power competition and [averting](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202111/t20211116_10449035.html) a “new Cold War.” The talks, however, [failed to produce](https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/17/china/xi-biden-summit-beijing-victory-mic-intl-hnk/index.html) a diplomatic breakthrough. There was no agreement on [substantive policy issues](https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/17/china/xi-biden-summit-beijing-victory-mic-intl-hnk/index.html) such as arms control, the coronavirus pandemic, climate change, and trade disputes. While the summit may ultimately ease tensions in the medium-term, the two countries were less inclined to agree on a framework that would encourage a more conciliatory approach. Part of the difficulty appears to be a political atmosphere that is increasingly hostile to diplomacy and a rising disposition to framing competition in security terms. The occasional rhetoric of non-confrontation aside, the threat perceptions of policymakers in Washington and Beijing are normalizing an existential contest for the twenty-first century. Instead of strengthening existing economic partnerships in the Asia Pacific region, the U.S. foreign policy establishment is more willing than ever to rally allies and lean on security partnerships—such as [AUKUS](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/aukus-can-jumpstart-better-transatlantic-alliance-195609)—to buttress the rules-based international order it has traditionally led. As China has risen to be an economic powerhouse in its own right, the United States has consistently resorted to “securitization” as a policy of choice. The militarization of Washington’s posture in the Pacific predates Biden and his immediate predecessor. Much overlooked is the Obama administration’s once-touted “[pivot](https://ras-nsa.ca/publication/the-american-strategic-pivot-in-the-indo-pacific/)” to Asia and its aim to reassign U.S. defense priorities to the region. On one hand, the “pivot” meant an increase in U.S. military spending and [additional](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-18305750) U.S. Navy assets in the region; on the other, China began ramping up its own military spending [and] its [island-building efforts](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-south-china-sea.html?mtrref=www.google.ca&gwh=F97B6244CBA99A8C3A166F10B92D3EE9&gwt=pay&assetType=PAYWALL) to secure its claims and trade routes in the South China Sea. Consequently, the regional military buildup can exacerbate tensions in several turbulent theatres. For instance, the prevailing security dilemma among the two powers can further escalate military tensions over [Taiwan](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/defending-taiwan-requires-diffusing-financial-%E2%80%98doomsday-machine%E2%80%99-198895), sparking a conflict with disastrous consequences for regional stability and the world economy.

#### Securitization of China for Western self imagination leads to actual conflicts

Song 15(Weiqing Song, chinese university of hong kong press, 2015, Securitization of the "China Threat" Discourse: A Poststructuralist Account, Jstor, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24291932?seq=1) TG

A few researchers diverge from the mainstream response to this

issue. Oliver Turner, for example, highlights the ideational rather than material factors in the processes of representing the China threat complicit in the U.S.–China policy.13 He argues that the main purpose of these processes is to create a threatening Chinese identity, foreign to that of the United States, to trigger actions that reinforce the binary opposition between the two countries. Before Turner and in the same vein, Pan takes a poststructuralist discursive approach to interpreting the role of the China threat within the U.S. political discourse. He focuses on the “discursive construction of otherness” by which China is fashioned as a “threatening, absolute other” to the “US-led evolutionary scheme.”14 Much of Pan’s discussion of this issue is devoted to real policy implications, namely the risk that considering “theory as practice” in U.S. policy will give rise to a real “China threat.”15 He further expands his scope of enquiry by deconstructing the Western representation of China’s rise. To him, dominant Western perceptions of China’s rise tell us less about China and more about Western self-imagination and its desire for certainty.

## Alternative

### 1NC – Reject Alt

#### The alternative is to reject the 1AC’s securitized representations – threat construction is only possible in a world of discursive repetition – voting negative endorses a discursive model that does not endorse securitization as a model of understanding the world

Van Rythoven 14 (Eric Van Rythoven, PhD candidate at Carleton University studying emotion, securitization, and world politics, E-international Relations, December 21, <https://www.e-ir.info/2014/12/21/emotion-and-dystopian-idealism-in-security-studies/>) SW

The recent forum on emotions and world politics in the journal International Theory is a welcome development for the field of International Relations. The contributors helpfully remind us that emotions research in IR remains hampered by a number of deeply embedded assumptions, such as the belief that emotions are only private and personal phenomena, or the belief there is a sharp dichotomy between emotion and rationality. Critically assessing these assumptions is important not only because it highlights what the discipline gets ‘wrong’ in its picture of world politics, but because it illuminates how current theories help to propagate such distortions.

In this brief intervention I focus on an additional assumption concerning emotion, one which permeates the subfield of security studies.  Here I am referring to the widely shared belief in the ubiquity of fear in the politics of security.  While this association is historically rooted in Hobbesian accounts of anarchy it has a distinct contemporary form.  Fear, we are told by a variety of figures, permeates the politics of security and is consistently and successfully marshalled by political elites, security professionals, and bureaucrats to sustain new images of threat which lead to an ever broadening security agenda.  Fear, whether over predatory great powers, immigrant minorities, or infectious diseases, facilitates securitization.  As a latent social resource collective fears always appear to be waiting patiently in the margins of discourse until they are easily and unproblematically deployed in a security argument.

These kinds of arguments radically underplay the fragility and contingency of political fears.  As forms of collective embodied judgment political fears are produced and sustained only through social interactions.  As I have argued elsewhere the memories, traumas, practices, rituals, symbols, and other cultural resources which sustain political fears are always open to contestation and destabilization (Van Rythoven, forthcoming).  Yet in security studies the logic of fear as a relatively settled and stable substance which can be drawn upon to serve narrow, instrumental purposes enjoys wide appeal.  The consequence is a particular form of dystopian theory, a distorting idealism which ignores both the empirical fragility of fears, as well as the often dispersed power struggles which shape this emotion in a multitude of differing ways.

To appreciate the breadth of this assumption in the field it is useful to begin by looking at two highly disparate figures: Stephen Walt and Didier Bigo.  Walt has become the essential flag bearer for a conventional neorealism that continues to define the mainstream of security studies in America.  Bigo’s contribution to the so-called ‘Paris School’ has made him a central figure in critical security studies which has grown exponentially outside of the heartland of American IR ([CASE, 2006](http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/37/4/443.short)).  While both hold sharply divergent understandings of security, method, and the purposes of its study they are surprisingly similar in their view of the relationship between fear and threat construction.  Nowhere is this more evident than in the close resemblance between their respective figures of the ‘threat monger’ and ‘the manager of unease’.

The figure of the threat monger is most evident in Walt’s contemporary work, especially his popular writings for [Foreign Policy](http://foreignpolicy.com/author/stephen-walt/).  Here the concern is not with the international system, anarchy, the balance of power, nor any other of the concepts normally associated with neorealist theory.  Instead the most pressing issue is the persistent and pernicious practice of threat inflation.  The dangers facing the national security apparatus in western states are vastly overblown.  Everything from the safety of the Olympics, to the danger of international terrorism, to the neologism of cyber security, to the threat of global warming are vastly blown out of proportion, especially relative to the traditional danger of interstate conflict (Walt, [2012](http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/13/what-terrorist-threat/#.UClvYIJhDFA.twitter), [2010](http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/03/30/is-the-cyber-threat-overblown/), [2009b](http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/08/10/national-security-heats-up/)).  Instead of objectively discerning national security demands from the material distribution of power, the United States’ security agenda has become bloated with a host of inflated threats.  In Walt’s view “[o]ne reason Americans exaggerate security fears is the existence of an extensive cottage industry of professional threatmongers, who deploy a well-honed array of arguments to convince us that we are in fact in grave danger” ([2009a](http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/05/04/the-threatmongers-handbook/)).  Through a variety of argumentative techniques threat mongers are able to engender fear in the American public over the threat of some dangerous ‘other’.  Such “tried-and-true methods do not work all of the time, of course, but they are undeniably effective” (Ibid).  Here fear receives little scrutiny.  It is simply a latent social resource activated by the discursive performance of the monger which helps wins audience approval.

Bigo’s ([2002](http://alt.sagepub.com/content/27/1_suppl/63.extract):66) examination of the security profession, “with its ethos of secrecy and concern for the management of fear or unease”, bears more than a passing resemblance to Walt’s threat monger.  His concern with those who work in the professional field of security, spanning from government bureaucracies, police, intelligence agencies, militaries, and their private partners, comes as a reaction to [earlier approaches](https://books.google.ca/books?id=j4BGr-Elsp8C&printsec=frontcover&dq=security+a+new+framework+for+analysis&hl=en&sa=X&ei=XtuRVMHnOYv9yQSi3oCABQ&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=security%20a%20new%20framework%20for%20analysis&f=false) narrowly focused on highly publicized security speech acts.  The social production of danger, Bigo argues, is in part sustained by the “sense of the routines, the day-to-day practices, of the bureaucracies” who produces both insecurity over policy fields like migration and the techniques of governance to respond (Ibid, 73).  Like Walt’s monger however, this task is only made possible through the deft generation and management of fear.  Security professionals partake in a broader discursive formation where “the word immigration becomes a term for catalyzing fears or misgivings about the economic, social, and political development of Western countries. It becomes a fixer of frights and confusions about national cultural identities as well as of weaknesses of solidarity mechanisms” (Ibid, 79 emphasis original).  It is through this capacity to affix specific frights to distinct programs of governance, especially through institutionalized routines, that the securitization of issues like migration is possible.

The differences between Walt and Bigo cannot be underplayed.  For Walt the polemical description of the monger is necessary because these actors recklessly inflate threats above and beyond what is objectively reasonable based upon the current international environment.  Bigo rejects the very framing of threat inflation as it presupposes some mythical baseline from which ‘true’ assessments of threat can be discerned.  Security issues in this view are always historically situated reflections of particular interests and modes of governance.

Yet this deep philosophical divide over threat construction is what makes the convergence between the figure of the threat monger and the manager of unease all the more striking.  Both Walt and Bigo envisage a collection of actors whom, with predictable and institutionalized regularity, engage in a series of discursive moves which couple latent fears with a distinct security agenda.  These fears, which never seem to be in short supply, are amplified, managed, and molded to the instrumental purposes of these actors.  Both present an array of techniques, such as the creation of categories of identity, which can be used to circulate fear, or as Walt pithily puts it “[h]ow to scare your fellow citizens for fun and profit” (2009a).  Though the nuances surrounding these figures differ when it comes to their central role in leveraging fear to produce a collectively shared image of threat they are the same.  The manager of unease is the threat monger and vice versa.

This is a permissive view of threat construction.  Practices of securitization are not simply relatively frequent occurrences, they also achieve a high rate of success.  In the strongest form of this view the deliberative, rule-driven, liberal order of world politics is constantly abridged by the emergency politics of security.  This distinctly dystopian view is sustained by both the assumed ubiquity of fear and its unproblematic instrumentalization.

The concept of dystopia employed here is best understood through its resemblance to earlier critiques of utopianism in IR.  These began with E.H. Carr’s Twenty Years Crisis in which he chastises interwar liberals for a utopian view which grossly exaggerated the ease and possibility of international peace.  More recently Samuel Barkin has revived the concept in his critique of contemporary American constructivism whose progressive view of the spread of humanitarian and democratic norms is eerily reminiscent of Carr’s utopian liberals ([2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1046/j.1079-1760.2003.00503002.x/abstract?deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false):332-336).  The utopian label functions as a shorthand for highlighting two fundamental defects in thinking about world politics.  The first is empirical.  For Barkin the norms that are the locus of liberal constructivism “are accepted largely uncritically as good ones, as are the elements of international civil society involved in spreading these norms” (Ibid, 335).  There is little empirical interest in ‘bad’ norms or what might be considered malignant forms of international civil society.  Carr explicitly positions empirical ‘reality’ as the opposite to utopianism with the latter being “the product of not analysis, but of aspiration” ([2001[1981]](https://books.google.ca/books?id=Gbz_EsWbioUC&dq=twenty+years+crisis&hl=en&sa=X&ei=BOWRVPu4E6yxsATrkIKIDA&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAA):7).  The second feature of this critique concerns the absence of power.  On this point Barkin repeats familiar criticisms of liberal norms-centered research: that it fails to consider why certain norms spread and others don’t, or why some norms are actively resisted (2003:335).  Carr argues the “[f]ailure to recognize that power is an essential element of politics has hitherto vitiated all attempts to establish international forms of government” (2001[1981]:100).

While utopia and reality are often presented as opposing mirror images–especially by Carr–this ignores how political idealism comes in different forms.  Dystopianism is a form of political idealism but instead of exaggerating the prospect of liberal progressiveness it exaggerates illiberal regression.  Security studies has become dystopian insofar as it has come to fetishize the illiberal character of emergency politics.  While utopianism envisions few substantive limits to the expansion of liberal order, the dystopianism of security studies sees few limits on the expansion of the concept of security.  Walt’s threat monger and Bigo’s manager of unease face no limits on invoking emergency politics because of their unparalleled ability to instrumentalize fear.

Yet because this position is fundamentally idealist it is also subject to the same lines of critique as liberal idealism.  Empirically there is a wealth of evidence (and common sense) to suggest collective fears are fragile, fugitive, and fickle phenomenon rather than the stable, steady, and settled social resources which can be reliably deployed in a security argument.  Wendy Pearlman’s rich ethnographic account of the Arab Spring for example, is centered precisely on the breakdown of collective fears over violent reprisal from authoritarian governments.  Analogous to the figures discussed above, authoritarian “[p]owerholders [in the Middle East] wielded fear as a tool for survival, enforcing it with security apparatuses and state discourses that warned that the alternative to the regime was chaos or Islamic radicalism” ([Pearlman, 2013](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8923772&fileId=S1537592713001072):393).  Pearlman’s account of revolution in Tunisia and Egypt is peppered with references to the overcoming or breaking down of fear, something captured in the popular expression “inkasar hajez al-khawf” meaning “The barrier of fear has broken” (Ibid, 388).

Even in instances where a broadly-based collective fear does emerge it may lack the historical durability to sustain any lasting vision of emergency politics.  Anxiety within in western countries over the spread of Ebola from West Africa reached a fevered pitch in the Fall of 2014.  When asked in October 65% of Americans said they were concerned about the possibility of a nationwide epidemic ([Washington Post-ABC News Poll, 2014](http://www.washingtonpost.com/page/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2014/10/14/National-Politics/Polling/release_366.xml)).  Citing Ebola as “a potential threat to global security” the Obama administration deployed 3,000 military personnel to West Africa ([Mason and Harding Giahyue, 2014](http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/16/us-health-ebola-obama-idUSKBN0HB08S20140916)).  Yet by November declining media coverage, eroding public interest, and empty congressional meetings suggested popular anxieties over the disease had largely evaporated ([Koren, 2014](http://www.nationaljournal.com/health-care/have-americans-stopped-caring-about-ebola-20141113); [Ferris, 2014](http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/224758-as-ebola-attention-fades-lawmakers-beg-for-spotlight)).  By December the Obama administration was left struggling to revitalize anxieties over Ebola to sustain a security response.  In a plea for a further a further $6 billion of emergency funding to maintain the response Obama urged that the crisis “can’t get caught up in normal politics” ([Hughes, 2014](http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/obama-presses-congress-on-ebola-funding/article/2556874)).

The fact that political actors so often struggle and strain to preserve the underlying sense of anxiety and crisis surrounding a security issue points to a precarious set of power relations surrounding emotions.  To be clear, scholars like Walt and Bigo offer very rich conceptions of power within their research.  Walt’s neorealism carries an explicit view of material state power even if this view is difficult to square with his popular writings focused on security discourses.  Bigo offers a much richer conceptualization of power which draws on both the constitutive force of speech acts as well as the positional authority of the security profession (2002:73-74).  While these forms of power are important they do not necessarily shape collective emotions which can be situated in a much more dispersed sets of cultural practices. Consider, for example, Stephen Hawking’s recent claim that the emergence of artificial intelligence could threaten humanity.  This claim likely resonated well in societies such as the United States where films and texts in popular culture have long envisioned autonomous robots as dangerous ([Brasor, 2014](http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/12/06/national/media-national/cultural-differences-shade-reactions-robots/#.VImzsTHF-Sq)).  Contrast this with how “Japan’s tendency to imbue machines with sentient qualities reflects certain native religious precepts” (Ibid).  Machines which may be culturally identified as objects of fear in one society may be objects of comfort, sentimentality, and even happiness in another.  In certain cases pre-existing cultural practices may sharply circumscribe the power of authoritative speech to generate collective fears.

Characterizing security studies as dystopian for its disregard of the power relations and empirics surrounding emotions may seem questionable.  Such accusations of idealism often come to be understood as a form of insult (Barkin, 2003:332).  Yet given how these views of fear have such broad and longstanding status within security studies a provocation, in a sense, is necessary.  There is however, an additional value to this framing of dystopia.  If any prolonged scrutiny of emotions finds the dystopian view of security studies to be unsustainable, then it raises questions over what kinds of worlds do collective emotions in world politics actually contribute to?  The answers to this question are bound to be more complex than simplistic utopias or dystopias, but they also promise to be far more interesting.

## FW

### Critique Key to Policy – Hybrid Warfare

#### Our criticism is key to policy-making – threat construction undermines credible threat identification, produces ineffective responses, and perpetuates anxiety rooted in Orientalism

Eberle and Daniel, 2022

(Jakub, Research Director at the Institute of International Relations Prague, and Jan, researcher and the Head of the Centre for the Study of Global Regions at the Institute of International Relations Prague, “Anxiety geopolitics: Hybrid warfare, civilisational geopolitics, and the Janus-faced politics of anxiety,” Political Geography, Vol. 92, January 2022, Article 102502, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102502, accessed 6/30/2022, ZW)

Introducing anxiety geopolitics as a conceptual linchpin between disparate arguments from debates on critical geopolitics, ontological security, and politics of anxiety, this article made two central contributions. First, we have theorised the relationship between geopolitics and anxiety, moving beyond the existing accounts above all by pointing out the Janus-faced character of anxiety geopolitics, in which anxiety is both repressed and reproduced. Second, using the case of Czechia, we have argued that hybrid warfare is a discourse that constantly oscillates between repressing anxiety by geopoliticising the source of danger in East/West terms, and subverting its own constructions by presenting the threats as insidious, invisible, and constantly shifting. Therefore, we contend that the HW discourse is structured in a way that cannot achieve its purported ambition to secure populations against ‘hybrid threats’ and instead ends up producing more insecurity and anxiety.

Our argument has clear normative implications that expand the existing criticisms of HW by putting the underlying civilisational geopolitics in spotlight. This should help us challenge the technology-centred presentism of the HW discourse, showing that many of the ostensibly unprecedented concerns are in fact reheated versions of narratives that date back decades if not centuries. More importantly, it enables us to point to the presence of some of the highly problematic aspects of East/West thinking, especially those that have been rightly criticised as Orientalist, chauvinist or even racist (see e.g. Said, 1978; Todorova, 2009). Realising the presence of civilisational geopolitics makes it possible to ask whether certain portrayals of Russia in HW debates – e.g. as barbaric, irrational, irredeemable – may not represent narcissistic projections of the ‘Western’ self, rather than credible threat assessments (Chernobrov, 2019). Importantly, these are not scholastic matters of concern just for ivory-tower peaceniks, as the proponents of HW sometimes like to put it. Instead, these criticisms have clear implications for security policy. As recognised even among NATO’s own analysts and officials (Caliskan & Li´egeois, 2020; Rühle, 2019), adopting the prism of HW and labelling Russia as an inherently irrational enemy is detrimental to leading a productive debate on the exact nature of the challenges that Putin’s regime poses and formulating appropriate and efficient strategies to respond to it. We add to it by highlighting that the HW discourse not only ‘undermines strategic thinking’ (Caliskan & Li´egeois, 2020), but also never actually manages to provide security and creates highly concerning societal side-effects (perpetuation of anxiety, proliferation of Orientalist images).

### AT: Ivory Tower/Not Policy-Relevant

#### Critique is engagement with security politics, not an ivory-tower judgement from outside the field – their interp’s rejection of critique ensures worse policy outcomes

de Goede, 2020

(Marieke, Professor of Politics with a focus on 'Europe in a Global Order’ at the University of Amsterdam, “Engagement all the way down,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 8, Iss. 2, 2020, pp. 101-115, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2020.1792158, accessed 7/2/2022, ZW)

Belgian philosopher Isabelle Stengers – and her philosophical companions – may contribute to exploring the affordances of the encounter between STS and CSS in relation to thinking critically. Stengers’ writing is substantial, and I do not here claim to be an expert in her philosophy, nor to be able to do justice to its many aspects. But her work as a practically engaged philosopher serves as an inspiration to further pursue the question of critique at the intersection between STS and CSS. It offers fruitful thinking and concrete starting points to build on Foucault’s notion of specific intellectuals, but also to push beyond. In fact, Stengers builds on Foucault’s calls for an ‘experimental’ critical attitude, which ‘put[s] itself to the test of reality … both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should take’ (Foucault, quoted in Stengers 2019, 2). With a parallel to 1990s debates on anti-foundationalism in International Relations that debated whether politics is ‘interpretation all the way down’ (Brown 1994; Doty 1997), Stengers (2019, 19) proposes that critique is ‘engagement all the way down.’ This section outlines possible contours of engaged critique as offered in the work of Stengers and others, to think through the ways in which these can be drawn upon for a critical analytics of security.

First, Stengers (2019, 7) talks about critical thinking as a process – not a fully formed, completed position, but an ‘inchoate’ practice, that is always anchored in a concrete event (like the GMO protest) – or what Stengers calls a ‘questioning situation’ (Stengers 2019, 10). There is no safe or stable outside position from which to launch criticisms, but rather, critical thinking is ‘immanent to the problematic events and encounters that force one to think’ (Savransky 2018, 7). Consequently, Stengers proposes a critical analytical attitude that seeks to escape the trap of rejecting versus ratifying, but that is primarily about following. It entails a notion of politics which ‘does not give the specialist the power of judging, but only the possibility of following the construction of the salutations that every collectivity brings to the problem’ (Stengers 2000: 60, emphasis in original). To be sure, this resistance to the power of judging articulated by Stengers does not mean that she claims the possibility of a ‘value-free’ approach. Rather, we should read it through her reliance on Deleuze, who offers a contrast between judging and evaluating. Where judging comprises a ‘moral attitude’ that appeals to ‘transcendent values (Good/Evil),’ evaluating, on the other hand, is thought to be ‘an ethical attitude that experiments with the qualitative and intensive difference between modes of existence’ (Zourabichvili 2012, 77).4

To further explore what such a move to ‘evaluation’ might mean, consider Annemarie Mol’s approach to suspending judgement concerning critical-philosophical questions, like the question ‘what is justice’. Such questions, Mol writes (drawing on Boltanski and Thévenot) traditionally demand normative answers and schemata. However, what happens if we suspend answers, and postpone judgement concerning what is good or bad justice? Instead, can we ‘listen and follow which ways of justification are current in a specific field, how these are mobilised and how these relate to each other’ (Mol 2000: 13, my translation)? Such a ‘philosophy in the wild’ reforms normative transcendental questions into practical, everyday, situated evaluations, that ask which ways of doing exist and which are silenced (Mol 2000). Again, the suggestion is that evaluation, rather than a judgement, offers the more viable mode of critique. Closer to CSS, Nyman (2016, 832) suggests we develop a pragmatist approach to security ethics, which calls for the ‘need to conduct a detailed empirical enquiry [of security] to see how different actors use it in different contexts and how individuals experience it, asking what do different security practices do.’

Second, what matters to critical analysis, for Stengers, is not to believe but to practice. Political critique is an uncertain, adventurous, engagement, not (primarily) a normative positioning. As Stengers put it during a public debate: ‘commoning’ is a verb not a position.5 It is a communal process, a collective doing, the outcomes of which are uncertain. For Stengers (2019, 18), it means ‘participating in an ongoing, adventurous, unguaranteed, but generative process of making sense in common.’ As Savransky (2018, 6) summarises Stengers’ philosophical intervention: it entails ‘an earthly, experimental, and gripping sort of affair.’ Thus, Stengers invites us to shift registers: from understanding critique as primarily a normative commitment or an ideological position (which then, secondarily, has to be put into effect), towards a focus on political engagement as a mode of practice itself. Consequently, the question is not so much, ‘can practice theory be a theory of critique?’, but more, ‘what happens when we think of critique as a practice, as a mode of practicing?’

Third, if critique is a process of engagement, a communal doing rather than purely a normative positioning, its outcomes are uncertain. When we critique, or engage, we do not know what it will bring, according to Stengers (2019, 13), it demands ‘casting our lot with some ways of living and dying and not others.’ This seeks to shift the terrain of critique: from battling through ‘pregiven positional structure(s)’ to ‘a dynamic evaluation’ (Massumi 2010). Again, this draws on earlier understandings, particularly by Homi Bhabha, who introduces a temporal an processual element into critical practice. Bhabha (1994, 25) sees politics and political resistance as a negotiation rather than a negation, because political engagement can never be fully counted on to produce the ‘mimetic reflection of an a priori political principle.’ What matters in political engagement is ‘to open up a space for translation: a place of hybridity … where the construction of a political object that is new, neither the one nor the other, properly alienates our political expectations’ (Bhabha 1994: 25, emphasis in original). Bhabha’s hybrid space is a new opening, something unpredictable. In Bhabha’s reading, politics has an uncertain, experimental, grounded character, which means that things could well go wrong (also Peter 2019). Indeed, to speak of the failures of critique is itself problematic, because it remains in the register of failure and success. If critical praxis is an experiment, then its measures of failure and success are not fully knowable at the outset (Sjoberg 2019).

In order to grasp what an engaged critique would look like, how it would read, look or feel, let us consider Annemarie Mol’s Body Multiple, which dissects and analyses the medical practices of the diagnosis and treatment of atherosclerosis. The book offers a careful unpacking of the socio-medical practices of hospital treatment, by ‘foregrounding practicalities, materialities, events’ (Mol 2002: 13, emphasis in original). Mol shows how the illness is a ‘composite object,’ that is composed of ‘elements that … may stretch all the way from the numbers that come out of the vascular laboratory to the possible future anger of someone’s disappointed children’ (Mol 2002, 71–72). All these elements may mix together when the hospital decides how to treat a patient. Mol adopts a perspective that could be said to think with doctors, patients, families, hospitals, laboratory test, surgeons, indicators, vessels and drugs. Nowhere does Mol condemn or denounce the doctors. Nowhere does she debunk Western medicine or unveil its hidden powers. She does not point at ‘the wrongs of medicine in general or at those of the treatment of atherosclerosis in hospital Z’ (185). At the same time, her book functions as a profound critique of medical ways of seeing and the ways in which hospitals come to know their patients. It ‘makes strange’ the ways in which medial practices sets indicators to reach its stated objectives of ‘saving lives’ and ‘improving health.’ Her book does not so much offer a way of ‘talking about medicine’ as a way of ‘talking inside it’ (185). Mol offers us a terminology and a praxiography that helps shift questions from ‘how can we be sure’ (about the diagnosis, about the right treatment), towards ‘how to live with doubt, how to live in an underdetermined world’ (Mol 2002, 165). Mol’s ontology of multiples shows the critical potential of foregrounding practice. Critique is not a matter of debunking, in this sense, but a matter of caring – through assembling, enriching, and ‘adding reality’.

## AT Common 2AC Arguments

### AT: IR Flexible

#### Their insistence on the flexibility of IR presumes white scholars who dominate the field are the agents of change informed by scholars of color relegated to the academic periphery

Pan, 2021

(Chengxin, Associate Professor of International Relations at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Deakin University, “Racialised politics of (in)security and the COVID-19 Westfailure,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 9, Iss. 1, 2021, pp. 40-45, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2021.1904195, accessed 7/2/2022, ZW)

Of course, boundaries of zones of (in)security can change. But redrawing such boundaries is again often the prerogative of scholars who self-identify with the ‘zone of security’. They routinely play a crucial cartographer’s role in mapping and re-mapping zones of (in)security (Huntington’s civilisational map and the ‘Indo-Pacific’ come to mind).2 Their dominance in the process of knowledge production about (in)security and about IR more broadly exposes and, indeed, often solidifies a colour line in academia that mirrors the racialised realities of IR (see also Henry, and Haastrup and Hagen 2021). Scholars of colour and/or from the South are at best treated as area specialists, a lowly ranked niche in the scholarly epistemic hierarchy, thus perpetuating the epistemic status quo that has helped produce the racially-mediated binaries in security thinking and practice in the first place.

### AT: Realism Good

#### Realism is an inaccurate lens for understanding IR – makes NATO inoperable and guarantees escalation

**Sireci and Coletta 09** (Jonathan Sireci and Damon Coletta, Damon V. Coletta is Professor of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy. Jonathan Sireci is a US cadet., Enduring without an enemy: NATOs realist foundations, Institute of International Relations, 2009.)

Difficulties associated with realist reactions to the persistence of NATO begin at the foundations of realism itself. Realism as a theoretical orientation toward the inter national system supposedly values what is over what should be (Carr, c1938, 2001: 63). When a theory that values cold, hard, objective reality as the cornerstone for explaining what will occur denies something obviously real, like continued NATO activity, the irony is damning. Beginning with neorealism, the scientific brand launched by Kenneth Waltz's (1979) Theory of International Politics offered a cogent restructuring of classic realist thought (Keohane, 1986:14). Waltz addressed Hans Morgenthau's failure to clarify the usage of such central terms as 'power' and 'balance of power' while avoiding the reductionism that weakened previous formulations. With respect to actors and goals in his theory, Waltz disciplined his predecessors' ideas, summing up states as 'unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination' (Ibid.: 13-15). He argued that the fundamental nature of states leads to balancing in their interactions. The position of every state within the structure of states' relative capabilities permits a systemic expression of international order (i.e., bipolarity or multipolarity) (Nye, 1988). For Waltz, the Cold War was a classic example of bipolar power alignment, NATO was fundamentally linked to this bipolar power alignment, and NATO would not survive the collapse of the Soviet Union because new power arrangements at the interstate level would render it obsolete (Keohane and Waltz, 2000-2001). Waltz excused the glaring failure of neorealism by arguing that the dissolution of the Soviet threat ultimately allowed American policy to become capricious (Waltz, 2000). Essentially, he retreated to the notion that while constancy of threat produces constancy of policy, in the absence of threat, policies become unpredictable.

### AT: Tech Development Neutral

#### Tech innovation and dominance isn’t a neutral tool, but is an end and object of US security politics to secure the US’s self-image – the instrumentalization thesis is ahistorical and can’t explain the form of US innovation policies

McCarthy, 2021

(Daniel R., Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Melbourne, “Imagining the security of innovation: technological innovation, national security, and the American way of life,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 9, Iss. 3, 2021, pp. 196-211, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2021.1934640, accessed 7/2/2022, ZW)

Technological innovation is generically viewed in security studies in an instrumental fashion, as a means to the end of national power and, thus, national security (Mearsheimer 2001, 62; Taylor, C., 2004, 602; cf. Kennedy and Lim 2018). An instrumental understanding of technological innovation presents innovation as context-transcendent and ahistorical. Essentializing innovation in these terms makes it difficult to understand how and why actually existing state innovation policies take a specific form and, in turn, how certain forms of technological innovation become ends in themselves and objects of security politics.

Critical security studies and critical international relations theory, drawing on the theoretical resources of Science and Technology Studies (STS), has begun to question this apolitical view of the practice of technological innovation (Bourne, Johnson and Lisle 2018; Bourne 2016; Lisle 2018). Through this work a picture of innovation emerges as always political, as central to the making and remaking of the state and its security politics. This article builds on this shared theoretical impulse through engagement with the Socio-Technical Imaginaries (STI) framework developed by Sheila Jasanoff and collaborators, whose work has been relatively neglected in International Relations (IR) to date (Jasanoff and Sang-Hyn 2009; Jasanoff and Kim 2013, 2015; Chenou 2019; McCarthy 2021). STI analyses common-sense socio-technical imaginaries, understood as encompassing world views. These are world-making, informing logics of practical action, their materialisation in technological infrastructures, and the recreation of specific forms of political order. Imaginaries are pre-theoretical, lacking the reflexivity of theory proper. As a result, they are informed by cultural tropes, myths and narratives, including, as recent work on cybersecurity has demonstrated, those found in popular culture (Dunn Cavelty 2019). Viewed in these terms, technological innovation, its security, and its place in modernity, is recast. Far from being a straightforward expression of instrumental reason, technological innovation is a politically and culturally contested process through which world order is created and maintained.

Answering the question of why a specific form of technological innovation is an object of security in US national security policy, this article argues that the United States pursues the national security of technological innovation in order to secure its ‘way of life’ as disclosed by its socio-technical imaginaries. A ‘way of life’ is broader than national identity – it is a ‘combination of patterns of thought and action that, as it becomes habitual and institutionalized, defines the thrust and character of a culture and society’ (Williams 1980, 12). Or, in Grove’s (2020, 2) more succinct phrase, these are ‘ways of being in the world’. In concrete terms, the US imaginaries detailed below portray market-led innovation as a means to the end of classic national security goals; technological innovation will not occur unless it is enabled by market-based incentives. Alongside this, the American policy narratives assert that market-led technological innovation enables material practices which express the American national identity. For heuristic purposes, then, we can separate these world-views into two elements, a causal account of how technological innovation happens, including the relationship between different actors, institutions, and the material incentives they create, and a normative evaluation of these practices and the threats to them (Taylor. C., 2004, 24–25). Technological innovation encapsulates the spirit of the American character, with threats to intellectual property rights emerging as a threat to America itself.

### AT: Threats Are Real – General

#### Their claims about “real threats” invests in a politics of anxiety – objects of fear are rhetorically constructed in an attempt to concretize a generalized and ever-present insecurity

Eberle and Daniel, 2022

(Jakub, Research Director at the Institute of International Relations Prague, and Jan, researcher and the Head of the Centre for the Study of Global Regions at the Institute of International Relations Prague, “Anxiety geopolitics: Hybrid warfare, civilisational geopolitics, and the Janus-faced politics of anxiety,” Political Geography, Vol. 92, January 2022, Article 102502, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102502, accessed 6/30/2022, ZW)

For this purpose, we reach to the literature on the politics of anxiety drawing mainly on the work of Jacques Lacan, a psychoanalyst whose ideas have been increasingly prolific in IR (for an authoritative overview see Zevnik & Mandelbaum, 2021), and, to a lesser extent, critical geopolitics (Klinke, 2016; Laketa, 2019; Müller, 2013). Our approach shares the Giddensian notion that anxiety is an inarticulable, traumatic and potentially paralysing affect that subjects attempt to avoid and repress. However, instead of seeing it as merely something that ‘lurks’ behind as the dark other of normal life, anxiety is understood as a durable affective condition interwoven in everyday experiences as well as social processes and political institutions. It doesn’t just lurk, it is always already there, as it is present in the key mechanisms that hold society together: in the production of social subjects and the creation of rules through which these are regulated and bound together.

In this reading, anxiety is correlative to the very emergence and existence of the subject as such. It is ‘a type of expectant dread’ or ‘a crushing experience of ‘out of placeness’’ that arises ‘when the subject, unable to ground themselves in either a functional horizon of values or a reliable social or subjective identification, fears that they might be somehow swallowed up, devoured’ (Hook, 2015, pp. 117, 119). It is less about the disorientation and uncertainty caused by one particular crisis (e.g. Russia invading Ukraine, Covid-19 arriving) and more about being reminded of the ultimately irreducible fragility of all things, including human lives and social orders. In this sense, anxiety is an affect linked to experiencing the limit of one’s own existence as a subject, something that signifies the encounter with ‘the real’, to use the Lacanian term for the internal limit of social order and/or the biological limit of human existence. Anxiety can never be fully managed or repressed, as it is a reaction to being confronted with what is for Lacan the ultimate reality of human existence: the fundamental ‘groundlessness of meaning’ (Balaska, 2019, p. 25) and, therefore, the impossibility of ever achieving a coherent and stable identity. In this sense, anxiety is the affect that ‘does not deceive’ (Lacan, 2014, p. 160), as it does not cover over the void at the heart of every social identity, but rather confronts us with it at the level of bodily sensation. To put it differently, subjects are always ultimately ontologically insecure, as no narratives, routines or relationships – personal or geopolitical – can ever fully deal with the omnipresent possibility that things may not make sense and everything can break down any minute. Anxiety emerges as the affect that signifies ‘the need for the stabilisation of the subject’ (Burgess, 2017, p. 29), yet this stabilisation is doomed to fail in the longer term.

Therefore, in contrast to readings that see it as an aberration, anxiety is omnipresent, even though it clearly varies in its intensity across time and space. Sometimes it is experienced more often and more strongly, while there may be other, less anxious times (Solomon, 2012 makes this argument with respect to affects in general). The current social condition is arguably one when anxiety is on the high; leading some authors to argue that we are now living in an ‘anxious society’, ‘a society on constant alert, despite having no identifiable existential threat. Instead, there is the constant presence of the possibility of that threat, and with it, the sense that government cannot fully protect the people and that danger resides in the everyday’ (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020, p. 247, emph. added; Eklundh et al., 2017). Such (highly) anxious society was created by the congruence of a range of factors. Some point to the effects of neoliberalism and austerity that produce the widespread feelings of powerlessness and loss of control (Hirvonen, 2017). Others focus on the social media economy that requires users who are constantly obsessively checking for news updates, notifications and the affective gratification coming from ‘retweets’ and ‘likes’ (Davies, 2019). For yet others, the proliferation of anxiety is connected to the societal changes linked to gender, race and immigration (Ali & Whitham, 2018; Klinke, 2016; Zevnik, 2017b), or the ‘security creep’ perpetuated by discourses and practices of counterterrorism and cybersecurity (Heath-Kelly, 2018; Jacobsen, 2020).

This extended understanding of anxiety as ontologically conditioned and socially circulated ‘nervous states’ (Davies, 2019) without a clear and concrete referent object opens the possibility to think (geo)politics of anxiety in broader and arguably more critical terms than in conventional ontological security literature. On the one hand, the Lacanian approach broadly agrees with the Giddensian ontological security framework with respect to how subjects try to deal with anxiety: by ‘pinning’ it onto an object and transforming it into a more tangible fear of something. In this manner, ‘fear becomes a way of easing anxiety; of attaching a signifier (an object of fear) to what is otherwise an unfounded experience of unease’ (Zevnik, 2017a, p. 237). Such ‘politics of fear’ then transforms the crushing and paralysing experience of anxiety into the management of ‘concrete objects that we have invented’ (Hirvonen, 2017, p. 261), such as the geopolitically coded ‘Muslim terrorists’ or ‘Russians hackers’. In this step, anxiety is ostensibly eased or repressed by the production of (geopolitical) narratives that ‘make sense’ of the unpleasant experience by giving it a name and placing it on a map.2 \*\*\*FOOTNOTE BEGINS\*\*\* There is nothing natural about the construction of particular fear objects, be it ‘Muslim terrorists’ or ‘Russian hybrid warfare’, as discourses of fear are always contingent. Societies are complicit in the production of their fears through the reflexive/strategic as well as non-reflexive/habitual ways through which discourses are produced and reproduced. This also makes it possible to challenge them and search for alternatives. \*\*\*FOOTNOTE ENDS\*\*\*

#### Be skeptical of every aff claims their threats are real – their rhetorical acts are only meant to deepen the ruse of securitization. Skepticism makes the entire system crumble.

Ojeda, 22 – Michelle Domenica Maffei Ojeda is a master’s degree candidate in Research in International Relations with mention in Security and Human Rights, [“*Political Discourse Analysis over the Securitization Discourse from the US towards Venezuela: The Case of Obama and Trump (2015-2020)”,* Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences, FLACSO Ecuador Department of International Studies and Communication, April 2022, https://repositorio.flacsoandes.edu.ec/bitstream/10469/18466/2/TFLACSO-2022MDMO.pdf]RA

The pivotal point over securitization is that speeches with a receptive audience create a threat. The more an idea is accepted by the audience, it becomes a reality. On the same note, for the process of securitization to work properly, it requires a political actor, which in this case is Obama and Trump along with an audience that will take their words as legitimate. According to Buzan “unless an idea is widely held, it cannot count as part of the idea of the state” (1983, 53). Language to work properly, or any speech act, it requires a teleological classification, what is good and what is bad, and for it to be accepted by the audience/society. Language itself is violent and requires a binary logic to outline the limitations of its own fields by excluding, when there is exclusion- the gray areas in the concept do not interrelate- then the more difficult is to forget or re-arrange the core block of an idea. Language is built in a way that the more you use an object as a threat, the audience will eventually believe it and get in sync. The analysis of threat construction from the securitization theory, states that the perception of threat is not something exogenous. Rather is constructed by widely accepted ideas from the collectivity, the audience, also known as the “us”. A threat is not physical or tangible but rather represent an existential danger to the construction of the “us” . It is everything that can categorically be foreign in our identity creeds. We must take into account that at the core, national security in the securitization theory is also linked with the notion of securitizing oneself from outside and domestic threats for survival. Hence, the political elite that invokes “securitization” will also inherently mention the consequences of taking no response at all, increasing fear through the possible weakening of state foundations/institutions, which is an extension of the nation and of individuals. The foundation to understand a threat is the construction of the ‘us’ versus the antagonist ‘other’, both are mutually sustaining and not excluded. This mutual constitution of language can be seen through the fact that Venezuela and the EE.UU. are antagonist and still have deep economic ties and be highly interdependent (Bonfili 2010).

## Case Impact Defense

### Cyberattacks

#### Scholarly articles tend to inflate the issue of cyber warfare into having a much larger impact than it does in reality, leading to fear amongst citizenry.

Gomez and Whyte 2021 (Miguel Gomez, Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich; Christopher Whyte, Assistant Professor of Homeland Security with expertise in U.S. Cybersecurity Policymaking), “Breaking the Myth of Cyber Doom: Securitization and Normalization of Novel Threats,” International Studies Quarterly, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/65/4/1137/6276244) //AA

State-sponsored OCOs are an increasingly common feature of the international system in the twenty-first century. In the past decade, incidents caused by these have taken a number of forms and each year has brought a dramatic overall uptick in the number of significant and publicly disclosed incidents. Simultaneously, there has been an immense diversification of those elements of government, industry, and civil society targeted, a trend that is apparent even in data that often misrepresent the impact of cyber events on civil society actors (Maschmeyer, Deibert, and Lindsay 2020). Cyber operations increasingly target prominent political personas and organizations in aid of influence campaigns in a remarkably prominent fashion. Moreover, beyond the routine theft of confidential information, malware designed to tamper with the function of industrial control systems across power generation, factory production, and even dam infrastructure is found with some relative frequency. Herein lies the broad assertion that physical effects from OCOs seem more likely today than ever before. Interestingly, even as cyber conflict evolves and becomes commonplace, professional narratives and media representations remain somewhat static (Dunn Cavelty 2008, 2013; Gomez and Villar 2018). Since at least 2007, when distributed denial-of-service operations targeting Estonia constituted the first major cyber assault on a NATO member state, the potential for catastrophic damage resulting from malicious digital behavior surfaced as a recurring narrative in Western punditry and popular commentary. Despite such depictions, the growing empirical record suggests the limited efficacy of publicly disclosed OCOs. Only a handful of deployments of malicious code have been captured to date that were intended to cause the physical effects that are so often the substance of doomsayer reporting. Of these, most did not execute. As an instrument of foreign policy, Iasiello (2013) and others argue that cyber operations often fall short of achieving their objectives despite advances in capabilities. Similarly, the latest version of the Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute (DCID) data, which tracks major interstate cyber conflict incidents between 2000 and 2016, illustrates the limited coercive potential of OCOs by identifying the rarity of concession-generating incidents (Valeriano and Maness 2014). The absence of empirical support for the revolutionary potential of cyber operations encourages criticism of those who oversell the strategic utility of the method (Gartzke 2013; Lindsay 2013; Maness and Valeriano 2016; Borghard and Lonergan 2017; Kostyuk and Zhukov 2017), with the result that the real-world impact of cyber conflict remains somewhat unclear even as the landscape of incidents becomes more densely populated. This growing skepticism surrounding the exercise of cyber power,3 however, continues to go against how the issue is framed in broader scholarship and in the public eye. Scholars still regularly cite the assumptions of “cyber doom” as they present their work, particularly in technical research (Dunn Cavelty 2009; Lawson et al. 2016). Furthermore, Jarvis, Macdonald, and Whiting (2017) observe that media reporting continues to depict OCOs as existential threats to cyber-dependent societies. Continued references to this narrative, even among otherwise skeptical researchers, are puzzling. While the six-year Jarvis, Macdonald, and Whiting (2017) study encompasses some of the most prominent cybersecurity incidents,4 it also permits the observation of its limited effects. Cyber operations that reflect the prevalent narrative are typically inaccessible to the majority of state actors (Pytlak and Mitchell 2016). Moreover, there is reason to think that prominent operations that could affect public perceptions of the shape of global cyber conflict should be few and far between. For one thing, the ability to inflict damage to critical infrastructure requires significant financial, scientific, and organizational resources (Slayton 2017). For another, if concessions are to be obtained, sustained pressure is typically required, which is challenging with OCOs relative to other mechanisms of state power (Borghard and Lonergan 2017). Lastly, strategic considerations also need to be considered. As most interactions in cyberspace are regionally bound and may involve rivalries, restraint is necessary to manage escalatory risk (Valeriano and Maness 2015; Fischerkeller and Harknett 2017). Unlike conventional capabilities, cyber operations and their corresponding tools do not communicate intent well and increase the risk of misperception (Buchanan 2017). It seems clear that while much conceptual and empirical clarifications about cyber conflict exist in scholarly and professional settings, there remains a distorted view of the impact of information about cyber conflict on the average citizen. This is problematic for a range of reasons, perhaps most notably because of how the diversification of cyber conflict has increasingly brought questions about the nature, integrity, and function of public information environments to the fore of strategic discussions about digital insecurity.

#### Cybersecurity threats are overblown and have more to do with creating the perception of a threat than the harm of the attack itself.

Fouad 19 – Noran Shafik Fouad is a Postdoctoral Research Associate, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, [“*The Peculiarities of Securitising Cyberspace: A Multi-Actor Analysis of the Construction of Cyber Threats in the US (2003-2016)”,* University of Sussex, Brighton, UK, 2019]RA

The nature of the cyber threat: between existentiality and urgency

Unlike other security sectors, cybersecurity threats are always perceived in the form of attacks, or hostile, purposeful, and deliberate actions by an enemy/adversary against the referent object(s). While this attack logic can still be used occasionally in all sectors, it is the dominant one in cybersecurity. All cyber operations, even the ‘defensive’, involve the use of malware by an actor to gain unauthorised access into the target’s system. A vulnerability in a system is not threatening per se if not exploited, and this exploitation requires an adversary’s or another party’s involvement. Although the resemblances with the military sector here are high, one more aspect makes cybersecurity more distinctive: the question of existentiality. According to the securitisation theory, the defining feature of security is the idea of existentiality; i.e. security is concerned with the survival of a certain referent object(s), which justifies the calls for urgent responses. In cybersecurity, despite the existence of existential discourses, the existentiality assumption is not as straightforward as it is in other sectors for multiple reasons. Firstly, the majority of cyber attacks that are seen as the most serious in history were neither objectively existential from a technical viewpoint, nor portrayed as such by the concerned actors. Stealing military, commercial, or personal information can hardly affect the survival of the state, the private sector, or any individual. Similarly, denying customers/citizens access to certain services through denial of service attacks (DOS) does not pose an existential threat to anyone. This does not mean that cyber threats cannot be hyped, exaggerated, or presented in urgent terms, since all those qualities are not essentially linked to existentiality. Secondly, the indirect nature of the majority of cyber attacks and the non-physicality of their consequences, although does not undermine their seriousness and urgency, acts as an impeding rather than a facilitating condition to the existentiality assumption. The empirical analysis also proves that existentiality is not the only reason for threats to register in the cybersecurity debate and that it is not a precondition for perceived urgency. Generally, cybersecurity is marked by different understandings of disruptive and destructive implications of cyber threats, and all invoke a certain level of urgency. The majority of discourses emphasise these ‘disruptive’ implications, including huge financial losses that can slow down the economy, loss of productivity and global competitiveness, customers’ loss of confidence in the information infrastructure, etc. Though not portrayed in ‘survival’ terms, these disruptive implications are still perceived as immanent, urgent, and as serious threats to national security. 3.

## Miscellaneous

### Cap K – Crisis Cap – AT: “No alternative”

#### Capitalism relies on producing catastrophes to expand access to new markets and delegitimize criticism – refuse the claim of no alternative in favor of analyzing capitalism’s construction of crises that opens space for revolutionary potential

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When is the Catastrophic? Think about the strangeness of today’s situation. Thirty, forty years ago, we were still debating about what the future will be: communist, fascist, capitalist, whatever. Today, nobody even debates these issues. We all silently accept global capitalism is here to stay. On the other hand, we are obsessed with cosmic catastrophes: the whole life on earth disintegrating, because of some virus, because of an asteroid hitting the earth, and so on. So the paradox is, that it’s much easier to imagine the end of all life on earth than a much more modest radical change in capitalism. “In relation to the history of organic life on earth,” writes a modern biologist, “the paltry fifty millennia of homo sapiens constitutes something like two seconds at the close of a twenty-four hour day. On this scale, the history of civilized mankind would fill one-fifth of the last second of the last hour.” The present, which, as the model of Messianic time comprises the entire history of mankind in a enormous abridgement, coincides exactly with the stature which the history of mankind has in the universe. In the early twenty-first century, narratives of end times proliferate—terrorism, peak oil, emerging disease, boom and bust capitalism, and a destabilized biosphere compete with each other for public attention. The difficulty of prioritizing which catastrophe should take precedence over all the others has created a curious new kind of psychosocial fatigue, where claims on imminent destruction are met with a retreat inward or simply a shrug. How is it that Americans, residents of the most powerful country in human history (unchallenged across military, economic, and political domains) have come to feel so precarious and vulnerable? It is important to note that our politics of catastrophe involve cultural formations as well as material assessments; they are historical projections that articulate fear but can also work to block both thought and action. Žižek (building on similar comments by Jameson about capitalism now seeming more permanent than the world) helps us see one dimension of this problem by underscoring the current lack of alternative ideologies to constitute the future today.37 The demise of the large social engineering projects of the twentieth century, and the rise of an unrestrained neoliberalism in their wake, combine to create a vision of a market driven future that can only produce profit by generating boom and bust cycles and extraction regimes that leave ruin in their wake.38 Disaster has actually become a kind of industry in recent years, revealing an unplanned obsolescence for urban infrastructure breaking down under shifting environmental condition and lack of maintenance. This has enabled radical new kinds of corporate experimentation and profit-making, making disaster highly lucrative.39 The formal end of the welfare state project (largely coterminous with the end of the Cold War, if not the nuclear danger) has also diminished the public space devoted to positive visions of a collective future in American life. It is difficult to find official commitments to a steady improvement in the qualities of collective life of the kind once used to balance images of nuclear catastrophe. Today, we are more than a generation removed from the kind of social contract that engineered most American institutions, and are instead increasingly reliant on market logics to design the collective future.40 Thus, we have inherited from the twentieth-century’s contest of utopian visions a world still organized by nuclear weapons but subject to the radical destabilizing effects of a boom and bust global capitalism that operates on ever-shorter windows of profitability and with fewer restraints and responsibilities. The reluctance of our systems of governance to imagine different futures, let alone to organize society on behalf of them, leaves crisis the predominant mode for political expression, as imminent danger becomes the primary motivating force outside of capital. Consequently, competing domains and scales of endangerment now seem to buffet U.S. citizens without respite, as the bursting of bubble economies resides alongside the minute-to-minute danger of a nuclear blast within the century-long sequence of anthropogenic environmental change. In a striking passage from his “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” Walter Benjamin evokes geological time as a way to shift the story of human beings on planet earth.41 All human history becomes a brief moment of planetary time from this perspective, which raises the important question how temporality itself informs the cataclysmic and whether human beings have the right senses to understand collective danger at all. Pre-figuring the language of the anthropocene, Benjamin uses geological time to disrupt the time of capital and to reposition humanity as merely one kind of life on planet Earth, a species which may or may not be able to avoid the cataclysmic end most creatures meet. But if danger incubates in the present, revealing itself in the catastrophic act, how can we see through a normative everyday to assess accruing danger operating on all possible temporal scales—particularly the forms that people generate and thus collectively control? Benjamin suggests that a radical emancipatory insight is also incubating in the present, a Messianic potential that could shift perception itself allowing a different kind of time to emerge, one that is not coded as “progress” (tied to homogenous empty time) and that is outside of capitalism. For Benjamin, just as the cataclysmic is coded into everyday life, so is the possibility for a radical shift in perception and with it an emancipatory politics. That this “potential” has not been activated is, for him, the ongoing state of emergency that he critiques so forcefully. In this way, he shifts the “emergency” from the narratives of violence that can function as heroic vehicles for self-sacrifice and warfare in the moment, to a more structural assessment of how social institutions normalize and render invisible the violence of capitalism itself. What Benjamin asks us to consider is how social institutions function as an expression and achievement of human engineering, and thus how the human-made can be remade under different concepts of value and with different futures in mind. Catastrophe’s apocalypse would, in this case, be to see the agentive behind the everyday crisis, to see the possibility of a social order not yet conceived as forestalled in the name of history, class, or the status quo. Catastrophe’s apocalypse would be to enter into a radically different temporality, a perspectival space for Benjamin in which structural violence is revealed as manufactured, enabling the current moment to be opened as a space of revolutionary critical potential. From this perspective, perhaps the proliferation of catastrophic images and narratives today has less to say about new objective degrees of endangerment than a shift in the psychosocial mechanisms of normalization and absorption. And here we might focus on a temporal paradox of our security culture today concerning the relation of nuclear danger to climate crisis. The nuclear danger of Cold War—the fears of a nuclear war that would consume global civilization in an instant—seems distant to many American in the twenty-first century but the technological systems built to enable it are still present and active. The global nuclear infrastructure remains on high alert and nuclear war could still be launched at a moment’s notice and between ever more nuclear powers. The Presidents of the U.S. and of Russia still carry launch codes with them every second of the day, and weapons scientists and defense personnel maintain a state of the art global nuclear system of war fighting. Americans tend to see global nuclear crisis now as an issue of the past, a matter for the last century (replaced by a wide range of terrorist threats). But today there are many more nuclear weapons on the planet than in 1958 when The Power of Decision was made, and the U.S. has committed to maintaining a state of the art arsenal for the indefinite future. Indeed, the nuclear fetish, despite the end of underground nuclear testing in 1992, remains firmly in place: In 2013, the U.S. Department of Energy asked Congress for funds to build a new nuclear complex for the twenty-first century, involving new weapons designs and production facilities—amounting to a $1 trillion expenditure over the next three decades.42 Thus, while perceptions of nuclear danger have changed markedly since 1958, the technological possibility of a total ending has only increased: we live today on the edge of nuclear war and just don’t seem to notice it anymore.43 So what was once a national fixation on nuclear crisis no longer mobilizes in the same way, attaining an embedded-ness in everyday life that can be ignored by most citizens in favor of other concerns. Similarly, the climate crisis of the twenty-first century was already present in 1958, when The Power of Decision articulated the terms of national crisis and Unchained Goddess warned viewers of a destabilized future environment. In the first decade of the Cold War, earth scientists publicized disturbing trends in their data sets, documenting shifts in air, water, and land quality via industrial pollutants. The debates about radioactive fallout from nuclear testing led to the Partial Test Ban treaty in 1963, which moved U.S. nuclear testing underground, eliminating the production of new radioactive fallout from the U.S. test program. However, the larger lesson of how industrial activity was harming the biosphere was left unaddressed as a security problem for decades. Had climate change risen to the level of a nation crisis in the 1950s the world would have been spared the coming destabilization of ecosystems, species die-offs, flooding, illness, and drought projected in the IPCC reports. Indeed, climate scientists now identify 1950 as the beginning of the “great acceleration”—a period of startling changes in human consumption patterns linked to the advance of the middle class and escalating carbon emissions.44 In other words, the inauguration of the global nuclear danger was also the inflection point for climate change, simultaneously installing two catastrophic potentials into everyday life that operate on vastly different time scales. Americans focused on the crisis of nuclear war in the twentieth century while missing the other incremental crisis of their own making, the expansion of a consumer economy that has become a highly destructive force on planet earth. Thus, nuclear and climate dangers are human-made crises decades in the making, and are deeply embedded within a petroleum-based capitalist-militarist-industrial system. After World War II, the security state embraced nuclear danger as its coordinating principle while rejecting the environment as a major security concern. Partly this is explained by the radically different temporalities evoked by each kind of danger: nuclear crisis playing out in minutes and hours while climate crisis plays out over decades and centuries. However, each crisis also evokes a different kind of sovereignty and requires very different kinds of governance. A global denuclearization project could substantially reduce the nuclear danger in a few years, but global warming is a planetary phenomenon that requires vast international cooperation—indeed, it now demands a post-national security logic of planetary defense. Perhaps this is also why so many images of climate change in the U.S. rely on tropes developed to communicate the danger of nuclear weapons, a way of acknowledging a collective danger without forcing a change in existing conceptual structures or modes of response. In U.S. public discourse, nuclear and climate dangers are both grounded in images of a world that is no longer capable of supporting human society, a time when as nuclear strategist Herman Kahn, once put it, the “survivors would envy the dead.”45 This kind of catastrophic narrative, in its depiction of a perfect and total loss, however, requires an apocalyptic rendering precisely because it is an historical and highly politicized artifact. What is required now is a critical engagement that assesses not only the possibility of total endings but also the instrumentalities, ideologies, and practices that inform them. Perhaps today this could take the form of a reassessment of industrial reasoning itself and an effort to “cancel the apocalypse” not by a heroic suicide bombing (as in Pacific Rim or The Power of Decision) but rather by attending to local infrastructure itself as a social project that needs constant critical reassessment and reinvention to acknowledge radically changing environmental conditions. This would mean embracing both middle and deep futures as a collective security project, and thinking through multigenerational toxic legacies as well as imminent dangers (see Orff and Misrash 2012).46 Above all, it would mean focusing expert and public energies not on rehearsing the perfect catastrophes of total endings but rather on the qualities, consequences, and insights of living in messy aftermaths.

# Aff Answers

## No Link

### Cyber – “Cyber Doom” Narrative

#### No link – studies prove “cyber doom” narratives don’t produce generalized anxiety and are informed by real incidents of cyber conflict

Gomez and Whyte 2021 (Miguel Gomez, Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich; Christopher Whyte, Assistant Professor of Homeland Security with expertise in U.S. Cybersecurity Policymaking), “Breaking the Myth of Cyber Doom: Securitization and Normalization of Novel Threats,” International Studies Quarterly, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/65/4/1137/6276244) //AA

According to some, advancements in technological and organizational capabilities among capable state and stateaffiliated actors over the past decade increase the likelihood that offensive cyber operations (OCOs) might soon produce destructive physical effects (Saltzman 2013; Healey 2016). Expectations of real-world damage inflicted through cyberspace reinforce the “cyber doom” narrative that digital insecurity might result in a massive failure of social and economic processes across societies dependent on new information technologies and that dread of such failure permeates public perspectives on cyber issues (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009). For those who study public opinion surrounding foreign policymaking, the “cyber doom” type of narrative is not especially uncommon. Environmental circumstances of sufficient visibility and meaning, such as the trauma-inducing experiences of 9/11 or the Cold War, often take on life of their own and affect opinion formation independent of an individuals’ priors or the cues of elites. Oddly, however, the oft-referenced notion of “cyber doom” appears paradoxical, even despite the link some scholars make between OCOs and physical effects. Presently, conflict in cyberspace is characterized by persistent-yet-limited effects and a condition of apparent restraint exercised by cyber-capable actors (Maness and Valeriano 2016; Fischerkeller and Harknett 2018a). Moreover, the unabated integration of vulnerable information systems across all aspects of modern societies raises the question of whether or not a sense of dread associated with the exploitation of cyberspace is as severe as commonly portrayed (Jarvis, Macdonald, and Whiting 2017). Most damningly, the idea that “cyber doom” is most visible in Western national experiences as a fear appeal employed by politicians to galvanize support for policy in no way explains these curious logical shortcomings. At the heart of the “cyber doom” narrative is the assumption that information about cyberattacks released to the public—particularly information about sophisticated cyber operations of foreign countries and organized crime1— produces anxiety about the digital health and security of a person. Ironically, this assumed relationship between cyber operations, their portrayal in public-facing media, and individual impact is often discussed in unclear terms by scholars than is the determining role of techno-strategic conditions. Despite the recent turn by some to consider the societal impact of OCOs (Lin and Kerr 2017; Lindsay 2020; Whyte 2020), most research on cyber conflict continues to emphasize logic-of-the-domain explanations for the behavior of cyber-capable actors.2 This makes a certain sense because the domain is human-made and malleable. However, it is also puzzling given the scope of cyberspace and the degree to which digital action impacts both private industry and civil society across numerous levels. Though the mechanisms of interaction may be less precise than is the case with other forms of state power, the literature on public opinion, morale, and psychology in foreign policymaking tells us that popular perceptions of threat are shaped by a host of factors that then impact the formulation and implementation of state security policy. In this article, we take aim at the “cyber doom” narrative logic as an initial step toward clarifying the relationship between cyber conflict, its portrayal, and public thinking about digital insecurity. Consequently, we align with critics of the narrative itself but argue that such criticisms make overly simplistic assumptions about public opinion and national security that do little to enrich and undergird evolving cyber conflict research. The logic of the core argument about digital disaster aside, the broader “cyber doom” argument— i.e., that the rhetorical and cognitive prospect of doom has some effect on a population—is undertheorized and understudied. This point is particularly important because scholarship aimed at explaining the sources of state public policy on cyberspace makes the curious misstep of holding domestic population preferences constant while focusing on third image determinants of strategy development. Authors argue that publics cyclically react with some fear to emergent threats and that, therefore, public policy is best explained by the incidence of cyber conflict or steps taken by state peers. Given that such assumptions are clearly far from safe on the merits, this article aims to ascertain whether or not negativity among the general public associated with malicious behavior in cyberspace is as salient as broadly claimed. We add evidence to the argument that the “cyber doom” narrative is unrealistic (Lawson 2013) by showing that the assumptions found therein are misleading. Our study finds that sensitivity to cybersecurity threats is situationally shaped by exposure to negative reporting but that the onset of associated dread is not a given. Instead, it is influenced by expectations of the role of technology in modern society. Respondents dependent on such technologies are not as prone to negative effect as are those who remain not so deeply embedded in the fabric of digital society. Both groups become more sensitive to cybersecurity threats to their person as the information they consume becomes more negative, and this personal concern facilitates a heightened sensitivity to threats to the polity. However, the dread predicted by the “cyber doom” narrative is only weakly predictive of this dynamic and has no effect on the threat sensitivity of those who do not respond emotionally. Finally, in both cases, the link between concern for society is not a clear result of negative information so much as it is the result of initial sensitivity to threats at the personal level. Consequently, we make two contributions. First, we show that the impact of novel environmental circumstances on individual opinion formation is shaped by issue embeddedness, suggesting that long-term exposure to any invasive development mitigates the affective response it is associated with. Second, we present evidence suggesting nevertheless that the unique characteristics of such a development matter in opinion formation, as sensitivity to digital threats to the polity is clearly premised on personal threat sensitivity. These findings suggest that not only “cyber doom” is strategically and functionally unrealistic, but the effects of the idea’s securitization are also minimal and prone to diminishment over time. In doing so, they speak to the broad research program on public opinion and audience dynamics in foreign policymaking. More specifically, in line with recent work (Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017), our study suggests that citizens are far more capable of responding to threat stimuli absent elite cues. Significantly, our work joins research that locates responsiveness to policy issues in the interaction of cognitive priors and social context with incoming information about new events. Judgment is rarely as linear as the “cyber doom” narrative suggests in its linking of negative reporting, fearful response, and sensitivity to threat inflation. Instead, individuals are conditioned by social circumstances such that even novel threats are incorporated into the horizon of issues the public encounters. The remainder of this article is divided into four sections. The first introduces the theoretical framework supporting the underlying claims investigated and adopts existing frameworks to account for the effects of continued exposure to cyber threats. The second discusses the experimental design employed. Though common across political science research, the methodology is only recently employed in cybersecurity and cyber conflict scholarship in response to (1) difficulties related to obtaining observational data and (2) the growing interest in individual-level behavior as impactful in digital affairs (Gross, Canetti, and Vashdi 2017; Gomez 2019b; Jensen and Valeriano 2019). This is followed by the presentation and analysis of results. Finally, an in-depth discussion is offered that further develops the theoretical and policy implications of the findings. The findings are not limited to the validity of the core “cyber doom” narrative and the general disposition of non-elites toward cybersecurity issues. Instead, we contribute to the body of scholarship on public opinion in foreign policymaking and speak to ongoing research linking decision-making and the modern digital information environment.

## Securitized Representations Good

### Climate Change

#### Climate securitization good – key to collectivize action to stop the worst effects before it’s too late

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Atmospheres of Destruction

Warming of the climate system is unequivocal. Human influence on the climate system is clear. It is very likely that the Arctic sea ice cover will continue to shrink and thin… Continued emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes in all components of the climate system. IPCC, Climate Change 2013 The latest projections of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) are startlingly depicting a new kind of collective violence that is escalating and will play out over the coming centuries in every ecosystem on Earth (see Figure 1.2).27 The extraordinary achievement of the IPCC is its radical interdisciplinary and multi-national cooperation, allowing teams of scientists across a vast range of fields to integrate huge data sets, and via computer simulations, project atmospheric effects out into the coming decades.28 The portrait of the coming century that the IPCC presents, however, is not pretty and asks us to seriously rethink industrial age understandings of both progress and catastrophe. The predicted elevation of the global temperature by between two and six degrees by mid-century, the IPCC argues, will create increasingly volatile conditions. The reduction in polar ice will lead to rising ocean levels, which will flood islands and coastal cities worldwide. It will also produce a more acidic ocean leading to vast oceanic dead zones. Similarly, extreme weather patterns (producing regional droughts and flooding) will challenge food production worldwide, while changing habitat zones on a massive scale and enabling new emerging diseases. Moreover, human population growth, potentially rising from 7 to 9 billion people by 2050, will create more consumers, and only increase pressure on the global environment. The resulting ecological stress could exceed what ecologists calculate is the “carrying capacity” of the global biosphere, leading to widespread scarcity or even more shocking ecological destabilizations. The worst-case vision is of future where the food chain collapses, leading to mass starvation and pushing species of all kinds towards extinction. Earth Scientists note that over 99 percent of the life forms that have ever lived on our planet have gone extinct. Extinction is thus not the exception but rather the rule over the long, longue duree of life on planet Earth. The best estimates today are that some four billion species have evolved over the past 3.5 billion years on this planet, almost all to die out. In addition to the process of natural selection in eliminating and promoting particular species, there have been five mass extinction events, periods where due to asteroid collisions or planetary-scale climatic changes, two-thirds or more of all the organisms on Earth have disappeared. In light of the IPCC assessments, there is much discussion today of a sixth mass extinction event—an ongoing shift in the terms of living on our planet drawn from the combined impacts of habitat destruction, pollution, overharvesting, invasive species, and human population growth. This sixth mass extinction will be unique in our planet’s history as it does not arrive in the form of an asteroid collision or volcanic eruption, but rather through the hyperactive work on one indigenous species: people. The industrial age human has become an ecological, even a geological force, constituting a future of fewer species, less biodiversity, and potentially catastrophic disruptions in the food chain.29 Climate change thus now posits a vision of end-times that rivals that of the nuclear danger, as the incremental and cumulative effects of human industry have foundationally shifted the atmospheric chemistry on our planet, setting off a reverberating chain of effects throughout the biosphere. But if the global nuclear danger is characterized by its shocking immediacy, climate danger works on an opposite temporality, constituting a slower violence that is treacherous precisely because it is so incremental that it is difficult in any given moment to sense a change in the environment or to connect discreet issues (such as, sea level or drought or violent weather) to industrially generated greenhouse gas emissions. It is a cumulative and momentum driven process, operating on so vast a scale that it raises basic questions about human perception, memory, and the terms of visualization appropriate for a planetary problem. In light of climate change, geologists are now debating how to sequence planetary time to recognize the effects of human industry. The professional geological societies are formally contemplating the adoption of the term “anthropocene” to designate the era of human impacts on the planet, a startling recognition of a new agentive force on Earth; as leading advocates of the concept put it: The advent of the Anthropocene, the time interval in which human activities now rival global geophysical processes, suggests that we need to fundamentally alter our relationship with the planet we inhabit. Many approaches could be adopted, ranging from geoengineering solutions that purposefully manipulate parts of the Earth System to becoming active stewards of our own life support system. The Anthropocene is a reminder that the Holocene, during which complex human societies have developed, has been a stable, accommodating environment and is the only state of the Earth System that we know for sure can support contemporary society. The need to achieve effective planetary stewardship is urgent. As we go further into the Anthropocene, we risk driving the Earth System into a trajectory toward more hostile states from which we cannot easily return.30 Geoengineering, life support systems, planetary stewardship—these are the terms of a new kind of emergency, one that operates on a total environmental scale. The 10,000-plus years of the Holocene emerges as a temporary atmospheric condition on planet Earth, one particularly beneficial to humans, who, living in that special air, rose to become the dominant species, inventing agriculture, writing, cars, computers, and atomic bombs in the process. Our concept of the planet is now fundamentally shifting, from literally the stable ground under our feet, unchangeable in its nature, to a “lifeboat” in hostile waters, underscoring that the fragile environmental envelope on which we depend is changing under accumulated industrial stresses. Historian Dipesh Chakrabarty has pointed out how climate change merges human history with natural history, creating a new kind of temporality that radically undercuts longstanding logics of economic progress and development.31 This collapsing of human time into geological time forces us to think on unfamiliar scales—such as, the planet—and to think not of populations and nation-states but species level human impacts (earth systems of air, ice, water, and geology). Thus, climate change as a collective problem challenges our political, economic and industrial orders, requiring not only a reverse engineering of global infrastructure to prevent a deepening ecological crisis, but also new conceptual structures. Here, the built universe of things and the desires that organize our consumption patterns are revealed to be literally catastrophic. The petrochemical economy that has revolutionized human society has unintentionally generated an unprecedented global environmental crisis, one that transforms the smallest of everyday activities—driving in a car or eating a hamburger—into a new kind of end-times. Hamburgers, the quintessential American fast food, are ruinous for the planet. In fact, geologists now use the global proliferation of McDonald’s restaurants as an index of anthropocenic environmental change.32 Every aspect of the mass-produced burger—from the management of cattle to the global supply chains to the plastic containers—is now a planetary force. Here, the catastrophic is revealed to be not just an external threat—an asteroid or foreign attack—it is now coded into tastes, desires, and naturalized modes of consumption. The everyday consumption patterns of each person on the planet, unremarkable in their singularity, have become cumulatively destructive in their species totality. This makes the basic requirements for human life (including food, transportation, heating, clothing) fundamentally dangerous to the future stability of the climate as they are embedded in a petrochemical economy. The virtues of modernization, globalization, and technology have thus been turned upside down by climate change: rather than extending equality, security, and comfort, these practices are a negative form of geoengineering, putting ever more pressure on the atmospheric “lifeboat” on which we depend. McDonald’s Big Mac now joins the atomic bomb as an existential threat to the collective future. How could such a calamity—with so many vectors of change—appear so suddenly in American life, challenging twenty-first century society simultaneously to reinvent economy, consumption, and governance? Climate change has, of course, been a scientific concern for decades, emerging from the data sets and theories of Cold War earth sciences.33 Indeed, one can find speculations about radical climate change from the mid-twentieth century that are eerie from a contemporary point of view.34 Consider Frank Capra’s 1958 educational film, Unchained Goddess, part of The Bell Laboratory Science Series, a post-Sputnik campaign to interest Americans in scientific careers hosted by literary professor Frank Baxter.35 The film, which merges cartoon characters, experts, actors, and documentary footage, presents an overview of meteorology but ends with a disturbing hypothesis about the future (see Figure 1.3). After a discussion of the possibility of weather modification and control, Baxter cautions: Extremely dangerous questions, because with our present knowledge we have no idea what would happen. Even now Man may be unwittingly changing the world’s climate through the waste products of his civilization. Due to our release through our factories and automobiles every year of more than six billion tons of carbon dioxide, which helps air absorb heat from the sun, our atmosphere seems to be getting warmer … It’s been calculated that a few degrees rise in the earth’s temperature would melt the polar ice caps. And if this happens, an inland sea would fill a good portion of the Mississippi Valley. Tourists in glass bottom boats would be viewing the grand towers of Miami through 150-feet of tropical water. For in weather we are not only dealing with forces of a far greater variety than even the atomic physicists encounters but with life itself. Without air and water, which are weather, Man would never have appeared on this small planet earth. There would be no sky, no ocean, no fields, no forests, nothing but a barren rock rotating in an airless void. Tourists in glass bottom boats over Miami. So what was part of a basic public survey of climatology in 1958 has suddenly become a collective emergency in the twenty-first century. The privileging of economy and nuclear threat over all other concerns in the second half of the twentieth century required a subsuming of climate danger, with mounting consequences. Thus, the environment emerges here as a problem not just of knowledge but also of perception, not just of understanding but also of collective memory. Catastrophe’s apocalypse is to recognize the human agency not only in producing anthropogenic changes in the environment but also in mystifying and occluding those understandings while the problem intensifies. Given the scale of environmental crisis, one of the immediate problems concerns its visualization and narration—of how to make hyper-complex, planetary dangers intelligible to nonexperts. We do not yet have a popular culture of climate change to match that of the nuclear danger, but it is emerging. J.C. Chandor’s 2013 film, All Is Lost, offers a disciplined start to such an endeavor.36 The plot is simple: a seventy-something white American male (played by Robert Redford) is alone, “somewhere in the Indian Ocean,” sleeping comfortably in his sailboat when an errant shipping container afloat in the open ocean ruptures the hull. After attempting to patch the hole, he endures a massive storm and is forced onto an inflatable lifeboat when the sailboat sinks. Drifting into shipping lanes, he repeatedly tries to signal gigantic freighters (stacked with the kind of containers that damaged his ship) for help, but they pass him by unnoticed, completely indifferent to his plight. Eight traumatic days later, out of supplies and hope, he sees a light on the nighttime horizon that might be a small boat, he accidently ignites his lifeboat in hopes of drawing attention to his plight and watches from underneath the water as his sole means of shelter goes up in flames. The last frames of the film are of a hand from a small rescue boat reaching down into the ocean offering our protagonist one last chance for survival, which he swims towards. A story with one character, known simply as “Our Man,” and only two real words of dialog—“help” (thrown in vain at shipping vessels) and a singular “fuck” (when the situation turns irrevocable)—the story is ultimately about the fragility of all lifeboats. Our Man is the quintessential master of industry. He is likely retired and wealthy enough to own the boat. He is also a man of action, both able and strong. When problems appear he does not complain or hesitate but responds with a learned confidence (even taking time to shave before the giant storm hits). He does not make any real mistakes. The weather and ocean are simply too strong for his technology, which continually breaks down, but it is more than bad luck. It is as if his vision of danger is out of synch with the universe he now inhabits and despite his best efforts and seriousness, his world falls apart. The story can also be read as an illustration of the indifference of global capital to individual suffering: the shipping container that strikes his boat is carrying children’s sneakers, a marker of the global industrial trade and not unlike the shoes Our Man is also wearing. His boat is filled with consumer products promising comfort and safety that ultimately prove insufficient. He is the big man rendered small in the face of linked planetary forces—capitalism and climate. The film begins almost at the end of his story, with a voice over reading of a note Our Man puts in a jar and tosses into the ocean, a last message to his family and friends, set adrift in hopes of finding a reader: 13th of July, 4:50pm. I’m sorry … I know that means little at this point, but I am. I tried. I think you all agree that I tried: to be true, to be strong, to be kind, to love, to be right. But I wasn’t. And I know you knew this, in each of your ways. And I am sorry. All is lost here … except for soul and body … that is what’s left of them … and a half-day’s ration. It’s inexcusable really. I know that now. How it could have taken this long to admit that I’m not sure, but it did. I fought until the end, I’m not sure what that is worth, but know that I did. I have always hoped for more for you all. I will miss you. I’m sorry. The embarrassment in the face of calamity here is the high note of the film. A man who is in control—and might well be part of the American elite that built the global infrastructure of neoliberal capitalism and petrochemical industry—loses that control when his technology fails in the face of global and planetary forces. He should have known better (given the obvious violence of global capital) but instead trusted his abilities and technology and resourcefulness. The global market is weaponized here in the form of the shipping container and the uncaring transport ships. A powerful storm—potentially amplified by climate change, a side effect of the petrochemical economy—merely finishes the job, leaving Our Man sinking in the open sea, to contemplate his decisions and fate. We do not know how far into the future the film is set—or if Our Man’s boat is traveling over any flooded cities as predicted in the Unchained Goddess—but the fragility of the environment that supports human life on planet Earth is underscored in every frame. Our Man’s message in a bottle is thus a profound projection of what we all might say in a few decades. It is an insufficient, if heartfelt, apology for embracing an economic form that offered short-term comfort in exchange for amplifying future dangers, and that abandons individuals increasingly to the uncontrollable and violent forces of capital/climate.

### Extinction Impacts

#### Securitization is essential to survival because it brings attention to existential threats and demands immediate action

Masua 22 (Robinson Masua Ph.D Student, Department of Security and Correction Science, School of Security, Diplomacy and Peace Studies, Kenyatta University. “Security is about survival: assessment of the assumption underlying the securitization theory”. Shikshan Sanshodhan : Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences. April 4, 2022 http://shikshansanshodhan.researchculturesociety.org/wp-content/uploads/SS202204003.pdf) //BK

Securitization is one of the most talked about, contested and revised concept of theoretical framework in Security Studies and specifically in Critical Security Studies. According to Williams, (2003), the concept is connected with the Copenhagen School and is seen as a synthesis of constructivist and classical political realism in its approach. Buzan and Weaver defined securitization as: a successful speech act through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 491). According to Lieven (2020, pp. 6-9), securitization begins with a speech act concerning a particular threat, by an authoritative national leader, institution, or party. The speech act attempts to shift the threat from normal politics into a security concern, thereby legitimating extraordinary measures to contain the threat. Securitization is a process-oriented conception of security, which stands in contrast to materialist approaches of classical security studies. Classical approaches of security focus on the material dispositions of the threat including distribution of power, military capabilities, and polarity, whereas securitization examines how a certain issue is transformed by an actor into a matter of security in order to allow for the use of extraordinary measures. Moreover, the securitization act, to be successful, must be accepted by the audience, regardless of the subject matter being a real threat. As Thierry Balzacq puts it: "securitization is a rule-governed practice, the success of which does not necessarily depend on the existence of a real threat, but on the discursive ability to effectively endow a development with such a specific complexion" (Balzacq, 2005). The audience may take several forms including technical, bureaucratic, public, and policymaking, and different audiences can perform different functions by accepting a securitization, as has been explored by (Roe, 2008). Securitization is the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat, which demands urgent and immediate attention, as well as the use of extraordinary measures to counter this threat (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998; Wæver, 1995) Like any other concepts in social science the concept of securitization has been revised and developed but there are still key concepts that has stood time and space. For example, the idea that security is not something real or given, but a process or move that someone applies in order to bring a discussion beyond the realm of everyday politics and to a sphere where extra ordinary, out-of- hand measures ought to be deployed and “actions outside of normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 24) are justified. It is important to note that securitization as a process is different from politicization. According to Buzan, Weaver and Wilde, (1998), a public issue can be politicized once it is discussed in political debate and a politicized issue will subsequently require government decisions based – at least in democracies- on careful consideration of possible odds reflecting logics and features on the individual political system. For that reason, securitized issue is perceived as an issue that constitutes Existential threat to a certain entity be it the state or else and requires extra-ordinary and emergency measures (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998, pp. 23-24). Within politicized issues there is room for debate and the outcome of such debate is generally or better theoretically open. Shikshan Sanshodhan : Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences ISSN: 2581-6241 Monthly, Peer-Reviewed, Refereed, Indexed Journal Impact Factor: 5.146 Volume - 5, Issue - 4, APRIL - 2022 Publication Date: 25/04/2022 Available online on – http://shikshansanshodhan.researchculturesociety.org/ Page 11 On the other hand, securitization demands firm actions and does not offer much room for political choice because it is so urgent that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of political but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 29) In the securitization process the term existential threat is very important as it provides the crucial criterion for analysis of securitization as some authors suggest should be textual analysis (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 29). This idea of labelling a threat as existential means that not only extra ordinary measures outside legal framework as a coercive necessity but also provides a moral or ontological justification for “emergency measures”. The assumption here in is that if the enemy is not stopped or the threat is not contained the most precious feature of a state/society/habitat is at stake and its very existence and survival. Look at the case of Saddam Hussein Iraq and USA invasion in 1993. It was informed by this logic of extentialism of Iraq as a threat to the other neighbouring countries including Kuwait. Buzan, Weaver and Wilde (1998, p. 25) asserts, a securitization must be intersubjective and accompanied by “saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects”. This bring about debate on securitization and political again, that not everyone could perform it as long as it is not successful, that is has a measurable political impact (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998). Also Buzan, Weaver and Wilde, (1998) call it as many securitization moves, which include speech acts performed towards an audience by securitization actor seeking to convince it of existential character of a threat towards referent object. Therefore, the emergency measures should be taken to contain or eliminate the existential threat. Where we have a recurring or pervasive threats to certain referent object, the securitization can become institutionalized. Examples of institutionalized securitization is of a state where it sustains a standing army or relies on the services of its secret agencies and also the dikes preventing large parts of the Netherlands from being flooded which are a commonly agreed upon feature of the Dutch security (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 28). Figure 1: The Securitization Process. Source: (Emmmers, 2010, p. 138). According to Buzan, Weaver and Wilde (1998, p. 24), the securitization process is a three-way process- can go either side or come from one side to the other in the cycle. That an issue can either be non-politicized (the state does not deal with it, and it is not an issue in the public debate)- de-securitization, politicized (an issue that is part of public debate and policy) or securitized (an issue that is presented as an existential threat, and can be dealt with using measures outside normal politics), and that ‘any issue can end up on any part of the spectrum’ (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 24) . So apart from security issue being securitized as shown on above figure, or after being securitized it can be de-securitized again. Therefore, de-securitizations are processes ‘in which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for exceptional measures to deal with the threat’ stated by Buzan and Waever, cited in (Coskun, 2008, p. 405). Thus, the key aim of (de)securitization theory is to identify what, when, where and how an issue is moved from being part of the normal environment of politics to become a threat to security and beyond normal politics – and the other way around (Snetkov, 2017).

## Thesis Indicts – Securitization Theory Wrong

### Realism Good – NATO

#### Realism is the only way to ensure US and NATO security – Countries will not stop in pursuit of cyberattacks on a military scale.

Daricili and Celik 21 (A. Burak Daricili, Case Officer in the Department of Intelligence and Security; Soner Celik, of Suleymen Demirel University, “National Security 2.0: The Cyber Security of Critical Infrastructure,” Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs. https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/2181981) //AA

Intellectuals such as Thomas Hobbes, Niccolò Machiavelli and Jean-Jacques Rousseau had a pessimistic perspective that can be applied to the ways in which national security needs to be understood. Those intellectuals accepted the international system as an area where states continuously fight with each other to pursue their own selfish interests. For this reason, it is impossible to establish universal peace, as the Idealists desire. This line of reasoning is accepted by Realists such as Carr and Hans Morgenthau; in their view, the only way to prevent a state from becoming a hegemon in the international system, where there is a constant conflict of interests among states, is for states to balance each other’s power.11 The pessimistic viewpoint of classical Realists is accepted by neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, according to whom security or insecurity is a result of the anarchic nature of the international system on a large scale. Therefore, international policy will continuously sustain a tendency to violence.12 The Realist political approach accepts states as the main actors of the international system; since the interests of each country differ from each other, there is always the possibility of war, and some kind of conflict or fighting is inevitable. The Realist approach defines the international system as anarchic, and characterizes international policy as a power struggle in which security is the main agenda item in the realm of international relations. In this respect, the security concept for Realist theoreticians is discussed through “insecurity” in general terms, and this theoretic approach is explained via themes of power, threat and insecurity. Cyberspace-based developments, today, propose new approaches to states’ threat, security and deterrence agendas. Some states have even begun to see cyber attack and cyber conflict as important methods of engaging in strategic defense and inflicting damage on their opponents. Developments in cyberspace bring along new security risks; the importance of removing these risks has thus also increased, compelling states to develop strategies to address this issue. For Realist theorists, this makes the international system even more uncertain and anarchic than before, especially given that cyber attacks can be caused not merely by states but by individuals.13 In Realist terms, the diversification of risks to cyberspace resources, and the inability to determine the source of these risks, deepens the anarchic structure of the international system. A cyberspace attacker can hide his or her identity by using various forms of crypto software and programs. The attacker can even conduct a “false flag”14 operation, making it appear that the source of the cyber attack is another state or a state-sponsored hacker group by using similar software. All of these circumstances deepen the insecurity of the international system and reinforce the mutual distrust between states. Power struggle and competition in the international system have expanded into a new dimension thanks to internet-based developments. Many states have used these technologies as an opportunity to develop their hard power. Improving military power with the help of cyber-based technology and skill has become an important goal for these states. Allocating budgets, making investments, training experts and establishing cyber military commands in tandem with conventional army development are now essential for states in order to reach a powerful attack and defense capacity in cyberspace.15 All of these developments contribute to what Realists call the “security dilemma,” a phenomenon whereby “many of the instruments that are used by a state to increase its security decrease the security of others.”16 And it is ongoing. When one state makes a military investment or takes a military measure, this is taken as a threat by another state, which then applies similar measures, which in turn are interpreted by other states as a threat. The threat perceptions of states vis-à-vis one another escalate, in some cases leading to an armament race with mutual measures taken back and forth.17 Based on the security dilemma concept, states evaluate international relations as a zero-sum game, and plan their behavior patterns in the international system based on the assumption of relative earnings. They also avoid cooperation by asking the question, “who will benefit more?” instead of, “how can we both profit?” As indicated above, the Realist approach adopts a competitive and confrontational security perspective on the axis of anarchy. Given the rigidity of this perspective, the limitations and difficulties of cooperation in the Realist paradigm come into prominence. Because the structure of the international system is anarchic, according to this approach, this insecure environment prevents states from cooperating in the long term,18 a situation exacerbated by the anonymous structure of cyberspace and its accompanying uncertainties, which diversify and deepen risks. Concerning all these evaluations, the mentality that has started to gain credence recently is that critical infrastructure is an inseparable part of a state’s cybersecurity and thus its cybersecurity strategies. This perspective is clearly emphasized in the national cybersecurity documents of many states. For example, Turkey’s National Cyber Security Strategy (2020–2023) Document states, “Cybersecurity is an inseparable part of national security. Providing national security in an absolute manner depends on achieving [our] goals in the cybersecurity field.”19 As mentioned above, the security of critical infrastructure and information systems that are mostly managed by internet technologies has become vital to the security of any state. States, now, are aware that cyber attacks targeting critical structures can be a serious threat, and that such attacks can negatively affect their political, economic and military security.

### **Reality Shapes Discourse**

#### Discourse doesn't shape reality

Riley et al, 07 (Dr Wendy Sims-Schouten: Deputy Director of Arts & Sciences and Associate Professor at University College London, Chartered Member of the British Psychological Society; Sarah Riley: Professor in Critical Health Psychology at Massey University, New Zealand; Carla Willig: professor of psychology at University of London, associate editor of the Journal of Health Psychology, member of the editorial board of Qualitative Research in Psychology; sage Journals; February 1, 2007; “Critical Realism in Discourse Analysis: A Presentation of a Systematic Method of Analysis Using Women's Talk of Motherhood, Childcare and Female Employment as an Example” https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0959354307073153 ) //KM

In critical realism, language is understood as constructing our social realities. However, these constructions are theorized as being shaped by the possibilities and constraints inherent in the material world. For critical realists, material practices are given an ontological status that is independent of, but in relation with, discursive practices. The advantage in taking a critical realist, rather than relativist, approach is that analysis can include relationships between people's material conditions and discursive practices. Despite calls to develop a critical realist discourse analysis there has been little empirical critical realist work, possibly because few have addressed the critique that critical realists have no systematic method of distinguishing between discursive and non-discursive. In this article we outline a three-stage procedure that enables a systematic critical realist discourse analysis using women's talk of motherhood, childcare and female employment as an example.

### Securitization Theory Too Limited

#### Securitization theory is flawed – scope too limited to be useful for accurately analyzing geopolitical developments beyond the West

Masua ’22 (Robinson Masua Ph.D Student, Department of Security and Correction Science, School of Security, Diplomacy and Peace Studies, Kenyatta University. “Security is about survival: assessment of the assumption underlying the securitization theory”. Shikshan Sanshodhan : Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences. April 4, 2022 http://shikshansanshodhan.researchculturesociety.org/wp-content/uploads/SS202204003.pdf) //CD

The Securitization theory in security studies is applauded because of its widening concept of security analysis from the traditional military and positivist approach that security is real and we need real methodologies to deal with it. But besides its strengths in security studies it has found some serious criticism both in its function as a paradigm for analysing security processes and in overcoming the normative dilemma of analysing contemporary global security. The approach to securitization has often been criticized for being too limited, too focused upon the speech act and thus not serving a useful purpose in the study of real world situations (Balzacq, 2005; Stritzel, 2007; McDonald, 2008). It therefore falls short of referring to non-speech acts and practices (i.e. body language, visual representations in media) in the process of securitization. The main criticism is that of being a Eurocentric approach to security. For example, Wilkinson (2007), describes the case of Kyrgyzstan to show that the securitization theory is unable to sufficiently account for developments beyond the West for two reasons: First, she says, the theory takes it for granted ‘that European understandings of society and the state are universal’. Wilkinson sates that theorists within the Copenhagen School must explicitly question normative concepts such as state and society. Second, the theory’s emphasis on the speech act may be unsuited to non-Western contexts where limitations to speech exist, and where securitization may take place through other means, including action. Realists have also argued that the securitization theory widening of the security agenda risks giving the discipline of security studies "intellectual incoherence". For any paradigm to retain its theoretical precision and utility, and having in mind not everything can be defined as a security issue, as well as to remain engaged with the existing contentious definition of what is security, Wæver discusses the apprehension towards redefining security until the concept becomes meaningless and the analyst is no longer able to discuss operations of security working within a specific field (Wæver, 1995, pp. 48-49, 56; Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 24). The point is that the securitization theory is too broad in definition of security and actually as scholars we end up not being sure not differentiating security, human development and sustainable development. The other problem of the securitization theory is the assumption of a normal state of politics that can be distinguished from exceptional measures, especially separation of politics and society. Holbraad and Pedersen (2012), argues that revolutionary Cuba provides a case of a non-liberal non-Western state where the liberal assumptions underpinning Copenhagen School cannot explain fully the separation of the two- politics and society. They posit that the liberal distinction between the state and society collapses in a revolutionary ontology, with revolutionary states assuming themselves to be the people. Thus, rules and exceptions cease to exist for a revolutionary state because the state is society (Holbraad & Pederson, 2012). The Securitization theory assumes a basic level of stability and cannot therefore be applied to exceptional situations where there is no such thing as normal politics. A good example is the work of Greenwood and Weaver Shikshan Sanshodhan : Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences ISSN: 2581-6241 Monthly, Peer-Reviewed, Refereed, Indexed Journal Impact Factor: 5.146 Volume - 5, Issue - 4, APRIL - 2022 Publication Date: 25/04/2022 Available online on – http://shikshansanshodhan.researchculturesociety.org/ Page 17 (2013), who test the paradigm in the context of Egypt during the Arab Spring. They point out that the Arab Uprisings separated regimes from societies in a number of states, toppling previously embedded authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. In other states, regimes framed protesting groups as existential threats, reconstructing the nature of political organization amidst the conflation of domestic and regional, normative and geopolitical agendas.

## Threats Real – Specific Scenarios

### AI Tech Race

#### The international security is currently at high risk, especially as countries compete to make breakthroughs in AI.

Schmidt 22 - Eric Schmidt, a Fellow of the American Academy since 2007, is the former Chief Executive Officer of Google and former Executive Chairman and Technical Advisor of Alphabet, Inc. He is also a Founder of the Schmidt Foundation, the Schmidt Ocean Institute, and Schmidt Futures. He is the Chair of the Special Competitive Studies Project and was the Chairman of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence from 2019 to 2021. (Eric Schmidt, “AI, Great Power Competition & National Security”, 5-1-22, <https://direct.mit.edu/daed/article/151/2/288/110603/AI-Great-Power-Competition-amp-National-Security>)

Breakthroughs in AI are accelerating global commercial competition and transforming the international security environment. The reach and influence of foreign-based network platforms present risks to American society and require us to confront questions about their origin and purpose. Meanwhile, AI technologies are enhancing several existing national security threats, and will change the way states try to gain leverage against adversaries and exercise coercion and influence in other societies. The open nature of free and democratic societies, combined with their increasing reliance on poorly secured digital networks, makes them especially vulnerable. In the military realm, AI holds the prospect of augmenting cyber, conventional, and nuclear capabilities in ways that make security relationships among rivals more challenging to predict and maintain, and conflicts more difficult to limit. Even as they compete, rivals should explore limits on AI capabilities. The AI ecosystems of the principal global competitors, the United States and China, remain intertwined, and a calibration of the bilateral technology relationship requires both selective decoupling and continued collaboration in areas of mutual interest. These changes require a comprehensive national strategy for the next decade that preserves global leadership advantages for America's economy and security.

The second decade of the twenty-first century featured two major developments that, together, are shaping the third decade we have now entered. The geopolitical landscape is marked by intensifying competition between the United States and its major power rivals, China and Russia. At the same time, the scientific landscape is characterized by significant advances in artificial intelligence, which promise tremendous economic and strategic advantages for those who capitalize on them.

### China AI

#### Empirical evidence shows China is increasing military AI systems to compete with US, showing how the threat is now and prevalent.

Jensen et al, 19 - Benjamin Jensen is an Adjunct Hurst Professorial Lecturer who has taught and helped develop courses on peace, conflict resolution, foreign policy, and strategy at AU since 2006. AND\*\* Christopher Whyte is an assistant professor of homeland security and emergency preparedness. His research interests include a range of international security topics related to the use of information technology in war and peace, political communication and cybersecurity doctrine/policy. AND \*\* LtCol Cuomo next had the opportunity to serve as the Director, Infantry Officer Course. Upon completion of this assignment, he served for two years as an Operational Planner and Ground Combat Element Integration Officer within Headquarters Marine Corps Aviation. (Benjamin M Jensen, Christopher Whyte, Scott Cuomo. “Algorithms at War: The Promise, Peril, and Limits of Artificial Intelligence”. 7-24-2019 https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viz025 )

Artificial intelligence has not only begun to be introduced by states in various spheres of activity, but has also become part of everyday life. China, as an emerging great power, strives to maintain and improve its positions in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) at a rapid pace, with military artificial intelligence as one of its priorities. The article analyzes the activities of the Chinese government aimed at the development of military artificial intelligence systems, examines the existing threats, and also provides recommendations on the use of automated weapons.

The use of artificial intelligence by large states has become one of the main means to achieve dominance on the world stage. Along with the use of automated systems in vital spheres (education, industry, medicine, etc.), achieving economic superiority and improving living standards, artificial intelligence has also become an integral part of warfare and the defense sector. According to statistics, China currently ranks second after the United States in terms of artificial intelligence development, and the global market in this area is growing by 44.5% annually, while the cost of AI development ranges from 1.6 to 2.7 billion dollars, which is approximately equal to the cost of American AI. These data clearly demonstrate that China is striving to compete with the United States in the near future and rise to the highest level of artificial intelligence development. The widespread introduction of artificial intelligence in China has become the national interest of the country and has come to the fore, so the concept of the transition of war from "informational" to "intellectual" has influenced the speed and nature of the development of artificial automated systems [1]. Since 2014, Xi Jinping has been paying particular attention to changes related to the development of military technologies, that is why at the meeting of the Politburo in August the Chinese leader set the goal to develop artificial automated systems in the military sphere for the reformation of the RMA. An important step forward in the development of military AI is considered to be the adoption of the "White Paper" in 2015, namely the Chinese Military Strategy, which refers to a "new stage" in the development of military AI. As part of this, 7 areas were identified in which the PLA is mastering artificial intelligence, where the most popular are intelligence, intelligent and autonomous transport, intelligence and information weapons, as well as automatic target recognition. The turning point in the development of AI in China was the adoption by the State Council of China of the "Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Program" in 2017 in which the main directions of the development of artificial intelligence were highlighted. А plan was developed with the purpose of improving military equipment, making command decisions, as well as increasing funding for paramilitary systems, as Xi Jinping said. This implementation was the first initiative on the national level that is directly focused on the development of paramilitary AI as Chinese common strategy. China has set a benchmark for the Development of its C4ISR among which are command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. At the moment, China has many goals, and, in addition to economic superiority, China also seeks to gain military leadership, which is confirmed by the Communist Party in a report from the Ministry of Defense and Military Power of China for 2020. According to the report, the PLA plans to reach a qualitatively new level of military equipment and warfare, which will be carried out with the aim of conducting a systemic war, as well as the ability to seriously repel hostile neighbors. Conflicts with the Uighurs, unresolved contradictions with Hong Kong and Taiwan, conflicts in the South China Sea - all these problems motivate China to accelerate the pace of development in the military sphere, in particular in the field of AI, as well as to change the approach to warfare.

### China Cyber War

#### Chinese cyber warfare is real – unchecked that makes conflict inevitable

Wu and Duffy 21 (Dr. Benson Wu, Co-Founder & CEO, CyCraft Technology Chad Duffy VP of Strategy, CyCraft Technology CyCraft Technology Corp Is a leading Taiwan-based security provider and specializes in threat-hunting solutions, “China Implicated in Prolonged Supply Chain Attack Targeting Taiwan Financial Sector,” CyCraft Technology Corp on Medium. https://medium.com/cycraft/china-implicated-in-prolonged-supply-chain-attack-targeting-taiwan-financial-sector-264b6a1c3525) //AA

Taipei, Taiwan — 22 February 2022 — CyCraft, a leading managed detection and response (MDR) provider based in Taiwan, uncovered intelligence regarding the November 2021 cyberattacks targeting the Taiwan financial and securities trading sector; CyCraft further attributed the cyberattacks to APT10 — a China state-sponsored hacker group widely believed to be associated with the Chinese Intelligence Agency, the Ministry of State Security (MSS).

The November 2021 attacks were originally attributed to password mismanagement; however, following a security incident response (IR) investigation conducted by CyCraft into the second wave of February 2022 attacks, new evidence uncovered the exploitation of a severe vulnerability in commonly used financial software aided by a newly identified hacking technique, Reflective Code Loading.

CyCraft urges all organizations who may be vulnerable to this attack — especially financial firms who have recently experienced an increase in compromised user credentials — to conduct an immediate, thorough security assessment.

These attacks are the latest in a series of attack campaigns against Taiwan by China-based threat groups. In early 2020, CyCraft curtailed a year-long attack campaign targeting Taiwan’s semiconductor ecosystem; this attack was attributed to another China-based threat group, Chimera. Again, in April 2020, a CyCraft incident response (IR) investigation into a government agency breach uncovered Waterbear malware — malware designed and distributed by the China-based threat group BlackTech.

The frequency of cyberattacks targeting Taiwan institutions surged by 38% in 2021, reaching an average of 2,644 attacks per week, Taiwan News reports. The global average is 925 attacks per week. This disparity is due to Taiwan’s unique geopolitical situation, high-tech economy, and mature communications infrastructure.

First Attack Wave, November 2021

At 5:27 p.m. on Thursday, November 25 of last year, a number of Taiwan financial institutions and securities traders informed the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TWSE) and the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) that they would be suspending online transactions due to suspicious behavior — large, unusual purchases of Hong Kong stocks on consumer trading accounts — as a result of a cyberattack.

After several weeks, the IR investigations theorized that the November attacks were most likely due to password mismanagement and credential stuffing; however, the findings were not conclusive and suggested there may have been other causes.

Credential stuffing attacks leverage poor cyber hygiene habits (i.e., users reusing the same username/password combinations across multiple platforms and websites). Several security countermeasures were taken, including forced password updates and multi-factor authentication.

Second Attack Wave, February 2022

Once again, in mid-February 2022, a number of Taiwan financial institutions and securities traders were targeted — some being victims of the November 2021 attacks and others CyCraft customers. CyCraft MDR/EDR cybersecurity solutions observed suspicious files and login events on customer servers and immediately began investigating. After three days, CyCraft completed their IR investigations.

CyCraft’s three-day IR investigation uncovered that neither the February 2022 nor the November 2021 attacks were solely a direct result of credential stuffing. A more thorough investigation revealed evidence suggesting credential stuffing was purposely left behind by APT10 — credential stuffing was just a smokescreen.

Both attacks were the result of a supply chain attack targeting specific financial software. A vulnerability existing in financial software with a majority market share among Taiwan securities traders was exploited by the attackers, granting them high-level access to multiple firms. Further investigation showed that what was initially presumed to be two separate waves of cyberattacks was actually one prolonged attack campaign in which the attackers leveraged advanced obfuscation techniques not previously observed.

This isn’t the first “smokescreen attack” by a China-based threat group. In April 2020, CyCraft observed a China-based threat group use ransomware as a smokescreen for a targeted attack on the CPC Corporation, as reported by CyCraft and Bloomberg.

“For more than a decade, Chinese hackers have waged a persistent cyber offensive against Taiwanese government, non-government and corporate targets. Taiwan also happens to be home to some of the electronics, semiconductor, and military technology that China desperately wants to get its hands on.”

Bloomberg on smokescreen cyberattack targeting the CPC Corporation

Attack Attribution

Analysis of the attacker C2 domain, the Quasar backdoor malware, and the attacker behavior used in the attacks has led to a high degree of confidence in attributing the attacks to a Chinese threat actor. In the second wave of attacks observed by CyCraft, there is a medium degree of confidence in the attribution of APT10 — a China-based threat group.

The objective of these attacks does not appear to have solely been financial gain but rather the exfiltration of brokerage information, the scraping of high-value PII data, damaging the reputation of Taiwan financial institutions, and the disruption of investor confidence during a period of economic growth for Taiwan.

One of the many attack techniques utilized by APT10 was the new technique “Reflective Code Loading”, which was incorporated into the MITRE ATT&CK framework just last October.

### Hybrid Warfare

#### Hybrid warfare causes securitization – the plan is key to reverse that trend

Unver et.al ’22 (Ozyegin University, Department of International Relations, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University - Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Kurnaz Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University - Department of Political Science and Public Administration “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis”, February 21, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4040148) //CD

Over the last few years, **disinformation, information warfare** and **fake news** have become important **strategic** and **political concepts** in **international relations**(Cour la, 2020; Lanoszka, 2019). Although these terms aren’t new and are as old as the term ‘propaganda’, their mainstream use within the context of digital communication skyrocketed after the 2016 US elections (Grinberg et al., 2019). However even before that, these terms had begun to enter into the foreign policy discourse of NATO countries following the 2014 Russian military operations in Ukraine. Prior to the annexation of Crimea, Russia had already designated information warfare as part of its 2010 Military Doctrine, which was updated again 2014 with a special emphasis on digital communication (Renz, 2014). A year prior, the importance of the digital space for military doctrinal considerations was outlined by General Valery Gerasimov - Russian Chief of the General Staff. In his 2013 article titled ‘The Value of Science is in the Foresight’, Gerasimov wrote: “The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. … All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character.” (Galeotti, 2019) These three texts are generally accepted as the doctrinal basis of modern Russian information operations that were demonstrated both in Ukraine in 2014, and later in Syria, after mid-2015 (Sinovets, Renz, 2015). Since then, strategic communicative actions that are intended to influence, mislead and confuse foreign populations have assumed a central position in global debates about politics and foreign policy. Given the impact of such actions on elections, polarization and crisis management, it was natural for the rhetoric about these actions to assume such a central position(Bradshaw, Howard, 2018). However, over time, popular buzzwords like ‘disinformation/misinformation’, ‘fake news’, and ‘information operations’ have proliferated in global political mainstream discourse and assumed an accusatory nature worldwide as more leaders, diplomats, and politicians have begun using them to discredit and delegitimize their political opponents. This dynamic was later conceptualized as ‘discursive deflection’ (Ross, Rivers, 2018; Smith, 2019) and became acutely visible in the foreign policy domain, as more countries have begun securitizing the concepts **‘fake news’, ‘disinformation’, and ‘information warfare’ to** similarly **discredit, and delegitimize** rival countries(Baum, Potter, 2019). Broadly speaking, ‘discursive-deflection’ is the strategy of discrediting competitors and rivals by portraying oneself as the sole source of truth. While the domestic political use of these terms is well-studied, we are still somewhat in the dark with regard to why countries choose to securitize these terms and what happens in their interactions with other countries when they do so.